Clearly, the code sections are concerned not with just a driver and not with just a vehicle, but with the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident. ( People v. Bellah, 237 Cal.App.2d 122, 126 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 598]; People v. Foreman, 205 Cal.App.2d 485, 488 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 925].) While it is true, as defendant argues, a court cannot, by an extension of the language of a statute, make something a crime which the Legislature has not defined as criminal, it is also true that a court, in interpreting legislation of this character, looks at the evil which the statute is designed to remedy.
In recognition of the fact that blood test evidence should be equally available to prove innocence as well as guilt, it has been held to be a denial of due process to deny one accused of being under the influence of intoxicating liquor a reasonable opportunity to procure a timely sample of his blood at his own expense. ( In re Newbern, 175 Cal.App.2d 862 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 80, 78 A.L.R.2d 901]; see In re Howard, 208 Cal.App.2d 709 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 590], and cases therein cited; People v. Bellah, 237 Cal.App.2d 122, 127, 128 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 598].) In People v. Huber, 232 Cal.App.2d 663 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 65], in which the factual situation was similar to the instant case, the court also upheld the right to extract a blood sample, relying ". . . primarily upon the `emergency' and `exceptional circumstances' rule applied in both federal and state courts" (p. 673), and stated at page 670, as follows: "We view the circumstances surrounding the withdrawal of the blood sample in the light of the known facts `that the intoxicating effect of alcohol diminishes with the passage of time' ( In re Martin, 58 Cal.2d 509, 512 [ 24 Cal.Rptr. 833, 374 P.2d 801]), the `scientific reliability of blood alcohol test', `to exonerate, as well as to convict' . . . ( People v. Duroncelay, 48 Cal.2d 766, 770-771 [ 312 P.2d 690]), as establishing such `emergency' and `exceptional circumstances' as would justify the officer's conduct in the absence of a warrant, consent or arrest."
At the time the subject question was asked no Miranda warning was required. (See also People v. Bellah (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 122, 126-127 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 598].) There being no unlawful fruit of any Miranda violation, the suppression motion was properly denied.
" (Italics added; see also Gilbert v. California (1967) 388 U.S. 263, 267 [18 L.Ed.2d 1178, 1183, 87 S.Ct. 1951].) In People v. Bellah (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 122, 127 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 598], decided before the enactment of section 13353, the court said that a suspect, in deciding whether to take a field sobriety test, "was scarcely in need of legal advice in reaching that decision." With respect to the delay in taking the test which would result from compliance with the condition imposed by respondent, the Department cites the well-established rule that the probative value of a chemical test for intoxication diminishes with the passage of time.
( Citizens Utilities Co. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal.2d 805, 814 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 316, 382 P.2d 356].) We note that the accused has no right to counsel while committing a crime ( People v. Sogoian, 232 Cal.App.2d 430 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 736]; People v. Candelario, 239 Cal.App.2d 68 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 494]; People v. Ayers, 237 Cal.App.2d 351 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 878]; Grier v. United States, 345 F.2d 523); nor during a traffic stop investigation ( People v. Jackson, 164 Cal.App.2d 759 [ 331 P.2d 63]; People v. Beverly, 200 Cal.App.2d 119 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 67]); nor during the "field" sobriety test administered to one suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol or narcotics ( People v. Bellah, 237 Cal.App.2d 122, 127 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 598]). The admission of blood test evidence does not violate the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, ( People v. Haeussler, 41 Cal.2d 252, 257 [ 260 P.2d 8]) and taking a blood sample incident to a lawful arrest and in a medically approved manner does not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure ( People v. Duroncelay, 48 Cal.2d 766, 771 [ 312 P.2d 690]), or a coerced confession ( People v. Sudduth, 65 Cal.2d 543 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 393, 421 P.2d 401]; People v. Graves, 64 Cal.2d 208 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 386, 411 P.2d 114]; People v. Dinkins, 242 Cal.App.2d 892, 903 [ 52 Cal.Rptr. 134]).
Although appellant did, of course, give his name when he was encountered by the police, his departure without having provided it to the victim could be regarded as having completed the offense. (See People v. Bellah, 237 Cal.App.2d 122 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 598].) Appellant had been instructed by Reed not to go away and although Reed did not have the authority of a police officer, he was so far in command of the situation that appellant, in his attempt to excuse the fact that he, appellant, did not render direct aid to the victim, relies on the assistance which was being given by Reed.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974]) would be applicable, because the foregoing principles do not govern the taking of a blood test or the use of the results thereof as evidence. ( Schmerber v. California (1966) 384 U.S. 577 [86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908]; and see Breithaupt v. Abram (1957) 352 U.S. 432, 434-440 [77 S.Ct. 408, 1 L.Ed.2d 448]; People v. Graves (1966) 64 Cal.2d 208, 210-211 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 386, 411 P.2d 114]; People v. Kemp (1961) 55 Cal.2d 458, 478 [ 11 Cal.Rptr. 361, 359 P.2d 913]; People v. Duroncelay (1957) 48 Cal.2d 766, 770 [ 312 P.2d 690]; People v. Haeussler (1953) 41 Cal.2d 252, 257 [ 260 P.2d 8]; People v. Zavala (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 732, 737-738 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 129]; People v. Bellah (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 122, 127-128 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 598]; and People v. Huber (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 663, 670-673 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 65].) The foregoing makes it unnecessary to determine whether the failure to object at a trial held after the decisions in Escobedo and Dorado precludes the assertion of any error predicated upon the introduction of evidence obtained in violation of the principles set forth in those cases.
Since he has the statutory right to refuse to take such test, his refusal may not be used against him in a criminal trial. The applicability of Dorado to the situation where a defendant signed a written consent to the taking of a blood test to determine the alcoholic content of his blood was discussed in People v. Bellah, 237 Cal.App.2d 122 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 598], a case involving a prosecution for drunk driving. It was there held that although the police had not advised the defendant of his right to counsel and to remain silent before taking the blood sample from him, evidence of the results of the test was admissible at the trial.