Opinion
D057177 Super. Ct. No. FVI025088
10-04-2011
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHARLES E. BELL, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, Eric M. Nakata, Judge. Affirmed.
A jury convicted Charles Edward Bell of second degree murder. (Penal Code,section 187, subd. (a).) It found true an enhancement allegation that Bell personally discharged a firearm, causing death. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) The court sentenced Bell to state prison for 40 years to life as follows: a term of 15 years to life for murder and a consecutive term of 25 years to life on the enhancement allegation.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
Bell contends: (1) the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence his involuntary interview statements made to detectives, thus violating his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution; (2) insufficient evidence supported both the murder conviction and the true finding on the enhancement; (3) the trial court erroneously denied his new trial motion; and (4) there was cumulative error. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Prosecution Case
On June 4, 2006, Tina Pinuelas and her friend, Valerie Ledesma, went to a club in Victorville, California, where Ledesma's boyfriend, Maurice McCullough, worked as a security guard. Many club patrons started yelling and fighting, and pepper spray was released inside the club, causing patrons to run outside. As Pinuelas and Ledesma approached Ledesma's car, Pinuelas heard two gunshots and saw McCullough fall. She saw McCullough running towards the club's front entrance and someone firing shots at him from the front passenger seat of a car, which then left the scene.
Ledesma testified that after an argument broke out in the club, McCullough was escorting patrons outside. Later, after the pepper spray incident, McCullough tried to break up another fight near the club entrance. As Ledesma reached her car, Pinuelas shouted that McCullough was on the floor. Ledesma ran to him and stayed with him until paramedics arrived. She had never seen McCullough with a gun that night or any time.
Another club security guard, William Holley, testified he saw Bell, who was aggressive, involved in a shoving incident with McCullough inside the club. Holley intervened and pushed Bell outside. In the parking lot afterwards, Holley saw a speeding car slow down. Holley clearly saw Bell, in the passenger seat, stick his arm out the window and fire four or five gunshots at McCullough. The security guards were not allowed to carry guns, and Holley never saw McCullough with a gun. The club owner kept a gun in a safe, but Holley did not see that gun that night or hear of it being used then. Holley subsequently identified Bell in a photo lineup.
Holley admitted he had felony convictions for grand theft auto and was facing another felony charge for uttering a forged document. He also testified two of the club owners, Eric Arias and Nelson Arias, were on duty during the incident, and that morning Eric had a heart attack and was treated by paramedics.
Todd Edwards, the club security manager, was on duty that morning and after the shooting helped McCullough walk back into the club. Edwards saw paramedics remove McCullough's clothing, but did not see a gun on his person. Edwards's policy barred security guards from carrying a gun on duty, and he never saw McCullough with one.
Dr. Chanikarn Changsri, a San Bernardino County deputy medical examiner, performed the autopsy on McCullough, who was six foot six inches tall and weighed 427 pounds. McCullough had gunshot wounds to the right upper abdomen and right arm. A bullet perforated his liver, causing extensive damage, and entered the colon. The cause of death was gunshot wound to the abdomen. McCullough's blood was drawn in the hospital and tested days later, and his blood alcohol content was .03 percent, but it likely was higher when he was shot.
At the end of July 2006, San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department detectives David Burgess and Jonathan Billings interviewed Bell in a Las Vegas jail, after giving him warnings under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436. A recording of the interview was played for the jury. Bell initially lied about his involvement in the case, insisting he was not the shooter, and that he drove his car while another male, named Eggie, was in the front passenger seat and fired the shots. Bell later told detectives that although McCullough was not wearing a glove during the altercation inside the club, Bell saw McCullough wearing gloves in the parking lot. McCullough's left hand was behind his back and his right hand clenched. Bell, believing McCullough had a gun, fired shots downward at the ground, and the bullet hit McCullough.
