Opinion
3-10-0921
2013-09-19
In re B.C.P., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellant, v. B.C.P., Respondent-Appellee).
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court
of the 14th Judicial Circuit,
Henry County, Illinois,
Appeal No. 3-10-0921
Circuit No. 10-JD-25
Honorable
Ted J. Hamer,
Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Holdridge and McDade concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: In an appeal from the grant of a motion to suppress confession in a juvenile-delinquency case, the appellate court held that the respondent-minor was in custody and should have been given Miranda warnings prior to his interrogation. The appellate court, therefore, affirmed the trial court's judgment, which granted the respondent's motion to suppress his confession. ¶ 2 The State filed a juvenile-delinquency petition, alleging that the then 13-year-old respondent, B.C.P., was a delinquent minor in that he had committed two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16(c)(2)(i) (West 2010)) and seeking to have respondent made a ward of the court. Respondent filed a motion to suppress his confession on the grounds that he had not been advised of his Miranda rights. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to suppress. The State filed a certificate of impairment and brought an interlocutory appeal to challenge the trial court's ruling. Finding that the Supreme Court Rules did not provide for such an appeal by the State in a juvenile-delinquency proceeding, we dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In re B.C.P., 2012 IL App (3d) 100921, ¶ 12. The Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making authority, modified the rule to vest jurisdiction in this court to hear the appeal, reversed our decision, and remanded the case for us to review the merits of the State's appeal. In re B.C.P., 2013 IL 113908, ¶ 20. Having done so, we find for the reasons that follow that the trial court properly granted the motion to suppress, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 3 FACTS
¶ 4 In June 2010, the State filed the instant juvenile-delinquency petition as to respondent. Both counts of the petition alleged that between April 1 and May 7, 2010, respondent committed aggravated criminal sexual abuse in that he committed an act of sexual conduct with M.L.K., who was under the age of nine when the act was committed, in that he knowingly placed his hands on M.L.K.'s chest and vagina for the purpose of his own sexual gratification. Respondent filed a motion to suppress his confession. In the motion, respondent alleged that he was interrogated on May 10 by police officer Ryan Tone and a child protection investigator; that at the time, he was a minor and was not aware that he was free to leave, or that he did not have to respond to questions, or that he could have an attorney present; that he was not advised of his Miranda rights; that he gave an inculpatory statement; and that his statement should be suppressed. ¶ 5 A hearing was held on the motion in December. At the hearing, Special Agent Ryan Tone testified that he had been a police officer with the Illinois State Police for 23 years, the past 10 of which he had spent as a special agent investigating felony crimes. On May 10 at about 4 p.m., Tone and Mike Conner from the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) went to respondent's residence in an attempt to interview him. A few days earlier, Tone had witnessed an interview with the victim at the child advocacy center. Tone had no other suspect at that time and felt, based upon the interview, that he had reasonable suspicion to believe that respondent had committed the offense. Tone had not met respondent previously and did not remember if he had called ahead before he went to respondent's residence. ¶ 6 Upon arriving at the residence, Tone rang the doorbell or knocked on the door but did not remember who answered. Tone was dressed in a shirt and tie, did not have a weapon displayed, and did not remember if he showed his identification, although he testified that it was not customary for him to do so. Tone spoke to respondent and his family, and they consented to an interview of respondent. Respondent was 13 or 14 years old at the time. The family requested that the interview take place outside, so Tone conducted the interview about 30 feet away from the door of the residence next to his parked, unmarked squad car. Tone did not read respondent his Miranda rights because, according to Tone, the interview was noncustodial. Respondent's mother was welcomed to be present for the interview and was present for most of the interview, although at one point, she went back into the residence to get respondent's stepfather. According to Tone, no evidentiary questions were asked of respondent during the time when respondent's mother was absent. ¶ 7 During the interview, respondent was not handcuffed or arrested and Tone never drew or displayed his weapon. When he was questioning respondent, Tone went over the importance of telling the truth. As the interview progressed, respondent admitted that on one occasion, he had touched a child's chest, buttocks, and vagina while they were watching a television show called Wizards of Waverly Place and that on another occasion, he walked into a bathroom where a child was taking a bath and placed his hands on that child's chest, vagina, and buttocks. Respondent declined to make a written statement to that effect but did agree to sign a page of Tone's notes from the interview. Respondent acknowledged in front of both his mother and his stepfather that the notes accurately reflected what he had told Tone. The signed note page was later admitted into evidence at the hearing. ¶ 8 Tone told respondent that he was not under arrest, that he was not going to be arrested, and that when the interview was over, he was going to go back into the house and watch television or play or do whatever he was going to do. Tone did not tell respondent that he did not have to answer questions or that he could have a lawyer because the interview was noncustodial. Tone denied that he ever told respondent that he knew respondent had committed the offense. According to Tone, if respondent had declined the interview, Tone would not have placed him under arrest at that time. Tone stated that he never raised his voice to get respondent to confess and did not convey in any way to respondent that respondent