People v. Beller

76 Citing cases

  1. People v. Miller

    96 Ill. 2d 385 (Ill. 1983)   Cited 12 times
    In People v. Miller (1983), 96 Ill.2d 385, 450 N.E.2d 322, our supreme court noted the contradiction between Beller and Fletcher but found it unnecessary to resolve the differing principles.

    They therefore characterize the issue as involving the propriety of cross-examining a defendant as to his post-arrest silence, in the absence of the Miranda-warning assurances. The State primarily cites Fletcher v. Weir (1982), 455 U.S. 603, 607, 71 L.Ed.2d 490, 494, 102 S.Ct. 1309, 1312, for the proposition that, where a defendant does not receive Miranda warnings, it does not violate "due process of law for a State to permit cross-examination as to postarrest silence when a defendant chooses to take the stand." The defendant relies on People v. Beller (1979), 74 Ill.2d 514, in which this court determined that the Doyle rule, prohibiting comment on a defendant's post-arrest silence, is applicable whether or not Miranda warnings have been given. Because we find that defendant did receive the Miranda warnings in the instant case, it is unnecessary to resolve the differing principles set forth in Fletcher and Beller. We note initially that the parties' contentions assumed a different posture during oral argument.

  2. People v. Lucas

    88 Ill. 2d 245 (Ill. 1981)   Cited 109 times

    ( 426 U.S. 610, 618, 49 L.Ed.2d 91, 98, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2245.) This court expressed agreement with the rationale of the Doyle majority in People v. Beller (1979), 74 Ill.2d 514. We hold that the Doyle rule applied, even absent any evidence that the defendant had been given Miranda warnings.

  3. People v. Jones

    240 Ill. App. 3d 213 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)   Cited 4 times

    ) In other words, a defendant's silence may merely be his invoking of his constitutional right as opposed to an admission that he has no explanation or defense. ( Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617, 49 L.Ed.2d at 97, 96 S.Ct. at 2244; People v. Monaghan (1976), 40 Ill. App.3d 322, 326, 352 N.E.2d 295, 298.) Illinois courts have closely followed Doyle and explicitly held that the rule is applicable even if it appears that defendant has not been advised of his Miranda rights. ( People v. Beller (1979), 74 Ill.2d 514, 521, 386 N.E.2d 857, 860.) There are, however, exceptions to the Doyle rule.

  4. People v. Chriswell

    133 Ill. App. 3d 458 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)   Cited 12 times
    Concluding that "a defendant may not be cross-examined regarding his post-arrest silence unless the defendant's trial testimony is inconsistent with the pretrial statements that were made to police"

    The court noted that while there was some inconsistency concerning the involvement of a car, that inconsistency did not impeach, through its inconsistency, the defendant's shelter defense offered at trial. Similarly, in People v. Beller (1979), 74 Ill.2d 514, 386 N.E.2d 857, the court held that the prosecution had improperly commented upon a defendant's failure to tell police his exculpatory story upon arrest. In so holding, the court noted that the pretrial statement the defendant made in that case was not inconsistent with his subsequent trial testimony.

  5. People v. Zenner

    396 N.E.2d 1107 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 5 times

    While the import of his testimony as to this statement on cross-examination is not entirely clear, we are satisfied that it did not so nullify the direct testimony as to render prosecutorial reliance upon the latter in closing argument improper, insofar as a definite inconsistency with defendant's statement to Locallo was disclosed. See People v. Beller (1979), 74 Ill.2d 514, 525, 386 N.E.2d 857; People v. Sinclair (1963), 27 Ill.2d 505, 509, 190 N.E.2d 298; and People v. Kent (1973), 15 Ill. App.3d 523, 526, 305 N.E.2d 42. • 3 In his closing argument defense counsel himself commented upon defendant's pretrial statements, asserting their mutual consistency.

  6. People v. Wendt

    283 Ill. App. 3d 947 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)   Cited 26 times
    In Wendt, the defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and aggravated battery and was sentenced according to the plea agreement.

