People v. Baugh

7 Citing cases

  1. People v. Turcios

    228 Ill. App. 3d 583 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)   Cited 24 times
    Rejecting ineffectiveness claim based on failure to tender instruction where evidence showed no reasonable probability that defendant would be convicted of attempted second degree murder

    As a matter affecting credibility, a defendant has a right to inquire about any interest, bias, or motive to testify falsely on the part of a witness. ( People v. Baugh (1981), 96 Ill. App.3d 946.) Impeachment of a witness for the purpose of showing bias in testifying is an important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination. People v. Betts (1983), 116 Ill. App.3d 551.

  2. People v. Austin

    123 Ill. App. 3d 788 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)   Cited 26 times
    Recognizing that "an illegal alien, like a probationer, might be vulnerable to pressure, real or imagined, from the authorities"

    The key factor is not the existence of actual pressure, but the witness' state of mind. ( People v. Baugh (1981), 96 Ill. App.3d 946, 951, 422 N.E.2d 166.) Where the witness is in a position to contemplate the possibility of leniency or favor, the defendant should be allowed to question the witness concerning these matters.

  3. People v. Harmon

    2015 Ill. App. 122345 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015)   Cited 132 times

    The key factor is not the existence of actual pressure, but the witness's state of mind. People v. Baugh, 96 Ill.App.3d 946, 951, 52 Ill.Dec. 485, 422 N.E.2d 166 (1981). Where the witness is in a position to contemplate the possibility of leniency or favor, the defendant should be allowed to question the witness concerning these matters.

  4. People v. Rainone

    530 N.E.2d 1026 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)   Cited 9 times

    • 5 If the record reflects that the jury has been made aware of adequate areas of impeachment of the witness, the prohibition of further cross-examination does not result in error. ( People v. Lindgren (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 112, 443 N.E.2d 1129; People v. Baugh (1981), 96 Ill. App.3d 946, 422 N.E.2d 166.) Additionally, there is no abuse of discretion in restricting cross-examination when, as here, the jury is informed that the witness has been charged with a crime and that there has been no promise of leniency in exchange for the witness' testimony.

  5. People v. Harrell

    445 N.E.2d 496 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)   Cited 6 times

    We find the Lindgren holding controlling. • 3 As a further basis for our holding we note that the court in People v. Baugh (1981), 96 Ill. App.3d 946, 951, 422 N.E.2d 166, 171, stated: "The issue under the confrontation clause is whether the jury has been made aware of adequate factors to determine whether a witness is worthy of belief, not whether any particular limitation has been placed upon defendant's ability to cross-examine a witness or whether the jury has knowledge of any specific fact. [Citations.] Thus, if it appears from the entire record that the jury has been made aware of adequate factors concerning relevant areas of impeachment of a witness, no constitutional question arises merely because defendant has been prohibited, on cross-examination, from pursuing other areas of inquiry. [Citation.]"

  6. People v. Lindgren

    111 Ill. App. 3d 112 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)   Cited 21 times
    Rejecting similar argument under similar circumstances, and holding that "[i]t is not error to elicit a complete recitation of police procedure, even if the recitation includes reference to a defendant's exercise of his constitutional rights, so long as the recitation is not argued to be indicative of guilt."

    • 3 Finally, in determining whether a defendant has been denied the right to confront witnesses against him, a court must look to what was allowed, not what was prohibited. ( People v. Baugh (1981), 96 Ill. App.3d 946, 422 N.E.2d 166.) If the jury is made fully aware of all the factors concerning the relevant areas of impeachment, there is no denial of the right to confront. The jury was told that Lewis had pleaded guilty to reduced charges and had been released on her own recognizance in exchange for her testimony.

  7. People v. Rufus

    104 Ill. App. 3d 467 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)   Cited 19 times
    In Rufus, wherein the defendant was improperly restricted from cross-examining a State's witness regarding the specific nature of charges pending against him, the appellate court concluded that no prejudicial error requiring reversal resulted in that defense counsel was not precluded from establishing the existence of pending charges and therefore brought the credibility of the witness into question.

    ( People v. Hines (1981), 94 Ill. App.3d 1041, 1048, 419 N.E.2d 420.) See also People v. Baugh (1981), 96 Ill. App.3d 946, 951, 422 N.E.2d 166. • 4 Although we find no constitutional violation, we do find that the trial court's limitation of defense counsel's cross-examination of Grover Evans was improper under the law of evidence.