Opinion
B193951
11-16-2007
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DANTHONY LANCE BEAL, Defendant and Appellant.
Syda Kosofsky, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Victoria B. Wilson and Ryan M. Smith, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
The jury convicted defendant Danthony Lance Beal, who drove the getaway car, of two counts of robbery. (Pen. Code, § 211.) He received a three-year prison sentence. He contends on appeal that: (1) his motion for acquittal should have been granted; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict; and (3) he should have been granted probation. We reject his contentions and affirm.
BACKGROUND
Shortly before 10 p.m. on September 13, 2005, Brandon Davila was hit in the face and robbed by two men who displayed a knife outside an Arco station in Torrance. Just after 10 p.m. and about a mile away, Oren Sheldon was thrown to the ground, beaten, kicked, and robbed by two men who displayed a knife outside a car dealership in Torrance. Sheldon, who was 70 years old, sustained lacerations and bruises, particularly to the head and ribs, and had his pants leg torn off during the assault.
At 10:22 p.m., based on a bystanders description of the getaway car, Torrance police stopped a car driven by defendant as he was heading east on Sepulveda Boulevard, just west of Cabrillo Avenue, about two and a half miles from the car dealership. As the officers exited the patrol car, however, defendant suddenly accelerated and turned right onto Cabrillo Avenue. The officers saw the left rear passenger, Jason Cameron, making "furtive movements like . . . he was tucking objects into the seat behind him." The officers followed the car around the corner, where it stopped on Cabrillo, about two to three car lengths south of Sepulveda.
The police ordered defendant and his three passengers out of the vehicle. Davila and Sheldon were brought to the scene for a field identification showup and they each identified the two rear passengers, Cameron and Bryan Parker, as their assailants. Neither victim saw the getaway car and neither identified defendant.
The police recovered both victims stolen property from the rear passenger compartment, including: (1) Sheldons torn pants leg; (2) Sheldons empty wallet; (3) Sheldons planner; (4) Davilas cell phone; and (5) two Blow Pop lollipops that Davila had purchased at the Arco station just before the robbery. In addition, the police found two knives, in plain view, on the rear seat and protruding from a pouch behind the drivers seat.
A total of $355 had been stolen from both victims and the police recovered $396 from the car and its occupants. In addition to $107 found in defendants wallet, the police found $106 on Carlton Holmes, the front passenger, $20 on Cameron, $152 wedged in the back seat of the car, and $11 where it had fallen on the ground as Cameron exited the vehicle.
Defendant testified at trial that his father had given him the $107 in his wallet. Defendant denied receiving any money from Cameron or Parker. Defendant testified that Camerons brother owned the vehicle, which he was driving only because Cameron had forgotten his license. Defendant described Cameron as a "[c]lose friend" who lived "in the same neighborhood, and I knew him for a number of years." On the night in question, Cameron was "the director" and was telling defendant, who was unfamiliar with the area, where to drive. Defendant testified to having stopped at three places before being pulled over by the police: (1) once to use the restroom at a service station; (2) again for Cameron and Parker to use the restroom at an Arco station but it was out of order; and (3) a third time for Cameron and Parker to use the restroom at a shopping center. Defendant did not see what Cameron and Parker were doing when they left the car because defendant was facing the other way, listening to the radio, and using his cell phone. Defendant did not see anything in Cameron or Parkers hands when they walked back to the car. When the police pulled over the car, defendant initially thought it was a routine traffic stop. He turned the corner before stopping because he did not want to stop in the middle of the intersection. He did not see the rear passengers squirming around or trying to hide things in the back seat.
In rebuttal, the prosecution presented defendants interview statements to Detective Rudolph, in which he initially denied having made any stops before being pulled over by the police while looking for the freeway in order to go home. It was only after being asked specifically about the Arco station on Sepulveda Boulevard and Ocean Avenue (where Davila was robbed) that defendant admitted to having stopped there to use the restroom. Contrary to his testimony that he did not see anything in the codefendants hands when they returned to the vehicle, defendant told Rudolph that "they had a candy in their hand, one of them did. And he assumed they went to the store" at the Arco station. Defendant then described stopping at a parking lot, where Parker and Cameron "got out and came back." Defendant told Rudolph that Cameron and Parker "were his friends and he didnt want to tell on anybody because they wouldnt talk to him again."
