Opinion
2007-925 RI CR.
Decided December 13, 2007.
Consolidated appeal from (1) an order of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Richmond County (Matthew A. Sciarrino, J.), dated October 30, 2006, and (2) an order of the same court, dated May 3, 2007. The order dated October 30, 2006 granted defendant's motion to suppress evidence. The order dated May 3, 2007 dismissed the accusatory instrument.
Order dated May 3, 2007 affirmed.
Appeal from order dated October 30, 2006 dismissed as moot.
PRESENT: WESTON PATTERSON, J.P., GOLIA and BELEN, JJ.
The People argue that the court below, by inviting defense counsel's oral motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument, which charged defendant with violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (2) and (3), on statutory speedy trial grounds (CPL 30.30) and, upon hearing the motion, dismissing the instrument, violated the People's right to a written motion on reasonable notice (CPL 170.30; 170.45, 210.45 [1]). However, confronted with this procedure, the People remained silent, registering no complaint regarding either the procedure adopted or the merits, and they made no motion for reargument. The People thereby "waived their right to insist upon conformity with the procedural requirements" for motions to dismiss ( People v Jennings, 69 NY2d 103, 113; see also Matter of Attorney Gen. of State of N.Y. v Firetog, 94 NY2d 477, 484; People v Singleton, 42 NY2d 466, 471; People v Liggins, 165 AD2d 816). Assuming, without deciding, that the People may raise legal arguments for CPL 30.30 exclusions for the first time on appeal ( cf. People v Boldon, 81 NY2d 146, 155-156; see also People v Luperon, 85 NY2d 71, 77-78; People v Santos, 68 NY2d 859, 861; People v Littles, 188 AD2d 255; see generally People v Brown, 207 AD2d 556, 557; People v Collado, 125 AD2d 584, 585), the People have provided no minutes of any of the adjournments from defendant's arraignment until defendant moved to suppress evidence, a period which exceeds the statutory speedy trial time for the offenses alleged herein (CPL 30.30 [b]), and, thus, the record, as presented, is insufficient to permit a finding that the motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds should have been denied ( see People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333, 349). Accordingly, the order dated May 3, 2007 dismissing the accusatory instrument is affirmed. In light of the foregoing, the appeal from the order of October 30, 2006 is dismissed as moot.
Weston Patterson, J.P., Golia and Belen, JJ., concur.