Defense Case
Bell was eighteen years old at the time of the crime. He testified that while he was in the admission line for the club, he gave his car keys to Eggie to place the gun inside the car. Bell bribed Edwards to let him enter the club. Bell bought and drank four alcoholic drinks inside the club. He was not involved in the altercation inside the club, but afterwards he moved towards the exit and saw McCullough use foul language and push one of Bell's friends. Bell objected to McCullough, who punched Bell in the back of the head and cursed and gestured at him. Bell responded, "Why did you hit me? I'm not involved in any of the fights that are going on around here."
Bell was intoxicated after they exited the club. Meldanado Hankins drove Bell's car, while Bell sat in the front passenger seat. Bell felt the gun under his foot, and left it there under a mat. In the parking lot, Bell clearly saw McCullough, wearing gloves, quickly approach the car, with his left hand behind his back and his right hand clenched in a fist, and staring at Bell. Although Bell did not see a gun in McCullough's hand, he believed Hankins said something like, "I think that he has a gun." Bell grabbed the gun from under the mat, put his hand out the window and, from a distance of approximately 10 feet, looked at McCullough and fired three or four shots downward. Bell's goal was not to hit McCullough, but to scare McCullough and protect himself. Afterwards, Hankins sped out of the parking lot and they went to a friend's apartment, where Bell gave the gun either to his cousin, Terrence Williams, or to Hankins. Within a day or two of the incident, Bell left for Las Vegas.
Bell admitted at trial that he had lied in the jailhouse interview by initially denying he was at the club or drove his car, and by claiming Eggie was the shooter. At trial, Bell acknowledged for the first time that Williams was in the rear passenger seat of Bell's car during the shooting. Bell also acknowledged not telling detectives he believed Hankins had said McCullough had a gun, or that Bell subsequently gave the gun to either Williams or Hankins. Bell claimed he told those lies because he was afraid police would not believe him. Separately, Bell admitted he was arrested and jailed previously for illegally buying a gun.
Hankins testified he drank two alcoholic drinks at the club. He saw McCullough punch Bell in the back and point his finger at Bell "in a gun kind of gesture," saying to Bell, "I'm going to kill your bitch ass." After the altercation, Hankins was driving Bell's car and saw McCullough, who appeared angry, holding a revolver in his right hand and walking really fast toward Bell's car. McCullough reached approximately six feet from the car, and pulled his right hand out and pointed it at the vehicle. Hankins was scared and accelerated the car; he might have told Bell, "watch him" or "look at that guy," but he did not get a chance to say McCullough had a gun. Hankins heard approximately four gunshots and saw Bell's revolver. Bell admitted to Hankins he had shot McCullough. Hankins admitted he had lied to police regarding the incident by denying he was at the club. He acknowledged an earlier arrest for having 30 ecstasy pills and a loaded gun on his person.
A forensic toxicologist testified that the drinks Bell and Hankins consumed at the club were prepared by mixing tequila, rum, gin, vodka and possibly Seven-up. He testified based on a hypothetical that someone of Bell's height and weight at the time of the incident, who had had four such drinks, would have a blood alcohol content of between .15 and .20 percent at approximately 3:30 a.m., exhibit confusion, disorientation and loss of inhibitions, and likely misinterpret others' words and actions.
DISCUSSION
I.
Bell contends his jailhouse interview with detectives was involuntary, coerced by a promise of leniency, and violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution; therefore, the trial court erred in admitting his statements into evidence. Bell does not identify any of his statements made in the interview that he sought to suppress. We assume for purposes of this contention he is referring to his confession he shot at McCullough from the passenger seat of his car.
In his opening brief, Bell extracts a series of the detectives' remarks made during the interview and provides no context for them or any legal analysis, although he claims they show the detectives coerced or induced his confession. We will analyze only the detective's comment that the trial court found somewhat problematic, and regard as forfeited any claim Bell makes based on the detectives' other statements.