DISCUSSION
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant contends that his motion for acquittal should have been granted at the conclusion of the prosecutions case-in-chief because of insufficient evidence of his liability as an aider and abettor. He similarly argues for reversal of the judgment due to insufficient evidence that he aided and abetted the commission of the robberies. The contentions lack merit.
A. Aider and Abettor Liability
"`A person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or she, (i) with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, (ii) and with the intent or purpose of committing, facilitating or encouraging commission of the crime, (iii) by act or advice, aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime. (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1164; People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 561.) [¶] `Whether defendant aided and abetted the crime is a question of fact, and on appeal all conflicts in the evidence and reasonable inferences must be resolved in favor of the judgment. (People v. Mitchell (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 325, 329.)" (People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409.)
"For purposes of determining aider and abettor liability, the commission of a robbery continues until all acts constituting the offense have ceased. The taking element of robbery itself has two necessary elements, gaining possession of the victims property and asporting or carrying away the loot. (See People v. Perhab (1949) 92 Cal.App.2d 430.)" (People v. Cooper. supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1164-1165, fn. omitted.) But asportation is not the same as escape. In Cooper, the Supreme Court held that a getaway driver in a robbery is not liable under an aiding and abetting theory "if that person was unaware of the robbery until after all of the acts constituting robbery, including the asportation, had ceased. Such a driver is powerless to either prevent the robbery, or end the acts constituting the robbery if such acts have already ceased. Although the law should also deter the getaway driver from helping the robbers escape from justice after commission of the crime has ended, this goal is appropriately served by the threat of liability as an accessory after the fact. Thus, in determining liability as an aider and abettor, the focus must be on the acts constituting the robbery, not the escape." (Id. at p. 1168.) The Supreme Court further explained that "[t]he intent of such a getaway driver is to be distinguished from one who agrees before (or during) commission of a robbery to be a getaway driver and thereby encourages and/or facilitates the commission of the robbery. In such circumstances, the driver could be liable as an aider and abettor of the robbery." (Id. at p. 1168, fn. 12.)
B. Motion for Acquittal
Penal Code section 1118.1 provides that in a jury trial, the defendant may move, at the close of the evidence on either side and before the case is submitted to the jury, for the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses on appeal. In ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal under section 1118.1, the trial court applies the same standard "applied by an appellate court in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, that is, `whether from the evidence, including all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, there is any substantial evidence of the existence of each element of the offense charged. [Citations.]" (People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 139, fn. 13.)
Evidence is "substantial" if it is "reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) Except where additional evidence is required by statute, the testimony of one witness, if believed, is sufficient to prove any fact. (Evid. Code, § 411; People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 263.) In addition, "`"`[c]ircumstantial evidence may be sufficient to connect a defendant with the crime and to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." [Citations.] [Citations.]" (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1329.)
C. Analysis
Defendant argues that his motion for acquittal should have been granted at the close of the prosecutions case-in-chief because the prosecution failed to prove his liability as an aider and abetter in the robberies. Defendant claims that the prosecutions evidence failed to show that he had any knowledge, before or during the commission of the robberies, of Cameron and Parkers criminal intent and purpose. We disagree with defendants view of the evidence, which included substantial circumstantial evidence that he drove the getaway car as a willing participant in the robberies.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, the evidence supports a reasonable inference that defendant had driven both to the Arco station and the car dealership in order for Cameron and Parker, who were armed with knives, to commit robberies. Defendant described Cameron as a close friend who was directing him where to drive that night. Knives used in the robberies were found in plain view inside the car. Cameron and Parker twice came back to the car, within minutes, carrying personal items belonging to both victims—a wallet, planner, torn pants leg, cell phone, candy, and cash. Shortly thereafter, defendant was pulled over by police while looking for the freeway in order to go home, and behaved suspiciously by accelerating around the corner as his passengers were hiding stolen property in the back seat. A reasonable jury could infer that because the cash recovered from the car and passengers fell short of the amount stolen from the victims, defendants wallet contained some of the stolen cash. A reasonable jury could also infer that the stolen cash was given to defendant for serving as the getaway driver. The prosecutions evidence, accordingly, contained substantial circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that defendant was a willing participant in the robberies. We therefore reject defendants contention that the motion for acquittal was erroneously denied.
