People v. Belge

129 Citing cases

  1. People v. Epakchi

    37 N.Y.3d 39 (N.Y. 2021)   Cited 12 times

    These enactments have been an integral part of the criminal procedural process for many years, and appear throughout the CPL"]). In dozens of areas of the law, the legislature has supplemented statutory rules regarding civil and criminal procedure with instructions for lower courts to deviate from those rules when necessary to ensure a just result—a recognition of the need for flexibility in carrying out their statutory duties (seePeople v. Belge, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 62–63, 390 N.Y.S.2d 867, 359 N.E.2d 377 [1976] [Fuchsberg, J., concurring] [noting that CPL 210.40 "constitutes the current codification of earlier enactments which expressed the need for a residuum of inherent discretion to act in the unusual case that cries out for fundamental justice beyond the confines of conventional considerations of ‘legal or factual merits of the charge or even on the guilt or innocence of the defendant’ "], quoting People v. Clayton, 41 A.D.2d 204, 206, 342 N.Y.S.2d 106 [1973] ; People v. Davis, 55 Misc.2d 656, 659, 286 N.Y.S.2d 396 [Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 1967] ["The criminal law is at best an imperfect instrument.

  2. People v. Epakchi

    2021 N.Y. Slip Op. 2018 (N.Y. 2021)

    The power of courts to make decisions in the interest of justice is woven into the fabric of New York's judicial system and extends far beyond the power to dismiss accusatory instruments (see People v Williams, 97 Misc 2d 24, 31 [NY Co Ct 1978] ["Legislative enactments permitting courts to make a variety of determinations 'in the interests of justice' or 'in furtherance of justice,' are not new to our State . . . . These enactments have been an integral part of the criminal procedural process for many years, and appear throughout the CPL"]). In dozens of areas of the law, the legislature has supplemented statutory rules regarding civil and criminal procedure with instructions for lower courts to deviate from those rules when necessary to ensure a just result—a recognition of the need for flexibility in carrying out their statutory duties (see People v Belge, 41 NY2d 60, 62-63 [1976] [Fuchsberg, J., concurring] [noting that CPL 210.40 "constitutes the current codification of earlier enactments which expressed the need for a residuum of inherent discretion to act in the unusual case that cries out for fundamental justice beyond the confines of conventional considerations of 'legal or factual merits of the charge or even on the guilt or innocence of the defendant'"], quoting People v Clayton, 41 AD2d 204, 206 [1973]; People v Davis, 55 Misc 2d 656, 659 [Sup Ct, NY County 1967] ["The criminal law is at best an imperfect instrument.

  3. People v. Tyler

    385 N.E.2d 1231 (N.Y. 1978)   Cited 12 times

    To say that Trial Term did not rely exclusively upon interest-of-justice considerations is not to say that the court did not dismiss in the interest of justice (cf. People v Belge, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 61-62). Indeed, in the determination of a motion for dismissal of an indictment as being in furtherance of justice and in the exercise of a court's discretion, one of the factors to be considered is the evidence of guilt (see People v Clayton, 41 A.D.2d 204, 207-208; Supplementary Practice Commentary by Bellacosa, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 11A, CPL 210.40, 1977-1978 Supp, pp 131-132).

  4. People v. Fritze

    28 Misc. 3d 1220 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2010)

    See also: People v. Kelley, 141 A.D.2d 764, 529 N.Y.S.2d 855 (2nd Dept.1988) “The Trial Court's discretion to dismiss in the interests of justice, should be exercised sparingly' and only in that rare' and unusual' case where it cries out for fundamental justice beyond the confines of conventional considerations.' People v. Belge, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 62–63, 390 N.Y.S.2d 867, 359 N.E.2d 377; People v. Belkota, 50 A.D.2d 118, 120, 377 N.Y.S.2d 321; People v. Kwok Ming Chan, 45 A.D.2d 613, 615–616, 360 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1st Dept.).” People v. Insignares, 109 A.D.2d 221, 491 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1st Dept.1985) The court must weigh the competing interests of the Defendant, the complainant and the community at large.

  5. People v. Curtis

    2003 N.Y. Slip Op. 51717 (N.Y. Misc. 2003)

    However, the antecedent statutes which granted power to the court to dismiss a criminal action in the interest of justice failed to provide specific guidelines for the exercise of that power. In People v. Belge, 41 N.Y.2d 60 (1976), the Court of Appeals called for amendment of CPL 210.40, arguing that "[t]o the extent that the section now fails to prescribe specific criteria for the responsible exercise of the discretion granted by the section and fails to require the court to articulate the manner and extent to which the particular case meets such criteria, it is open to misuse and effective appellate review is made difficult, if not impossible." 41 N.Y.2d at 62.

