Opinion
June 9, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Niagara County, Koshian, J.
Present — Denman, P.J., Green, Wesley, Doerr and Balio, JJ.
Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant was not denied the right to be present at a material stage of trial when defense counsel and the prosecutor reached a Sandoval compromise outside of his presence. Although the better practice would have been to have defendant present "during every colloquy relating to the Sandoval question" (People v. Favor, 82 N.Y.2d 254, 268, rearg denied 83 N.Y.2d 801), reversal is not required. Prior to trial, in defendant's presence, Supreme Court explained the terms of the attorneys' stipulation. The court asked defendant if he understood the terms of the stipulation and if he consented to it. Defense counsel indicated that he had discussed the Sandoval compromise with defendant. Defendant then stated that he understood and consented to the stipulation. The record supports the conclusion that defendant waived his right to be present (see generally, People v. Spotford, 85 N.Y.2d 593).
The totality of the circumstances supports the conclusion of the suppression court that defendant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his Miranda rights (see, People v. Siler, 197 A.D.2d 842, lv denied 82 N.Y.2d 903; People v. Denis, 181 A.D.2d 1017, lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 1048; People v. Hill, 175 A.D.2d 603). Defendant's present argument that the People's CPL 710.30 notice was incomplete is not preserved for our review (see, CPL 470.05). The evidence is sufficient to support the verdict and the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see, People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495). The evidence of extensive use of drugs by defendant, his knowledge of drug terminology and his familiarity with the packaging of drugs for sale is sufficient to support an inference that defendant knew that he possessed a narcotic substance with an aggregate weight of 1/8 ounce (see, People v. Ryan, 82 N.Y.2d 497, 505). Defendant did not object to the court's charge on circumstantial evidence, thereby failing to preserve for our review his present argument concerning its propriety (see, CPL 470.05). In any event, the charge as given adequately conveyed to the jury the proper basis for evaluating circumstantial evidence (see, People v Ford, 66 N.Y.2d 428, 441; People v. Sanchez, 61 N.Y.2d 1022, 1024; People v. Porter, 179 A.D.2d 1018, 1019, lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 1006). We decline to modify defendant's sentence as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see, CPL 470.15 [b]).