Opinion
E040116
5-31-2007
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CATHIE ELIZABETH BEDSWORTH, Defendant and Appellant.
Jennifer A. Gambale, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr., Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Pat Zaharopoulos, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
A jury found Cathie Bedsworth, defendant and appellant (hereafter defendant), guilty of abusing her elderly mother, a violation of Penal Code section 368, subdivision (b)(1), and also found true a special allegation under subdivision (b)(3) of Penal Code section 368, that defendant inflicted great bodily injury that caused her mothers death. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve a total term of 10 years in state prison — the middle term of three years on the elder abuse conviction and a consecutive term of seven years on the special enhancement.
Defendants contentions in this appeal all pertain to the admissibility of evidence of other acts, or uncharged crimes, that occurred in April 1998, February 2004, and March 2004. In particular, defendant contends the other incidents did not involve elder abuse and therefore evidence of those incidents was not admissible under Evidence Code section 1109. Next, defendant contends that even if admissible for purposes other than to show defendants bad character, the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by its potential for prejudice and therefore, by admitting the evidence the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352. Finally, defendant contends that even if some evidence of the other incidents was properly admitted, the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 by admitting an excessive and therefore prejudicial number of photographs of the living conditions that existed in the homes of defendant and her mother in 1998.
Defendant also notes that the trial court imposed a $600 fine under Penal Code section 368, subdivision (b)(1), but the abstract of judgment incorrectly reflects a fine of $6,000. We will direct the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect the correct amount of the fine.
We conclude, for reasons we now explain, that defendants contentions are meritless. Therefore we will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL DETAILS
The pertinent facts are not in dispute. On December 28, 2004, defendant took her 73-year-old mother, Rosemary Bedsworth, to Rancho Springs Hospital because she was unconscious and breathing rapidly. According to Leah Patterson, the registered nurse who examined defendants mother in the emergency room, Mrs. Bedsworth appeared to have been severely neglected — she had urine on her clothes and dried stool on her legs, in her shoes, in between her toes, and in the groin area. She also had loose stool around the rectum. Newspaper was stuck to the dried stool.
A physical examination revealed that Mrs. Bedsworth had pneumonia and a bladder infection. She also appeared to be dehydrated and her left side was swollen, a fact that indicated to Patterson that she had been lying on that side for some period of time without moving. Mrs. Bedsworth had numerous decubitus ulcers on her body. Patterson testified that such ulcers, commonly referred to as bedsores, can range in severity from stage one, which typically consists of redness on the skin, to stage four, which is a wound that goes into the muscle and bone. Stage four decubitus ulcers result from pressure that prevents oxygen and nutrition from reaching the area, which in turn causes the tissue to die. Mrs. Bedsworth had a stage four decubitus ulcer on her left labia, and stage two and three decubitus ulcers on her back. Stage two ulcers look like blisters, and stage three ulcers penetrate into the skin. Mrs. Bedsworth appeared to be in septic shock, and in critical condition.
Patterson talked with defendant, who claimed that her mother had not been feeling well for about a week, but that she had been up the preceding night and had eaten a burrito. Defendant said that Mrs. Bedsworth attended to her own care and walked with the use of a walker. Defendant would not tell Patterson where she lived and said only that they were from Florida and were currently living in a trailer park in Temecula. Patterson suspected that Mrs. Bedsworth had been abused and called adult protective services because Mrs. Bedsworths condition, in particular the stage four decubitus ulcer, was inconsistent with defendants statement that her mother was up and moving around the night before.
Detective Mason Yeo responded to Pattersons call and observed Mrs. Bedsworth at the hospital lying on a gurney. Detective Yeo then interviewed defendant who told the detective that she and her mother and her son Anthony had been living in a motor home and traveling around the country for several years. When Detective Yeo asked defendant about the serious bedsores on her mothers legs and buttocks, defendant denied that Mrs. Bedsworth was bedridden and said that her mother had been sitting in one spot for a while. Defendant explained that Mrs. Bedsworth slept on the dinette, which folds out into a bed, and often her mother would sit on the bed all day, and then just put her head down on the pillow when it was time to go to sleep for the night. Defendant acknowledged that her mother needed help to get up but was able to walk to the bathroom on her own.
The detective taped the interview and the tape was played at trial for the jury. The jurors were also provided with a transcript of the taped interview.
Anthony, who was 16 years old at the time, is developmentally delayed.