was being forced to participate in the interview. Tone stated further that he just asked respondent to tell the truth. ¶ 9 Respondent's mother, J.H., testified that on the date and time in question, Tone and Conner showed up at the family's residence unexpected. J.H. answered the door. Tone and Conner told her that they had a few questions that they needed to ask respondent. Respondent had never been questioned by a police officer before. J.H. called respondent out of his bedroom and introduced him to Tone. Tone asked to conduct the interview outside because he was allergic to the family's cats. Tone told J.H. that she could stay in the house, but J.H. stated that she was not going to allow her son to go outside and answer questions without her being present. Tone never told them that respondent did not have to answer any questions. ¶ 10 As the interview progressed, Tone kept asking respondent about the incident he was investigating and kept telling respondent that he knew that respondent did it. Respondent kept denying the allegation and was in tears. J.H. tried to comfort respondent and Tone yelled at her to shut up and told her that she was upsetting respondent. J.H. got upset and went to get respondent's stepfather. J.H. admitted that both she and respondent signed Tone's page of notes and stated that she did so because she was stupid. J.H. described respondent as being "pretty smart" but stated that he was in a few special education classes because it took him longer to learn how to read. J.H. acknowledged that Tone did not pull a weapon on them, or handcuff respondent, or use any force against her, but stated that Tone did raise his voice to her when he told her to shut up. J.H. stated that after a while, respondent merely started telling Tone what he wanted to hear. At that point, J.H. and Tone both told respondent that they just wanted to know the truth. Upon questioning from the court, J.H. stated that Tone never told respondent that he was not under arrest or that he was free to go. ¶ 11 Respondent testified that he remembered Tone coming to the house unexpectedly in the springtime. Inside the house, Tone introduced himself to respondent, told respondent that he was a police officer and that he was coming to see respondent about respondent touching M.L.K., and stated that he wanted to ask respondent some questions. Respondent went outside with Tone and J.H. went with them. Respondent did not remember if Tone said anything to J.H. about whether she could come outside with them. Tone questioned respondent outside by the street by Tone's parked car. Tone told respondent that he wanted to ask him some questions and that his answers had to be the truth. Tone did not tell respondent that he did not have to answer questions, and respondent thought that he had to go with Tone. Tone did not tell respondent that he could have a lawyer with him. Tone never raised his voice when he was with respondent. Tone kept telling respondent that he knew respondent did it, and respondent kept denying it. Eventually, respondent gave in because Tone kept persisting and made respondent cry and because respondent was tired of it. Respondent signed the page of notes, although he did not know what was on it. Respondent acknowledged that Tone told him to be truthful and admitted during his testimony that he had made the incriminating statements to Tone but stated that Tone told him what to say. Respondent stated that he lied and told Tone that he committed the offense because Tone kept insisting that he had done it and because he was crying and Tone had told his mother to shut up. ¶ 12 Upon being recalled, Tone testified that he did not remember telling J.H. to shut up during the interview. According to Tone, during the interview respondent was very quiet, embarrassed, and withdrawn. Tone told respondent that he thought respondent was still "cross-wired" because of respondent's past, which caused respondent to open up. Tone stated that respondent was horrified by what he had done and may have cried during the interview, although Tone did not remember. According to Tone, there was no mention of the television show, Wizards of Waverly Place, in the victim's child advocacy interview, and Tone was surprised when respondent brought that up. Upon questioning from the court, Tone acknowledged that he had other pages of notes but stated that they were likely destroyed and that only the page with respondent's signature was kept. Tone also acknowledged that he was allergic to cats and that he may have suggested that the interview take place outside if the family had cats. ¶ 13 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court made its decision. The trial court first made a determination of the relevant facts. The trial court found that: (1) respondent was the focus of the investigation and there were no other suspects; (2) Tone went to the residence in an attempt to gather incriminating information from respondent; (3) the interview of respondent did not take place at the police station and no guns were drawn, but it was conducted outside by Tone's unmarked squad car, rather than in the house, because Tone was allergic to the family's cats; (4) respondent's mother was present for the interview; and (5) respondent was not arrested, even after the statement was given. Considering those facts, the trial court determined that a reasonable 13-year-old in respondent's position would have believed that he was in custody at the time of the interrogation and that he was not free to leave. The trial court went on to rule that because respondent was clearly the focus of the investigation, Miranda warnings should have been given before any statements of an incriminating nature were taken from respondent. Accordingly, the trial court granted respondent's motion to suppress his confession. The trial court noted, however, that the respondent's will was not overcome and that his statement was voluntarily given such that the statement could be used for impeachment purposes if respondent testified to something different at the adjudicatory hearing. ¶ 14 After a brief recess, the State made an oral motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied. The State filed a certificate of impairment and notice of appeal, and the case progressed initially on appeal as noted above.
All of the dates listed in this order are from the year 2010. The year has been omitted from this point forward for simplicity purposes.
