Additionally, defendant contends that the State's only real purpose in calling Harris as a witness in its case-in-chief was to introduce his prior statements. Defendant claims that People v. Barton, 286 Ill. App. 3d 954, 677 N.E.2d 476 (1997), is instructive. In Barton, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder.
[Citation.]" People v. Barton, 286 Ill. App. 3d 954, 961, 677 N.E.2d 476, 481 (1997). See also Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d at 359, 643 N.E.2d at 657.
We disagree. This court has recently resolved the same issue in People v. Barton, 286 Ill.App.3d 954, 222 Ill.Dec. 273, 677 N.E.2d 476 (1997). The Barton court, citing James, held that the Barton defendant lacked standing to contest the voluntariness of statements made to the police by two witnesses.
Defendant's involuntary statements remained inadmissible for impeachment purposes or substantively. Rule 801(d)(2)(A) does not operate to make illegally acquired, nonprobative, and suppressed evidence admissible as substantive evidence. ¶ 60 In reaching our conclusion that the suppressed evidence was improperly used as substantive evidence in the second trial, we are persuaded by the analysis set out in People v. Barton, 286 Ill. App. 3d 954 (1997). In Barton, a witness, McGuire, testified at defendant's first trial and was impeached with her prior inconsistent statement, a statement given to police in which the witness stated that defendant admitted to her that he had been involved in the murder.
In People v. James, 118 Ill.2d 214, 226, 514 N.E.2d 998 (1987), our supreme court held that a claim to suppress the product of a fourth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. IV) violation can only be asserted by the individual whose rights were violated. The rule has been applied in circumstances where the evidence sought to be suppressed was a statement made to the police by a third party ( People v. Barton, 286 Ill. App.3d 954, 959-60, 677 N.E.2d 476 (1997)) or the defendant's own statement made after being confronted with a statement illegally obtained from a co-defendant ( James, 118 Ill.2d at 225-26). Nevertheless, the defendant, relying on this court's decision in People v. Bates, 267 Ill. App.3d 503, 642 N.E.2d 774 (1994), argues that the testimony relating to Ward's statements and the defendant's own statement were subject to suppression as having been obtained by exploitation of Ward's illegal arrest.
As defendant asserts that his personal rights were violated, we find that, under the circumstances of this case, defendant has standing to move to suppress his statements. See People v. Barton, 286 Ill. App.3d 954, 959, 677 N.E.2d 476 (1997). On appeal, defendant concedes that, had he attended the trials of the individuals charged with the beating of Lenard Clark, he could not have moved to suppress his statements as the statements do not incriminate him and that he could not have invoked his fifth amendment rights to protect a third party from prosecution.
Likewise, courts have held that a defendant does not have standing to contest statements made by witnesses in his case. See People v. Govea, 299 Ill. App.3d 76 (1998) (defendant lacked standing to object that witness's statement was obtained by coercion in violation of fourteenth amendment); People v. Barton, 286 Ill. App.3d 954 (1997) (defendant lacked standing to object to voluntariness of statements made by two witnesses). We believe the instant case is analogous to the foregoing and find that defendant lacks standing to object to Johnson's sentence or to the agreement to reduce his sentence.