Defendant told Detective Yeo that a couple days before she brought her mother to the hospital, defendant noticed that her mother had not been getting out of bed and going to the bathroom, so defendant rolled her mother over, examined her "bottom," and found the bedsores. Defendant realized the bedsores were serious and one was "really bad." Defendant cleaned the wounds with Bactine and treated them with Neosporin ointment. Defendant did not take her mother to a doctor because the bedsores were healing. When Detective Yeo pointed out that the bedsores would have been very painful, and asked whether defendants mother ever complained, defendant said no. Defendant also denied that her mother showed symptoms of pneumonia, other than that she had been blowing her nose a lot.
During that interview defendant made various statements regarding the condition of the motor home, including that it was "deplorable" and a "nasty mess," because defendant had just been throwing things around while caring for her mother. After stating several times that he was not concerned about the condition of the motor home, Detective Yeo ultimately told defendant that the condition of the motor home would only be a problem if it were "an unhealthy situation." Defendant responded, "Its an unhealthy situation. I have to clean it." Defendant acknowledged that the motor home had been "like that for a while." When Detective Yeo asked defendant whether she normally kept the motor home "[i]n the condition its in now" defendant answered, "No. No. Its horrible."
After talking with defendant at the hospital, Detective Yeo went to the motor home. The interior of the motor home was filthy — trash and clothing covered the floor, dried food was caked on unwashed pots and was also on the floor, stained and presumably soiled bedding was on a couch. The detective found rotten food in the refrigerator. The motor home smelled of urine, feces, and rotten food. Detective Yeo found a brown-stained pillow case and a similarly stained blanket on the bed where Mrs. Bedsworth slept. He also found an absorbent medical pad, the type used to protect a bed when a person is incontinent, and that pad had a partially dried brown stain.
In the bathroom of the motor home, Detective Yeo found medical supplies, such as ointment, but did not see any prescription medications for Mrs. Bedsworth. The shower was grimy and so cluttered it was unusable. The toilet was soiled with dried feces.
Mrs. Bedsworth was hospitalized on December 28 and placed on a ventilator. She died on February 19, the day after she was taken off life support. Dr. Glenn Holt, a forensic pathologist employed by the San Bernardino County Coroners Office, testified in pertinent part that he performed the autopsy of Mrs. Bedsworth. In his opinion, Mrs. Bedsworth died as a result of sepsis combined with multiple organ failure, all due to the decubitus ulcers, which in turn were caused by neglect of physical care. Dr. Holt also expressed the opinion that the manner of death was a homicide because Mrs. Bedsworth would "likely" have lived longer if it were not for the neglect of care.
Mrs. Bedsworth was transferred at some point to St. Bernadines Hospital in San Bernardino, which is where she died.
Over defendants various objections, the prosecution presented evidence of three other incidents, one in April 1998, another in February 2004, and the third in March 2004, that the prosecutor claimed were admissible under Evidence Code section 1109, as prior incidents of neglect. With respect to the 1998 incident, Detective Robbie Bornsheuer of the Colton Police Department testified in pertinent part that on April 5, 1998, he contacted defendant outside her mothers apartment as part of "an investigation." The detective explained to defendant that he needed to talk with her and asked to go inside in order to protect her privacy, but defendant initially refused and insisted on talking outside. After additional urging, defendant ultimately allowed the detective inside what defendant claimed was her mothers apartment, or "condo." The detective testified that the interior was in "terrible" condition, trash was strewn everywhere, and animal feces were ground into the carpet. Defendant said that she lived in a different condo in the same complex and had been living with her mother for a couple weeks to help her clean the place up. Defendants condo was in the same condition as that of her mothers. Detective Bornsheuer identified numerous photographs, which ultimately were admitted into evidence, that had been taken inside the two condos in 1998.
The February 2004 incident occurred at an RV park on the Ramona Expressway in Riverside County and involved a report that a woman in a motor home was yelling for help. The park manager and two women who responded to the calls for help testified in pertinent part that the motor home belonged to defendant and that the woman yelling for help was defendants mother. Defendants son Anthony was in the motor home with his grandmother and had to be coaxed to open the door. Each witness testified that the interior of the motor home was filthy, full of trash, and smelled like rotten food, urine and feces. The condition was so bad that the manager directed his office to call the police. Defendants mother, whom the manager testified looked very frail, had urinated on herself. She was crying and said she needed help to get up. She told the manager that defendant had been gone for a couple days and left her alone with Anthony. When a deputy sheriff arrived he decided to call the county department of social services. Defendant did not return during the two hours that the manager was at the motor home with the sheriffs deputy. The next day, defendants motor home was gone and there was trash on the ground in the space where it had been parked.