Although defendants testimony provided an alternative explanation that, if believed, suggested he was innocent, the jury reasonably rejected his testimony as false. On rebuttal, it was established that defendant, during his interview at the police station, had admitted to having seen Cameron and Parker return to the car with Davilas candy, which undermined his testimony that he was unaware of the knives, cash, and numerous stolen items found inside the car. In addition, defendant initially lied to the detective, denying he made any stops that evening, which supported the jurys finding that he was lying to hide his own guilt and not just to protect his friends. In short, the record contains substantial evidence that defendant was a knowing and willing participant in the robberies and was driving the getaway car specifically for that purpose.
In his reply brief, defendant cites People v. Hill (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 287, in which the getaway driver, Ingram, was improperly convicted as an aider and abettor in a robbery based solely on the incriminating circumstance that he had driven the perpetrators to the robbery location and waited in the car until they returned. We distinguish Hill for several reasons, including the absence of any evidence that Ingram had seen the gun used in the robbery, received a share of the proceeds, or attempted to assist the perpetrators to escape detection.
II. Denial of Probation
The trial court received numerous letters from defendants friends, family, and community leaders in support of his request for probation. The trial court was informed that this was defendants first criminal offense, he came from a stable and loving family, he had completed a 375-hour automotive maintenance course, and his employer was willing to take responsibility for him. The trial court also heard defendant express remorse "for what happened on that day" and for the inexcusable way in which Sheldon, who was 70 years old, had been beaten, kicked, and robbed.
The trial court acknowledged that defendant had several mitigating factors in his favor, such as "a good upbringing," "very concerned, involved, parents," and "a loving family," but it questioned "how it could be that all of this went out the window in one evening." The trial court concluded that, on balance, the aggravating factors weighed in favor of a denial of probation. The trial court noted that Sheldon had been "humiliated" and "beaten severely," which made this a "more aggravated" robbery. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.414(a)(1) [factors in aggravation include the relative seriousness and circumstances of the crime].) In addition, although defendant expressed remorse at the sentencing hearing, he had lied under oath at trial about his lack of awareness of the crimes. (Rule 4.414(b)(7) [factors in aggravation include whether the defendant is remorseful].) Finally, Sheldon was vulnerable in that he was 70 years old and walking alone at 10 p.m. in front of a closed car dealership. (Rule 4.414(a)(3) [factors in aggravation include the vulnerability of the victim].)
All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for probation. We disagree. It is sufficient to state a single aggravating factor in support of the denial of probation (People v. Robinson (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 609, 615), and here there were at least three. Moreover, a trial courts discretion in determining a defendants suitability for probation is broad (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 233), whereas the defendants burden when attempting to show an abuse of discretion is heavy. (People v. Aubrey (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 279, 282.) A trial court abuses its discretion when its reasons for denying probation are arbitrary, capricious, or beyond the bounds of reason. (See People v. Warner (1978) 20 Cal.3d 678, 683.) There was no abuse of discretion in this case.
Defendant cites numerous first degree residential robbery cases for the proposition that victims who are alone indoors are more vulnerable than those who are outdoors. He contends that Sheldon was not vulnerable because he was outside on a public street and had access to help. The cited cases, however, are distinguishable because nothing in the residential robbery statute or case law precludes a trial court from finding that an outdoor robbery victim was vulnerable under the particular circumstances of the case. The fact that residential robbery victims are vulnerable when they are surprised by an intruder while alone indoors does not mean that outdoor robbery victims cannot also be vulnerable. Although it was fortunate that Sheldon happened to receive prompt assistance after the attack, it does not lessen his vulnerability under the circumstances.
Finally, defendant contends that he should have been granted probation because he was unaware that "Cameron and Parker were robbing someone at the time, much less that . . . they were robbing someone who was vulnerable." As noted by the trial court, however, the jury found that defendant was lying with regard to his lack of knowledge of Cameron and Parkers criminal intent. Nor was the trial court required to believe defendants claim that he did not know Cameron and Parker were planning to rob Sheldon. We find no abuse of discretion.
In anticipation of a waiver argument (that the Attorney General did not raise in the response brief), defendant alternatively argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in not objecting below to the finding of vulnerability. Given our consideration and rejection of that issue on the merits, the ineffective assistance claim must fail for lack of prejudice.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur:
WILLHITE, Acting P. J.
MANELLA, J.