    However, a defendant may not challenge an agreed sentence where the trial court exercised no discretion in imposing the sentence. People v. Soles, 226 Ill. App.3d 944, 946-47 (1992); see also People v. Goodbrake, 255 Ill. App.3d 833, 837 (5th Dist. 1994); People v. Terneus, 239 Ill. App.3d 669, 674 (4th Dist. 1992); People v. Beller, 54 Ill. App.3d 1053, 1063 (5th Dist. 1977), aff'd, 74 Ill.2d 514 (1979). The Appellate Court, Fifth District, and the Appellate Court, Fourth District, have expressly held that a defendant who agrees to accept a specific sentence as part of a negotiated plea may not challenge the length of that sentence.

  7. People v. Homes

    274 Ill. App. 3d 612 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)   Cited 26 times
    In Homes, the State explicitly and consistently argued that Homes intended to kill Shelly, but missed and shot another person, Moore, by accident.

    Similarly, Doyle does not apply to a cross-examination regarding actual prior inconsistent statements because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain silent. Anderson v. Charles (1980), 447 U.S. 404, 408, 65 L. Ed. 2d 222, 226, 100 S. Ct. 2180, 2182. Defendant improperly relies on People v. Beller (1979), 74 Ill.2d 514, 521-22, 386 N.E.2d 857, which extended the Doyle rule to situations where there is no evidence that the defendant had been given Miranda warnings. Three years after Beller was decided, the United States Supreme Court held in Fletcher (455 U.S. at 607, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 494, 102 S. Ct. at 1312) that there is no due process violation when a defendant is cross-examined regarding his post-arrest silence if Miranda warnings had not been given.

  8. People v. Watkins

    606 N.E.2d 254 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)   Cited 6 times
    In People v. Watkins, 238 Ill. App.3d 253 (1992), the trial court denied the defendant's request to reopen proofs where he sought to introduce police testimony to perfect the impeachment of a State witness.

    " Defendant contends that his constitutional rights were violated because it is improper for the State to introduce evidence of a defendant's post-arrest silence whether he has been given Miranda warnings or not. ( Doyle v. Ohio (1976), 426 U.S. 610, 49 L.Ed.2d 91, 96 S.Ct. 2240; People v. Beller (1979), 74 Ill.2d 514, 386 N.E.2d 857.) Defendant in Doyle maintained for the first time at trial that he was framed. The prosecutor tried to impeach that defendant by asking him why he failed to tell the police that he was framed when he was arrested.

  9. People v. Little

    223 Ill. App. 3d 264 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 7 times

    ( Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619 n. 11, 49 L.Ed.2d at 98 n. 11, 96 S.Ct. at 2245 n. 11.) (See also People v. Beller (1979), 74 Ill.2d 514, 522.) Thus, the State may comment on post-arrest silence if the defendant at trial falsely claims that he also gave his exculpatory statement to the police when arrested, and he may be impeached with evidence that he did not do so. ( People v. Adams (1981), 102 Ill. App.3d 1129, 1132, citing People v. Rehbein (1978), 74 Ill.2d 435, 441-42.

  10. People v. Smith

    158 Ill. App. 3d 595 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 11 times
    In People v. Smith, 158 Ill. App.3d 595, 110 Ill.Dec. 593, 598, 511 N.E.2d 770, 775 (1987), a prosecutor's assertion to the jury that they must find every State witness was lying before believing the defendant was not reversible error.

    The crucial inquiry remains whether there is a threshold inconsistency between the defendant's post-arrest silence and his subsequent trial testimony. ( People v. Green (1979), 74 Ill.2d 444, 386 N.E.2d 272; People v. Beller (1979), 74 Ill.2d 514, 386 N.E.2d 857; People v. Rehbein (1978), 74 Ill.2d 435, 386 N.E.2d 39.) In Rehbein the defendant was charged with giving a woman a ride in his car, then driving to an isolated area and sexually assaulting her. Police traced defendant by the license number that the complainant had noted on his car.