Applicable Law
"In order to introduce a defendant's statement into evidence, the People must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement was voluntary. [Citation]. If a statement is found to be involuntary, the statement and other evidence derived from it are inadmissible for any purpose. [Citation.] When, as here, the interview was tape-recorded, the facts surrounding the giving of the statement are undisputed, and the appellate court may independently review the trial court's determination of voluntariness. [Citation.] [¶] We rely upon the cardinal rule of the Supreme Court regarding the admission of a defendant's statement: '[W]here a person in authority makes an express or clearly implied promise of leniency or advantage for the accused which is a motivating cause of the decision to confess, the confession is involuntary and inadmissible as a matter of law. [Citation.]' [Citation.] This rule raises two separate questions: was a promise of leniency either expressly made or implied, and if so, did that promise motivate the subject to speak?" (People v. Vasila (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 865, 873.)
A confession is "obtained" by a promise within the proscription of both the federal and state due process guaranties if and only if inducement and statement are linked, as it were, by "proximate" causation. This is certainly true for the federal right. (People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 778.) An officer's mere advice or exhortation that it would be better for the accused to tell the truth when unaccompanied by either a threat or a promise does not render a subsequent confession involuntary. The distinction between permissible and impermissible police conduct does not depend upon the bare language of inducement. Instead, it depends upon the nature of the benefit to be derived by the defendant if he or she speaks the truth as represented by the police. (People v. Hill (1967) 66 Cal.2d 536, 549.) When the benefit pointed out by the police is simply that which flows naturally from a truthful and honest course of conduct, the subsequent statement will not be considered involuntary. (People v.. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 773, disapproved on another point in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.)
Background
Detective Billings told Bell in the interview, "[Y]ou're not being a hundred percent with us. . . . You've given us little bits and pieces and feedin' us a little bit here and there and you're not runnin' it together or tellin' us. If you made a mistake, somewhere, somehow that night." The detective continued, "We didn't have to drive out here. We did it 'cause we were hoping you were gonna be honest and say dude, I made a mistake and this is how I made a mistake. You're there. You're close. You're 75 [percent] to freedom, to, to, to making yourself feel good. Givin' us the truth. But you're holding back that quarter." (Emphasis added.)
During in limine proceedings before trial, Bell moved to suppress his interview statements, contending they were induced by Detective Billings's promise of leniency. The trial court listened to the recording of the interview and ruled, "The 75 percent . . . is obviously a mistake made by Detective Billings. I think he caught his mistake when he started stuttering. . . . [¶] If you look at the whole scenario, it's not a situation where the officers are offering him, Mr. Bell, the opportunity to leave, or his freedom if he continues to talk to them. Nothing to show that Mr. Bell was influenced by the fact that Detective Billings made the statement. Indeed . . . Mr. Bell isn't given the opportunity to really start talking until . . . in my estimation some 20 minutes later." The court added, "Quite frankly, I'm disturbed by the language used by the detectives in this. . . . [¶] As far as [the detectives] pushed the envelope to the edge, I don't find they have gone over the edge."
We agree with the trial court that Detective Billings's reference to "freedom" was isolated and appeared inadvertent. In the context, the detective was alluding not to Bell's freedom from punishment, but rather to the freedom resulting from truth telling. Detective Billings immediately steered away from that reference to freedom. But several pages later in the interview transcript, after Bell recanted and confessed to the shooting, Detective Billings told him, "You have told us everything, you got to feel good about that." Detective Billings specifically asked him, "What do you feel like?" Bell responded, "But I do feel better that I've told you all to be honest. But I do still feel shitty though."
Bell has not shown, in the context of the entire interview, that he was induced to confess to shooting the victim based on Detective Billings's passing comment regarding freedom or any other statement that the detectives made. Accordingly, we conclude that under the standard set forth in Vasila, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th 865, Detective Billings did not make an implied or express promise of leniency to Bell. Therefore, any of Bell's incriminating statements were not motivated by the detectives' statements.
In any event, any error in admitting Bell's confession into evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 831.) Evidence independent of Bell's jailhouse confession established he committed the murder. Pinuelas testified she saw his car and someone shooting from it, even as McCullough was walking towards the club entrance. Holley testified he saw the altercation in the club, with Bell acting aggressively towards McCullough, and he saw Bell shooting at McCullough. Hankins testified Bell was the shooter. As we will set forth below, in the context of the sufficiency of the evidence claim, Bell's postcrime conduct also was circumstantial evidence permitting the jury to conclude Bell was guilty.
