Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. NCR73377.
NICHOLSON, Acting P. J.
After pleading no contest to inflicting corporal injury to a cohabitant in violation of Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (a), including a special allegation of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and false imprisonment by means of violence in violation of section 236, defendant Jerrel E. Barron was sentenced to six years in state prison. Defendant appeals his sentence.
Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts are taken from the probation report.
In September 2007, defendant had been living with the victim for four years and they had two children. On September 18, 2007, defendant contacted the victim at his mother’s home and told her to come home. Worried he was upset with her, the victim nevertheless returned home. When she arrived, defendant said, “You like to tell my mom I hurt you?” and then began hitting her.
Defendant hit the victim a number of times before he told her to go in the bathroom and “look at [her] bleeding face in the mirror;” there the defendant twisted the victim’s finger so hard she believed it was broken. Defendant then took her into the bedroom, ordered her to strip naked and then forced her to orally copulate him.
While defendant was sexually assaulting the victim, a woman knocked on the door. Defendant initially refused to allow the victim to open the door, but after the woman shouted that she would call the sheriff unless she saw the victim and the children, defendant relented. The victim then left with the woman and the children and went to the hospital.
At the hospital, the victim told a sheriff’s deputy that defendant was not drunk, but appeared to be under the influence of methamphetamine. The deputy observed the victim had bruising under her eyes, on both arms, and on her thighs. She also had a cut over one eye and abrasions on her shins where defendant had kicked her.
Defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with oral copulation by force (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)) [count I]; corporal injury to a cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) with a special allegation of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) [count II]; false imprisonment by means of violence (§ 236) [count III]; corporal injury to a spouse (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) [count IV]; and making terrorists threats (§ 422) [count V].
Defendant pleaded no contest to count II as well as a special allegation of great bodily injury and count III. The remaining charges were dismissed. After considering the probation report and the letters submitted on defendant’s behalf, the court sentenced defendant to six years in state prison.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying him probation. This contention has two components: first, that the trial court erred in deciding this was not an “unusual” case rendering defendant eligible for probation; and second, that the trial court failed to adequately consider the statutory criteria set forth in rule 4.414 of the California Rules of Court in deciding whether probation should be granted. We disagree.
“A trial court has broad discretion in determining whether or not to grant probation. In reviewing that determination it is not our function to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.” (People v. Superior Court (Du) (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 822, 825 (Du).) Similarly, “‘[t]he standard for reviewing a trial court’s finding that a case may or may not be unusual is abuse of discretion.’” (People v. Stuart (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 165, 178; Du, supra, at p. 831.) Our function is limited to deciding whether the trial court’s denial of probation in this case was arbitrary, capricious, or exceeded the bounds of reason.
Here, prior to sentencing defendant, the trial court reviewed the probation report, defendant’s statement in mitigation, and the letters submitted on defendant’s behalf. The probation report identified defendant’s nearly 16 years of addiction to methamphetamine, noting defendant was clean during the three years he was on probation. Nonetheless, the probation officer found “[defendant] did not long benefit from the testing and counseling he got under supervision. For the past few years he used methamphetamine every day and never sought counseling. It is only now, after committing two serious felonies, that he is seeking help.
“Given his prior record, his on-going drug abuse, and the seriousness of the present offense the defendant is too great a risk to the public to consider for probation.”
At sentencing, defendant argued that, with the support of his family, he was now ready, willing, and able to participate in drug rehabilitation. He claimed that he only committed crimes because of his addiction and, without the addiction, he would be able to interact appropriately with society. The court was not persuaded.
As noted by the trial court, defendant was convicted of a violent crime against the mother of his children, a crime that resulted in great bodily injury. And the addiction defendant is now ready to overcome -- he has been suffering from that addiction for many years. The court thus determined defendant’s newly found resolve was “too-little too-late.”
Under the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding this was not an “unusual case.”
Defendant also argues that the court failed to consider defendant’s “prospects” in determining whether to grant probation. Defendant nevertheless fails to cite any authority to support the proposition that the court was required to consider his “prospects.” Defendant instead relies on People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, wherein the Supreme Court states that a trial court must consider a defendant’s prospects in determining whether to strike a prior strike. Such analysis is inapplicable here.
In any event, the court did consider defendant’s prospects. The court considered defendant’s promises to participate in rehabilitation, to reconnect with his family, and become a productive member of society. Given defendant’s criminal record and his long history of drug abuse, coupled with the violence of the crimes committed here; however, the court found defendant’s prospects were not good and did not justify a grant of probation.
Relying on California Rules of Court, rule 4.414, defendant also claims the trial court “failed to adequately consider all the facts and circumstances of the case and of the individual, as guided by the Rules of Court.” (Emphasis in original.) Defendant’s argument, again, misses the mark.
In the absence of an “unusual case” finding, defendant is not eligible for probation. (§ 462.) Consequently, there was no need for the trial court to consider California Rules of Court, rule 4.414 and the facts relating to the crime and the facts relating to the defendant.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: HULL, J., ROBIE, J.