Who did you hurt?" ¶37 Moreover, this case strikingly resembles the dispositive facts in People v. Begay, 2014 CO 41, 325 P.3d 1026. In that case, we observed:

We have previously stated that "[a] trial court errs by applying the ‘free to leave’ standard in evaluating whether a suspect is in custody under Miranda doctrine." People v. Begay, 2014 CO 41, ¶ 16, 325 P.3d 1026, 1030. Thus, the trial court applied the wrong legal standard and, in doing so, erred.

¶19 We conclude that the trial court erred during its oral ruling by applying the "free to leave" standard in evaluating whether Cline was in custody for Miranda purposes. See People v. Begay , 2014 CO 41, ¶ 16, 325 P.3d 1026, 1030. We likewise conclude that the trial court erred in its written order because the relevant question "is not whether a reasonable person would believe he was not free to leave, but rather whether such a person would believe he was in police custody of the degree associated with a formal arrest."

¶16 Whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes is a mixed question of law and fact. People v. Begay, 2014 CO 41, ¶ 9, 325 P.3d 1026, 1029. We defer to a trial court's findings of credibility and historical facts so long as they are supported by the record.

¶16 Whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes is a mixed question of law and fact. People v. Begay, 2014 CO 41, ¶ 9, 325 P.3d 1026, 1029. We defer to a trial court's findings of credibility and historical facts so long as they are supported by the record.

¶ 8 To determine if a suspect was in custody, we consider whether, “ ‘under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the [suspect's] position would consider himself to be deprived of his freedom of action to the degree associated with a formal arrest.’ ” People v. Begay, 2014 CO 41, ¶ 13, 325 P.3d 1026 (emphasis added in Begay) (quoting People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453, 468 (Colo.2002)). In performing this inquiry, we examine the following factors:

Mumford, ¶ 19, 270 P.3d at 958; see Holt, 233 P.3d at 1199. Indeed, the public nature of the encounter "offsets the ‘aura of authority surrounding an … officer,’ " People v. Sampson, 2017 CO 100, ¶ 30, 404 P.3d 273, 278–79 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 438, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984)), and can affect the suspect’s "peace of mind," which in turn provides a greater "ability to withstand psychological compulsion," Garcia, ¶ 22, 409 P.3d at 317; see also People v. Begay, 2014 CO 41, ¶ 22, 325 P.3d 1026, 1031 (explaining that when encounters occur in public, "the potential that police will use coercive tactics to compel a confession is diminished"); People v. Pleshakov, 2013 CO 18, ¶ 32, 298 P.3d 228, 236 (noting that the environment, "daylight … on a sidewalk, in plain view of any person who might be passing by," weighed against custody). ¶22 The location is particularly important here, given Eugene’s reliance on a handful of our past custody cases.

Essentially, the dissent inappropriately collapses the free to leave inquiry with the restraint to the degree associated with a formal arrest inquiry. See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty , supra, 468 U.S. at 435–37, 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138 (declining to accord free to leave inquiry "talismanic power" and holding, instead, that Miranda safeguards are triggered when suspect's freedom is curtailed to degree associated with formal arrest); People v. Begay , 325 P.3d 1026, 1029–30 (Colo. 2014) ("Under the [f]ourth [a]mendment, a seizure occurs when a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave or otherwise terminate an encounter with law enforcement. ... [W]hat constitutes custody for Miranda is narrower than what constitutes a seizure ....

¶18 Whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes presents a mixed question of law and fact. People v. Begay, 2014 CO 41, ¶ 9, 325 P.3d 1026, 1029. We defer to a trial court's findings of fact—provided that they are supported by the record—but we review de novo the trial court's legal conclusion that the facts constitute custody.

First, the investigatory detention that I assume occurred did not automatically equal custody for Miranda ’s purposes because such a "mere detention" did not deprive defendant of his freedom to the degree associated with a formal arrest. See id. at ¶ 20 ; see also People v. Begay , 2014 CO 41, ¶ 20, 325 P.3d 1026 ("Is ... a suspect [detained during an investigatory stop] seized under the Fourth Amendment?