  6. People v. Spicola

    2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 2484 (N.Y. 2011)   Cited 148 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by admitting expert testimony on rebuttal which connected generalized sexual abuse symptoms to the individual victim

    Defendant's argument that the trial court's preliminary instruction was improper is unpreserved. ( People v Robinson, 36 NY2d 224; People v Reynolds, 25 NY2d 489; People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241; People v Simons, 22 NY2d 533; People v Beige, 41 NY2d 60.) VI. Defendant was afforded effective representation by his trial counsel.

  7. People C. v. Balio, et al.

    2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 9662 (N.Y. 2006)   Cited 72 times
    In People v. Gillian, 8 N.Y.3d 85, 828 N.Y.S.2d 277, 861 N.E.2d 92 (2006), we held that a criminal defendant's request for self-representation which was made in the alternative to an underlying request for substitution of counsel was not an unequivocal request, especially where it was used as leverage to compel dismissal of assigned counsel.

    Francis D. Phillips, II, District Attorney, Goshen ( David R. Huey of counsel), for respondent. I. Defendant abandoned any challenge to the court's decision denying defendant's request to act as his own attorney. ( Faretta v California, 422 US 806; People v Beige, 41 NY2d 60; People v Hogya, 56 NY2d 602; People v Hallman, 92 NY2d 840; People v Glover, 87 NY2d 838; People v McIntyre, 36 NY2d 10; People v Rodriguez, 95 NY2d 497; Brown v Wainwright, 665 F2d 607; People v Sawyer, 57 NY2d 12; People v LaValle, 3 NY3d 88.) II. Defendant has failed to preserve his claim that the court penalized defendant for exercising his right to trial, and the court may not reach this issue absent preservation. ( People v Beige, 41 NY2d 60; People v Hurley, 75 NY2d 887.) Before: Chief Judge KAYE and Judges CIPARICK, ROSENBLATT, GRAFFEO and READ concur with Judge PIGOTT; Judge SMITH concurs in result in a separate opinion.

  8. People v. Thompson

    83 N.Y.2d 477 (N.Y. 1994)   Cited 95 times
    In People v Thompson (83 NY2d 477 [1994]), the Court of Appeals considered the constitutionality of mandatory sentences for drug offenses, as applied to defendant.

    Some years ago, faced with a similar vacuum of legislative criteria for the exercise of the interests of justice dismissal power, the Judiciary filled the interstice (People v Clayton, 41 A.D.2d 204 [Hopkins, J.]). Spurred by that traditional common-law development (see also, People v Belge, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 62), the Legislature eventually codified criteria for nisi prius guidance and appellate review purposes (CPL 210.40). Broadie's atrophying rare case exception has apparently stimulated particular legislative attention in a bill that, arguably and as finally enacted, might allow an interests-of-justice consideration of a reduction in just such a case as the instant one (see, 1994 N.Y. Assembly Bill A 7693).

  9. People v. Rickert

    58 N.Y.2d 122 (N.Y. 1983)   Cited 179 times
    In People v Rickert (58 N.Y.2d 122, 128), the Court of Appeals observed in connection with this provision that "while the statute does not compel catechistic on-the-record discussion of items (a) through (j), useful as that would be to indicate that in fact all applicable items have been considered, the need to show that the ultimate reasons given for the dismissal are both real and compelling almost inevitably will mean that one or more of the statutory criteria, even if only the catchall (j), will yield to ready identification".

    . Discomfited that, nevertheless, CPL 170.40 and 210.40 (as these existed prior to 1979) prescribed neither specification of "criteria for the responsible exercise" of interest of justice discretion nor articulation of "the manner and extent to which a particular case meets such criteria", this court, in People v Belge ( 41 N.Y.2d 60, 62), expressed concern that, absent such guidelines, whether judicially or legislatively declared, effective appellate review was, to say the least, difficult. Indicating a decided preference for legislative correction, we expressly invited the attention of the Legislature "to this predicament".

  10. People v. Sant

    2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 50720 (N.Y. App. Term 2017)

    In exercising its discretion to do so, a court must engage in a sensitive balancing of the interests of the individual against those of the State (see People v. Quadrozzi, 55 AD3d 93, 103–104 [2008] ; People v. Kelley, 141 A.D.2d at 765 ; People v. Clayton, 41 A.D.2d 204, 208 [1973] ). Furthermore, the use of such a drastic remedy depends on principles of justice, beyond the confines of conventional considerations of legal or factual merits of the charge or even on the guilt or innocence of the defendant (see People v. Belge, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 62–63 [1976] [Fuchsberg, J., concurring]; People v. Stewart, 230 A.D.2d 116, 120–122 [1997] ; People v. Clayton, 41 A.D.2d at 206 ). Here, the Justice Court correctly dismissed the accusatory instrument in furtherance of justice.