II.
Bell challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction and the true finding on the enhancement allegation, claiming, "a reasonable jury would have realized that it was impossible to convict [him] of anything more than manslaughter." Bell argues the evidence showed he was young and intoxicated; McCullough cursed at him and physically provoked him; and, he responded in self-defense based on his reasonable belief McCullough was armed and about to attack him. Bell further argues, "Mr. McCullough was a huge man. He certainly was intimidating." Bell finally argues, Holley "not only suffered convictions involving moral turpitude, but had ample reason to lie."
Applicable Law
"Second degree murder is defined as the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, but without the additional elements — i.e., willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation — that would support a conviction of first degree murder." (People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4 Cal. 4th 91, 102; see § 187, subd. (a).) Section 188 defines malice as follows: "[M]alice may be express or implied. It is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature. It is implied, when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart."
When sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal our role in reviewing the evidence is limited. We do not reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the jury. (People v. Escobar (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 477, 481.) Instead, we must determine whether any rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.) We view the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment and presume the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence in support of the judgment. (People v. Abrego (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 133, 136.) This standard applies whether direct or circumstantial evidence is involved. (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1251.) This court's authority begins and ends with a determination of whether any substantial evidence, disputed or not, supports the verdict. Thus, where the record discloses substantial evidence — that is reasonable, credible and of solid value — we accord due deference to the trier of fact. (People v. Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 314.)
Analysis
In light of Bell's admission he shot McCullough, the primary issue at trial was his intent. The jury could reasonably conclude, based on Bell's altercation with McCullough in the club, that Bell intended to shoot him in response to the altercation. Further, the circumstantial evidence involving Bell's postcrime conduct showed his consciousness of guilt. Bell disposed of the murder weapon by giving it to either Williams or Hankins, took flight to Las Vegas, and gave differing accounts of the shooting in interviews with detectives and at trial. The court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 372 regarding flight, with CALCRIM No. 362 regarding consciousness of guilt and with CALCRIM No. 371 regarding a defendant who provides false testimony or conceals or destroys evidence. The jury evaluated the trial testimony in light of those instructions.
On appeal, Bell has not addressed prejudice caused to him by referring to the law of self-defense, the jury instructions on that topic, or the trial evidence. At any rate, we presume that the jury followed the court's instructions regarding CALCRIM Nos. 572 and 505, dealing with imperfect self-defense and self-defense respectively. "It is axiomatic that '[j]urors are presumed able to understand and correlate instructions and are further presumed to have followed the court's instructions.' " (People v. Hernandez (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1502.) The jury, which had the exclusive duty to determine witness credibility, rejected the self-defense claim and found Bell guilty of second degree murder. Bell's arguments on appeal — including that he was young and intoxicated, McCullough was big and intimidating and Holley was not credible — amount to an invitation that we reweigh the evidence. But we cannot do so. "The existence of possible exculpatory explanations, whether they are simply suggestions not excluded by the evidence or even where they could be reasonably deduced from the evidence, could not justify this court's rejecting the determination of the trier of fact that defendant is guilty unless on appeal it 'be made clearly to appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the conclusion reached in the [trial court].' " (People v. Redrick (1961) 55 Cal.2d 282, 290.) We conclude substantial evidence, set forth above, supported the jury's verdict.
III.
Bell contends the trial court erroneously denied his new trial motion brought on grounds of insufficient evidence (§ 1181, subd. (6)), newly discovered evidence (§ 1181, subd. (8)) and juror misconduct. We reject the claim.
A.
Newly Acquired Evidence
Bell contends, "There was new evidence impeaching the testimony of witness William Holly [sic], and Todd Edwards . . . [which] also suggested the availability of a gun to the security guards in a case in which [Bell] and another witness believed the victim was armed with a gun and was seeking to inflict bodily harm." (Emphasis added.)
