As has been demonstrated by this Court and our Supreme Court, prison-disciplinary proceedings are not criminal-prosecution proceedings. See People v Wyngaard, 462 Mich. 659, 663; 614 N.W.2d 143 (2000); and People v Bellafant, 105 Mich.App. 788, 790; 307 N.W.2d 422 (1981). Further, federal courts have held that "prison disciplinary hearings are not part of a criminal prosecution" and, consequently, they "do not implicate double jeopardy concerns."
Stated differently, prison administrative proceedings and the corresponding punishments have been consistently treated as purely administrative and have been found not to invoke double jeopardy and other constitutional protections. See People v Wyngaard, 462 Mich. 659, 663; 614 N.W.2d 143 (2000) (the defendant was sanctioned at an administrative hearing for possession of marijuana and later prosecuted and convicted of possession of contraband); People v Bellafant, 105 Mich.App. 788, 790; 307 N.W.2d 422 (1981) (criminal charge of assault of a prison employee held not to violate double jeopardy despite administrative forfeit of earned good time as a result of the same assault); Pfefferle v Corrections Comm, 86 Mich.App. 366, 373; 272 N.W.2d 563 (1976) People v Bachman, 50 Mich.App. 682, 684; 213 N.W.2d 800 (1973) (holding that administrative forfeiture of earned good time as punishment for escape from prison combined with a conviction and sentence in a criminal proceeding was not violative of the Fifth Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy). Because "[p]rison disciplinary hearings are not part of a criminal prosecution . . . [they] do not implicate double jeopardy concerns." Lucero v Gunter, 17 F.3d 1347, 1351 (CA 10, 1994).
Where the Legislature makes its intent known through clear and explicit language, this Court must enforce that intent. People v Bellafant, 105 Mich. App. 788, 790-791; 307 N.W.2d 422 (1981). Here, we find that the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous.
Defendant's first claim of the unconstitutionality of the act based on a title-object violation is without merit. This Court has previously held that MCL 750.197c; MSA 28.394(3) does not violate the title-object clause of the Michigan Constitution. People v Wingo, 95 Mich. App. 101; 290 N.W.2d 93 (1980), lv den 410 Mich. 880 (1981); People v Bellafant, 105 Mich. App. 788, 790; 307 N.W.2d 422 (1981); People v Cousins, 139 Mich. App. 583; 363 N.W.2d 285 (1984). Similarly, defendant here does not have standing to challenge for vagueness and overbreadth the constitutionality of the statute under which he was charged and found guilty. "'[V]agueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand.'"
This argument has previously been addressed by this Court and held to be without merit. People v Wingo, 95 Mich. App. 101; 290 N.W.2d 93 (1980), lv den 410 Mich. 880 (1981); People v Bellafant, 105 Mich. App. 788, 790; 307 N.W.2d 422 (1981). Affirmed.
Furthermore, we do not regard a presentence conference to be a critical stage of the criminal proceedings. People v Bellafant, 105 Mich. App. 788, 791; 307 N.W.2d 422 (1981). Affirmed.
The defendant's challenges to the validity and applicability of the statute under which he was charged must be rejected. People v Wingo, 95 Mich. App. 101; 290 N.W.2d 93 (1980); People v Bellafant, 105 Mich. App. 788; 307 N.W.2d 422 (1981); People v Boyd, 102 Mich. App. 112; 300 N.W.2d 760 (1980), lv den 412 Mich. 927 (1982). Justice LEVIN, dissenting from the order denying leave to appeal in Boyd, raises some interesting questions regarding the interpretation of the statute.