Defendant had a membership at the RV park and had regularly stayed there over the two years that preceded the incident.
One of the women testified that when Anthony opened the door, trash fell out onto the ground. There was so much trash inside the motor home that the sink in the kitchen area was not visible. The other woman testified that the place was "deep in trash, and it smelled of rotten food and of urine." The manager testified that he had to kick things out of his way in order to walk in the motor home.
The March 2004 incident was nearly identical to the one in February except that it occurred at a different RV park. The park manager testified in pertinent part that he went to defendants RV after getting a report that someone in the RV was yelling for help. The manager found defendants son outside and her mother inside the RV, but defendant was not there. Both the son and the mother seemed a bit disoriented. Because he was concerned that Mrs. Bedsworth might have had a stroke the manager called 911. According to the manager the inside of defendants RV was filthy.
A paramedic who responded to the 911 call testified that he called adult protective services because the inside of the RV was "absolutely filthy" and Mrs. Bedsworth was frail, had very dry skin, and sores or scabs on all the parts of her body that were exposed and visible to the paramedic. Mrs. Bedsworth was unable to answer four basic questions (person, place, time, and event), was only able to walk with assistance, and the only other person present was her disabled grandson. Because her blood pressure was high and she was unable to care for herself, the paramedic determined that Mrs. Bedsworth should go to a hospital. Defendant returned while the paramedic was evaluating Mrs. Bedsworth. Both the park manager and the paramedic told defendant that the condition inside the RV was unacceptable. Because she did not want her mother to be transported in an ambulance, defendant cleared her car (which also was a mess) and took Mrs. Bedsworth to a hospital.
A social worker who interviewed Mrs. Bedsworth in March at the hospital testified in pertinent part that Mrs. Bedsworth, although a little forgetful, was alert and very pleasant. She said that she lived in a motor home with her daughter and 16-year-old grandson and that they had been traveling around for the past year. When the social worker asked about her feet, which were very dirty, Mrs. Bedsworth explained that they tried to stay in campgrounds that had showers, so the social worker assumed that Mrs. Bedsworth had not bathed for a while. Defendant told the social worker that she had only gone out to get breakfast but while she was away her mother started to yell for help and then someone called the police. Defendant also said that she did not want her mother to be transported by ambulance because she wanted to make sure Mrs. Bedsworth was taken to a hospital that accepted her insurance.
Before discharging her from the hospital in March, the nurse who directed the rehabilitation center spoke with Mrs. Bedsworth. That nurse testified at trial that after she conducted an assessment of Mrs. Bedsworth, she made a report to adult protective services because Mrs. Bedsworth "was a high-risk elder, whose health was really in jeopardy of further decline. She didnt have good care, and she appeared to be neglected . . . when she came into our hospital."
DISCUSSION
Defendant, as noted previously, raises various challenges to the admissibility of evidence regarding the incidents in April 1998, and February and March 2004. The prosecution sought to introduce that evidence at trial on the ground that the incidents in question constituted prior acts of elder abuse which are admissible under Evidence Code section 1109 and in any event the evidence was admissible under section 1101, subdivision (b) to prove some fact other than defendants propensity to neglect or abuse her mother. Defendant argued in the trial court as she does on appeal that the evidence was not relevant because none of the three incidents involved elder abuse and therefore the evidence was inadmissible under section 1109. According to defendant, the evidence was nothing more than evidence of her bad character and as such was inadmissible under section 1101, subdivision (a).
All further statutory references are to the Evidence Code unless indicated otherwise.
The trial court initially agreed with defendant regarding the 1998 incident, but found that the incidents in February and March 2004 were admissible under section 1109 as prior acts of elder abuse. After considering offers of proof and additional argument, the trial court changed its ruling regarding the 1998 incident and found that it too was admissible as evidence of a prior act of abuse by defendant.
Defendant argues in this appeal that the trial courts rulings were incorrect first because none of the prior incidents involved elder abuse, as that crime is statutorily defined. But even if admissible for some purpose other than to show her bad character, defendant contends the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by its potential for prejudice, and therefore should have been excluded under section 352. Finally defendant contends that at the very least the photographs taken in 1998 of the interior of the condos where she lived and where her mother lived depicted conditions so shocking that any probative value was substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect of that evidence. We disagree with defendant.