A trial court's determination of a motion for a new trial will not be disturbed unless a manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion clearly appears. (People v. Delgado (1993) 5 Cal.4th 312, 329.) This standard "asks in substance whether the ruling in question 'falls outside the bounds of reason' under the applicable law and the relevant facts." (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 162.) The burden is on the defendant to show the trial court's decision was " 'irrational or arbitrary,' " or that it was not " 'grounded in reasoned judgment and guided by legal principles and policies appropriate to the particular matter at issue.' " (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez)(1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977.) A new trial will be granted if the newly discovered evidence was material to the defendant and "he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced [the evidence] at the trial." (§ 1181, subd. (8).) In Delgado, at p. 328, the California Supreme Court identified five factors to consider when ruling on a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence: " ' "1. That the evidence, and not merely its materiality, be newly discovered; 2. That the evidence be not cumulative merely; 3. That it be such as to render a different result probable on a retrial of the case; 4. That the party could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced it at the trial; and 5. That these facts be shown by the best evidence of which the case admits." ' "
"[N]ewly discovered evidence which would merely impeach or discredit a witness does not compel the granting of a new trial [citation], and a new trial will not ordinarily be granted for newly discovered evidence of that character. [Citation.] While it is true that the granting of a new trial upon the discovery of highly material impeaching evidence will not be held to constitute an abuse of discretion [citation], when the trial court denies such a motion, the reviewing court should not ordinarily interfere." (People v. Moten (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 692, 698.)
At a hearing on Bell's new trial motion, Eric Arias (Eric), the club's owner, and his brother, Nelson Arias (Nelson), a club employee, testified they never saw McCullough with a firearm during the time he worked there. Eric testified he once saw McCullough lose his temper with a customer, and Eric instructed a security supervisor to intervene.
Based on other parts of the brothers' testimony, Bell identifies the following inconsistencies between trial testimony and the newly acquired evidence: Contrary to Holley's trial testimony, Eric and Nelson were not at the club at the time of the shooting, and Eric did not suffer a heart attack that morning. Contrary to testimony by Edwards and Holley, the club did not have a separate room or office with a safe that had a combination lock where pepper spray or a gun was kept. Rather, Nelson referred to a small cubicle near the front door as the "office;" its safe was opened and closed using a key, which Edwards could use to get his gun that he stored there.
Bell argues those inconsistencies, coupled with other evidence, including that McCullough had lost his temper once before, sufficed for a new trial because, "A jury should hear of the lies told by [Edwards and Holley]. It should hear the testimony of the Arias brothers. The defense must be allowed to explore the new evidence that there was a handgun in the club accessible to Mr. McCullough."
We conclude that the evidence adduced in the new trial motion, at best, would have impeached the testimony of Edwards and Holley, and therefore no new trial was required. " 'A new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence is not granted where the only value of the newly discovered testimony is as impeaching evidence' or to contradict a witness of the opposing party." (People v. Hall (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 282, 299.)
Further, the newly acquired evidence related to tangential issues and was not enough to grant a new trial under Delgado, supra, 5 Cal.4th 312, because it was not reasonably probable the jury would have reached a different verdict based on it, and in light of Bell's admission he shot McCullough. The new evidence merely would have permitted speculation that McCullough might have had access to a gun. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying a new trial on the basis of newly acquired evidence as stated in Bell's motion, because its decision was not so irrational or arbitrary to amount to an abuse of discretion.
But Bell has failed to articulate a theory — and much less substantiate such a theory — that leads from that surmise to a conclusion that reasonably could overcome the jury's finding Bell acted with malice to justify the second degree murder conviction. He does not begin to meet his burden with this conclusory and insubstantial argument in his opening brief: "It is further submitted that had the jury heard this [newly acquired] evidence, the outcome of this trial would have favored [him]. To allow this conviction to stand will violate due process of law under the [Fourteenth] amendment to the federal [C]onstitution]."
B.
