People v. Bellafant

7 Citing cases

  1. People v. Racine

    No. 363399 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2024)

    As has been demonstrated by this Court and our Supreme Court, prison-disciplinary proceedings are not criminal-prosecution proceedings. See People v Wyngaard, 462 Mich. 659, 663; 614 N.W.2d 143 (2000); and People v Bellafant, 105 Mich.App. 788, 790; 307 N.W.2d 422 (1981). Further, federal courts have held that "prison disciplinary hearings are not part of a criminal prosecution" and, consequently, they "do not implicate double jeopardy concerns."

  2. People v. Adams

    No. 359017 (Mich. Ct. App. Jun. 15, 2023)

    Stated differently, prison administrative proceedings and the corresponding punishments have been consistently treated as purely administrative and have been found not to invoke double jeopardy and other constitutional protections. See People v Wyngaard, 462 Mich. 659, 663; 614 N.W.2d 143 (2000) (the defendant was sanctioned at an administrative hearing for possession of marijuana and later prosecuted and convicted of possession of contraband); People v Bellafant, 105 Mich.App. 788, 790; 307 N.W.2d 422 (1981) (criminal charge of assault of a prison employee held not to violate double jeopardy despite administrative forfeit of earned good time as a result of the same assault); Pfefferle v Corrections Comm, 86 Mich.App. 366, 373; 272 N.W.2d 563 (1976) People v Bachman, 50 Mich.App. 682, 684; 213 N.W.2d 800 (1973) (holding that administrative forfeiture of earned good time as punishment for escape from prison combined with a conviction and sentence in a criminal proceeding was not violative of the Fifth Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy). Because "[p]rison disciplinary hearings are not part of a criminal prosecution . . . [they] do not implicate double jeopardy concerns." Lucero v Gunter, 17 F.3d 1347, 1351 (CA 10, 1994).

  3. People v. Gaines

    223 Mich. App. 230 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 6 times
    In People v Gaines, 223 Mich App 230, 234; 566 NW2d 35 (1997), overruled by Neal II, 233 Mich App 649 (1999), this Court held that evidence of a defendant's incarceration in a state prison was insufficient to prove the lawfulness of that imprisonment.

    Where the Legislature makes its intent known through clear and explicit language, this Court must enforce that intent. People v Bellafant, 105 Mich. App. 788, 790-791; 307 N.W.2d 422 (1981). Here, we find that the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous.

  4. People v. Williams

    370 N.W.2d 7 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 4 times
    Noting that vagueness challenges to statutes that do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the facts of the case at hand, and that for a defendant to have standing to challenge a statute as overbroad, the statute must be "`"overbroad in relation to defendant's conduct."'"

    Defendant's first claim of the unconstitutionality of the act based on a title-object violation is without merit. This Court has previously held that MCL 750.197c; MSA 28.394(3) does not violate the title-object clause of the Michigan Constitution. People v Wingo, 95 Mich. App. 101; 290 N.W.2d 93 (1980), lv den 410 Mich. 880 (1981); People v Bellafant, 105 Mich. App. 788, 790; 307 N.W.2d 422 (1981); People v Cousins, 139 Mich. App. 583; 363 N.W.2d 285 (1984). Similarly, defendant here does not have standing to challenge for vagueness and overbreadth the constitutionality of the statute under which he was charged and found guilty. "'[V]agueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand.'"

  5. People v. Cousins

    139 Mich. App. 583 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 6 times
    In Cousins, 139 Mich. App. at 590, 363 N.W.2d 285, this Court adopted the definition of taking a hostage provided in State v. Crump, 82 N.M. 487, 493, 484 P.2d 329 (1971) : "the unlawful taking, restraining or confining of a person with the intent that the person, or victim, be held as security for the performance, or forbearance, of some act by a third person."

    This argument has previously been addressed by this Court and held to be without merit. People v Wingo, 95 Mich. App. 101; 290 N.W.2d 93 (1980), lv den 410 Mich. 880 (1981); People v Bellafant, 105 Mich. App. 788, 790; 307 N.W.2d 422 (1981). Affirmed.

  6. People v. Billington

    116 Mich. App. 220 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 8 times
    Determining that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of the defendant's prior act of breaking and entering, where the defendant admitted to participating in the prior offense, in order to establish the defendant's opportunity to access the weapon used in the homicide

    Furthermore, we do not regard a presentence conference to be a critical stage of the criminal proceedings. People v Bellafant, 105 Mich. App. 788, 791; 307 N.W.2d 422 (1981). Affirmed.

  7. People v. Johnson

    115 Mich. App. 630 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 7 times
    Construing M.C.L. A. ยง 750.197c, court held that "the statute was intended to include only the concept of violence implicit in any assault and, therefore, that any assault committed by a prison resident on any employee of the prison, whether or not committed during an escape, falls within the purview of the statute."

    The defendant's challenges to the validity and applicability of the statute under which he was charged must be rejected. People v Wingo, 95 Mich. App. 101; 290 N.W.2d 93 (1980); People v Bellafant, 105 Mich. App. 788; 307 N.W.2d 422 (1981); People v Boyd, 102 Mich. App. 112; 300 N.W.2d 760 (1980), lv den 412 Mich. 927 (1982). Justice LEVIN, dissenting from the order denying leave to appeal in Boyd, raises some interesting questions regarding the interpretation of the statute.