Section 1109, subdivision (a)(2) states, in pertinent part, that "in a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of an offense involving abuse of an elder or dependent person, evidence of the defendants commission of other abuse of an elder or dependent person is not made inadmissible by Section 1101 if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352." Section 1101, subdivision (a), in turn, provides, "Except as provided in this section and in Sections 1102, 1103, 1108, and 1109, evidence of a persons character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion." Subdivision (b) of section 1101 makes "evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act" admissible "when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or whether a defendant in a prosecution for an unlawful sexual act or attempted unlawful sexual act did not reasonably and in good faith believe that the victim consented) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act." (§ 1101, subd. (b).)
Defendant contends that although she had been living with her mother for several weeks, her mother was not in her care or custody in 1998, and therefore that incident could not have constituted elder abuse. Penal Code section 368, subdivision (b)(1) defines the crime of elder abuse and provides, in pertinent part that, "Any person who knows or reasonably should know that a person is an elder or dependent adult and who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any elder or dependent adult to suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any elder or dependent adult, willfully causes or permits the person or health of the elder or dependent adult to be injured, or willfully causes or permits the elder or dependent adult to be placed in a situation in which his or her person or health is endangered," is guilty of a crime.
As the trial court instructed the jury, whether defendants actions in 1998 and in February and March 2004 constituted elder abuse was a question of fact for the jury to decide, and the jury could only consider those incidents if it first found by a preponderance of the evidence that "defendant in fact committed the uncharged abuse of an elder." Whether her mother was in her care or custody in 1998 therefore was a question of fact for the jury to decide. Moreover, even if inadmissible under section 1109, the 1998 incident, including the photographs of the interior of the condos in which defendant and her mother lived, was relevant and thus admissible under section 1101, subdivision (b), quoted above, to refute defendants statement to Detective Yeo, recounted above, that suggested the condition inside the motor home in the current case was not normal or usual. In other words, the evidence of defendants conduct, not only in 1998 but also in February and March 2004, was admissible to show that the condition inside the motor home at the time pertinent to the charged crime was not a mistake or an aberration.
We also must reject defendants claim that the trial court should have excluded the prior acts under section 352, which provides in relevant part that a trial court "in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." We review this aspect of the trial courts ruling for abuse of discretion. (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 609.) "`[T]he term judicial discretion "implies absence of arbitrary determination, capricious disposition or whimsical thinking." [Citation.] `[D]iscretion is abused whenever the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered. [Citation.]" (People v. Mullens (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 648, 658.)
"`The prejudice which [section 352] is designed to avoid is not the prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally flows from relevant, highly probative evidence. [Citations.] `Rather, the statute uses the word in its etymological sense of "prejudging" a person or cause on the basis of extraneous factors. [Citation.] [Citation.]" (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 958.) In each prior incident as well as in the incident upon which the charges are based, defendant, along with her mother and son, lived in filth amid garbage and debris. The circumstances of the three prior incidents were no more shocking than those surrounding the charge for which defendant was on trial. Therefore, evidence of the three prior incidents did not create a substantial danger of undue prejudice in this case, defendants contrary claim notwithstanding.
Finally, we also must reject defendants assertion that the photographs depicting the interiors of the condos in which she and her mother each lived in 1998 were unduly prejudicial and, therefore, should have been excluded under section 352. We have viewed those photographs and agree with defendant that the scenes depicted are shocking and we find it difficult to understand how anyone could live in the conditions depicted. However, the photographs were relevant not only to refute defendants claim that her mother was a slob who did not take care of herself, but also to show that defendants conduct was not a mistake or an aberration, as previously discussed. Given that relevance and the fact that the jury also saw photographs that depicted the condition inside the motor home at the time of defendants arrest, we must conclude that the 1998 photographs were not unduly prejudicial in that they did not effectively encourage the jury to prejudge the case based on extraneous factors. (People v. Zapien, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 958.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The abstract of judgment is amended to reflect a fine of $600, which includes penalty assessments. The trial court is directed to prepare an amended abstract that correctly states the amount of the fine, and forward copies of the amended abstract to the appropriate agencies.
We concur:
Richli, J.
Miller, J.