Juror's letter and Testimony
When a party moves for a new trial based on juror misconduct, the trial court undertakes a three-step inquiry. (People v. Von Villas (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 175, 255.) First, the court determines, pursuant to the Evidence Code, whether the declarations supporting the motion are admissible under section 1150, subdivision (a) (overt acts and statements, if otherwise admissible, are admissible; effect of such acts and statements on a juror's thought process is not). Second, if the evidence is admissible the court determines whether the facts establish misconduct. Finally, assuming misconduct, the court determines whether the misconduct was prejudicial. (Von Villas, at p. 255.)
An appellate court reviews independently the determination of prejudice arising from juror misconduct, but the trial court's credibility determinations and factual findings are reviewed under the more deferential substantial evidence standard. (People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 582 & fn. 5.)
Here, following trial, a juror sent defense counsel a letter stating the jury did not follow an instruction regarding circumstantial evidence. That juror testified at a new trial motion hearing, and over the prosecutor's objection on grounds the inquiry violated Evidence Code section 1150's rule against intruding on the jury's deliberative process, the court permitted defense counsel to ask him, "Did any of the jurors when you mentioned this rule [regarding how to evaluate circumstantial evidence] say that they were not going to follow that rule?" The juror responded, "Oh, they didn't say it like that, but they again, argued their own point. But the majority of the other jurors at least considered what I was saying and they were saying the same thing. But we weren't able to really convince the other two or, you know, at least have them consider what we were saying."
The juror's letter stated: "I'm writing you because I have some concerns about this case and the verdict that was reached. I do not believe that we conducted our deliberations correctly as set down by the instruction given to us by the judge. Specifically . . . the instruction that states . . . and this is not word for word as in the written instruction but the best I remember . . . when there are two possible conclusion [ sic]to a certain event, both conclusions being reasonable, one pointing to innocence and the other to guilt, we have to go with the one pointing to innocence. I can recall at least a couple instances within the evidence or the testimony given where this instruction definitely applies but we did not give it proper consideration. I can not help but feel that if we had[,] that the outcome would have been different. At this point I want to mention that I'm not writing this as a reflection upon any of the other jurors. I truly feel that everyone there had the best of intentions and wanted to do this right. Unfortunately . . . with all the evidence and testimony to consider . . . along with all of the juror instructions . . . it's easy to lose sight of how things are supposed to be done. This is not an excuse for any mistakes we may have made nor do I presume to speak for any of the other jurors." The jury was instructed regarding circumstantial evidence with CALCRIM Nos. 224 and 225.
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Based on that testimony, the trial court denied the new trial motion, ruling, "[T]he one thing that [the juror] did say is that the other jurors did consider what I had to say, quote, unquote. [¶] So I find that there was nothing improper done by this juror. This is the way that it is. This is what jurors are asked to do, and they did it . . . to the best that they could."
On appeal, Bell does not analyze the juror's testimony or explain why the trial court's ruling was erroneous. Following Evidence Code 1150's bar on intruding on the jury's deliberative process, we rely only on those aspects of the juror's testimony that were subject to independent corroboration. We conclude substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding the jury did not commit misconduct. As noted, the jury is presumed to comply with the court's instruction regarding circumstantial evidence, and nothing in the record indicates the jury failed to do so. We conclude the trial court did not err in denying the new trial motion brought on grounds of juror misconduct.
IV.
Bell contends that based on the cumulative effect of the claimed errors, his trial was fundamentally unfair and he was denied due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution.
In a close case, the cumulative effect of multiple errors may be sufficient to cause the trial to have been unfair and hence cause a miscarriage of justice. (People v. Buffum (1953) 40 Cal.2d 709, 726, overruled on other grounds by People v. Morante (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 415.) Multiple errors may require reversal even when the errors, considered individually, would not warrant the same conclusion. (People v. Jackson ( 1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1670, 1681.) If, in the absence of the cumulative errors, it is reasonably probable that the jury would have reached a result more favorable to a defendant, the decision must be reversed. (People v. Holt (1984) 37 Cal.3d 436, 459, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Muldrow (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 636, 645.) Having found no error, let alone cumulative error, we reject this claim.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
O'ROURKE, J. WE CONCUR:
McINTYRE, Acting P. J.
IRION, J.