Opinion
G062244
12-13-2023
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAIME ENRIQUE BELTRAN, Defendant and Appellant.
Christine M. Aros, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County No. 96HF0884, Lewis W. Clapp, Judge. Affirmed.
Christine M. Aros, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
OPINION
SANCHEZ, J.
Defendant Jaime Enrique Beltran appeals from an order denying his petition for resentencing made pursuant to former Penal Code section 1170.95 (now Pen. Code, § 1172.6). His appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, to inform the court that counsel had found no arguable issues and to request that we exercise our discretion to conduct an independent review of the record. Counsel also suggested we consider whether the trial court erred in concluding defendant was not eligible for resentencing under section 1172.6.
Effective June 30, 2022, Penal Code section 1170.95 was renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Defendant was given the opportunity to file a supplemental brief on his own behalf and was given notice pursuant to People v. Delgadillo that if no supplemental brief was filed, the court might dismiss the appeal as abandoned. Defendant has filed a supplemental brief. Accordingly, we conduct an independent review of the record and address the issues raised by defendant. (People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.) We find no merit in the issues raised by defendant or appointed counsel and therefore affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
An amended information filed in July 1997, alleged that on or about August 14, 1996, defendant committed premeditated attempted murder (§§ 664,187; count 1) and in that defendant committed assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b); count 2). It was further alleged that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7) and personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).
In December 1997, a jury convicted defendant of both counts and found to be true the premeditation, great bodily injury, and firearm allegations. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of life with the possibility of parole, plus 10 years for the firearm enhancement. A panel of this court affirmed the judgment. (People v. Beltran (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 425.)
In May 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. The following month, the prosecution filed a response to the resentencing petition. The prosecution argued defendant had not been convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine and, therefore, was ineligible for resentencing. To the response, the prosecution attached the petition for resentencing (exhibit A), the abstract of judgment (exhibit B), the amended information (exhibit C), the verdict forms (exhibit D), the opinion affirming the judgment (exhibit E), and the jury instructions (exhibit F).
Defendant filed a reply to the prosecution's response. He argued his attempted murder conviction was improperly based on a theory of transferred intent.
The trial court appointed counsel to represent defendant. In September 2022, counsel for defendant filed a brief in support of his petition for resentencing. Counsel argued that the court could not consider the prior opinion to determine whether defendant had made a prima facie case for relief.
In January 2023, a hearing on the petition was held. The trial court denied the petition for resentencing. The court issued a written statement of decision in which the court concluded: (1) Defendant had not been convicted under a theory of imputed malice; (2) the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to attempted murder; and (3) defendant was ineligible for relief as a matter of law because he had not been convicted under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
DISCUSSION
The trial court denied defendant's resentencing petition on the ground defendant had failed to make a prima facie case for resentencing relief. "'A denial at that stage is appropriate only if the record of conviction demonstrates that "the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law." [Citations.] This is a purely legal conclusion, which we review de novo.'" (People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 101.)
Section 1172.6, subdivision (a) states, in relevant part: "A person convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person's participation in a crime, attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner's murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts ...." (Italics added.)
Thus, by its terms, section 1172.6 applies "only to attempted murders based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine." (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548.)
Defendant was not convicted of attempted murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The jury was not instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. "[T]he jury instructions in this case demonstrate, on their face and as a matter of law, that [defendant] was not and could not have been convicted of [attempted murder] under the natural and probable consequences doctrine." (People v. Soto (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1055.)
In his supplemental brief, defendant argues he made a prima facie case for relief because "the record of conviction in this case clearly establishes that the prosecutor unambiguously argued a transferred intent theory of attempted murder liability, i.e., that specific intent could be found as long as [defendant] fired the gun 'at somebody.'" But as the trial court explained, the jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 8.66, the instructions did not differentiate between an intended and unintended victim, and the jury was not instructed on transferred intent, which does not apply to attempted murder. (People v. Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 317.) The trial court correctly concluded, "As such, [defendant] fails to establish that he was convicted under a theory where malice was improperly imputed to him based on his participation in another offense." More fundamentally, relief under section 1172.6 for attempted murder is available only when the conviction is based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
"[T]the doctrine of transferred intent applies when the defendant intends to kill one person but mistakenly kills another. The intent to kill the intended target is deemed to transfer to the unintended victim so that the defendant is guilty of murder." (People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 317.)
Defendant also makes arguments related to the fact he was a juvenile at the time the crimes were committed. Juvenile offender status is not a ground for relief under section 1172.6.
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: GOETHALS, ACTING P. J. MOTOIKE, J.