¶ 15 ANALYSIS
¶ 16 As to the merits of this appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred in granting respondent's motion to suppress his confession. The State asserts first that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in determining whether respondent was in custody for the purposes of Miranda. According to the State, the trial court should have applied a reasonable person standard rather than one that took into account respondent's age. As respondent correctly points out, however, the reasonable juvenile standard is the one that our state supreme court has recognized and applied in the past (see, e.g., People v. Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d 492, 510 (2003); People v. Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d 322, 366 (2008)) and is one which has recently been held to be applicable by the United States Supreme Court as well (see J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2398-99 (2011)). Thus, we reject the State's argument in that regard. ¶ 17 As an alternative assertion, the State contends that respondent was not in custody for the purposes of Miranda because under the facts of the present case, a reasonable 13 year old would not have thought that he was not free to end the encounter and leave the interrogation. The State contends further that the trial court placed too much emphasis on the fact that respondent was the focus of the investigation and that the trial court improperly based its decision upon that single factor. Respondent disagrees with those contentions and argues that the trial court's ruling was correct and should be affirmed. ¶ 18 A reviewing court applies a two-part standard of review to a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress statements. See People v. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d 137, 149 (2008). The trial court's findings of fact and credibility determinations are given great deference and will not be reversed on appeal unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. However, as to the ultimate legal question posed by the motion, including whether suppression is warranted, de novo review applies. Id. ¶ 19 In determining whether an individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda, a court makes two inquiries: (1) what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and (2) given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt that he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. Id. at 150. When examining the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, there are several factors that a court considers, including the location, time, length, mood, and mode of the interrogation; the number of police officers present; the presence or absence of the family and friends of the accused; any indicia of formal arrest; the manner by which the accused arrived at the place of interrogation; and the age, intelligence and mental makeup of the accused. Id. The officer's own subjective beliefs as to whether the individual being interrogated is a suspect are generally not relevant in the inquiry, unless the officer made those beliefs known to the individual. Id. at 153. After considering and weighing those factors, the court must then make an objective determination as to whether, under the facts presented, a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would have believed that he or she was free to terminate the interrogation and leave. Id. at 150. In addition, as noted above, when a juvenile is involved the test must be modified to determine what a reasonable person of that age would have believed under the circumstances. See J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2398-99; Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 510; Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d at 366. ¶ 20 When we review the facts of the present case under the reasonable juvenile standard, we find that respondent was in custody at the time of the interrogation. Although respondent was not handcuffed or at the police station, he was also not in the security of his home as the interview took place outside of his residence, at Tone's request, next to Tone's unmarked squad car. There were two authority figures present, Tone and Conner. Respondent was a 13-year-old boy, who was described as being "pretty-smart" by his mother, although he had been in some special education classes because of difficulty reading. Respondent had never been interviewed by the police before. Respondent was not told that he was free to leave or that he did not have to answer Tone's questions. The mood of the interview was such that respondent was crying during the interview. Although respondent's mother was present, there was conflicting testimony as to whether Tone told respondent's mother to shut up. There was also conflicting testimony as to whether Tone repeatedly told respondent that he knew respondent had committed the offense, despite respondent's repeated denials, and whether Tone told respondent that he was not under arrest. Those conflicts in the evidence were for the trial court to resolve since the trial court had observed the testimony of the witnesses. See Slater, 228 Ill. 2d at 149. Under the facts of the present case, a reasonable 13-year-old would not have felt that he was free to end the interrogation and leave the encounter. Thus, respondent was in custody at the time of the interrogation and should have been given Miranda warnings prior to any questioning. See id. at 150. His motion to suppress his confession, therefore, was properly granted by the trial court. Contrary to the State's assertion on appeal, we find no indication that the trial court placed too much emphasis on any single factor in conducting its analysis. ¶ 21 In concluding that the motion to suppress was properly granted, we note that this case is distinguishable from the case of In re Tyler G., 407 Ill. App. 3d 1089 (2010), a case that is heavily relied upon by the State in support of its argument on appeal. In Tyler G., the Fourth District Appellate Court found that the 13-year-old respondent was not in custody when the interrogation in question took place in the respondent's home, with his primary caretaker present, and involved only a single police officer. Id. at 1093. The facts of Tyler G. are different from the facts of the instant case in which respondent was questioned with two authority figures present and the questioning took place outside by an unmarked squad car, rather than in respondent's home. See id. at 1093. In addition, in the instant case there was contradictory testimony as to certain aspects of the interrogation, which presented a question of credibility for the trial court to resolve. See Slater, 228 Ill. 2d at 149. It is also unclear from the decision in Tyler G. whether the appellate court in that case applied the standard of a reasonable person or of a reasonable 13-year-old. See id. at 1092-93. For those reasons, we find that Tyler G. is not comparable to the present case.
¶ 22 CONCLUSION
¶ 23 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Henry County. ¶ 24 Affirmed.