" C.R.C.P. 107(a)(5). Proceedings that involve a remedial purpose are civil, while those designed to "vindicate the dignity of the court by punishing the contemnor" involve criminal contempt. People v. Barron, 677 P.2d 1370, 1372 n. 2 (Colo. 1984) (citations omitted). We have further defined criminal contempt as "conduct that obstructs the administration of justice or tends to bring the court into disrepute."
Contempt of court can be divided into two categories, civil and criminal, dependent on the purpose and character of the sanctions sought to be imposed. People v. Barron, 677 P.2d 1370, 1372 n. 2 (Colo. 1984). Civil contempt proceedings are remedial in nature and are not intended to punish the contemner or to deter offenses against the public.
Our case law and the prior version of C.R.C.P. 107 have referred to contempt as "civil" and "criminal." See, e.g., People v. Barron, 677 P.2d 1370, 1372 (Colo. 1984); People v. Rezatos, 699 P.2d 970, 974 (Colo. 1985); see also C.R.C.P. 107(e) (1994). But these authorities make it clear that these terms refer to the "purpose and character of the sanctions," they don’t describe which set of procedural rules applies to the action.
Contempt, of course, is not a statutory offense, but instead is "an inherent and indispensable power of the court and exists independently of legislative authorization." People v. Barron, 677 P.2d 1370, 1372 (Colo. 1984). The General Assembly recognized this distinction when it abolished all common-law crimes in Colorado, but simultaneously noted that such abolition "does not affect the power of a court to punish for contempt.
11 Del. C. § 202(b) (emphasis added).See State v. Barron, Colo.Supr., 677 P.2d 1370, 1373 (1984) (en Banc). See also In the Matter of Daniels, Supr., 118 N.J. 51, 570 A.2d 416, 421, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 951, 111 S.Ct. 371, 112 L.Ed.2d 333 (1990) (New Jersey criminal code, "while abolishing common-law crimes, preserves this judicial power to punish for contempt"); State v. Murray, Supr., 225 Conn. 355, 623 A.2d 60, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 78, 126 L.Ed.2d 46 (1993) (legislature cannot abrogate the courts' inherent contempt power).
The remedial purpose and character of the fine establishes that the respondent court's contempt order is properly characterized as civil, not criminal. People v. Barron, 677 P.2d 1370, 1372 n. 2 (Colo. 1984) (civil contempt proceedings are remedial and not intended as a deterrent to offenses against the public, whereas criminal contempt is prosecuted to preserve the power and vindicate the dignity of the court by punishing the contemnor). The distinction made between the remedial or punitive purpose of the contempt order is not always helpful in determining whether the contempt is civil or criminal because C.R.C.P. 107(d), which sets forth the sanctions for civil contempt, provides that the court may impose a fine or imprisonment "to vindicate the dignity of the court," much like criminal contempt proceedings.
Our holding here should not be construed to narrow a judge’s ability to participate in contempt actions arising from a case in which she presided where it is otherwise proper under the statutes, rules, or common law and where she is not presiding over a case in which she is likely to be a witness. See § 18-1-104(3), C.R.S. 2018; C.R.C.P. 107 ; People v. Barron , 677 P.2d 1370, 1372-74 (Colo. 1984) (examining a court’s common law power to punish a defendant for criminal contempt). ¶ 27 In addition, where Colorado courts have declined to require disqualification based on a judge’s participation in prior proceedings, they have repeatedly emphasized that there was no obligation to recuse because the judge was not presiding over a case in which she might be a witness.
The University's reliance on Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); People v. Williams, 984 P.2d 56, 60 (Colo. 1999); People v. Barron, 677 P.2d 1370, 1373-74 (Colo. 1984); People v. Hertz, 196 Colo. 259, 260, 586 P.2d 5, 6 (1978); and Sheppard v. Rees, 909 F.2d 1234, 1236 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1989), for the proposition that the statement of probable cause "charged" Vecellio with a felony for purposes of criminal procedure and Rule 6-12(A), is misplaced. In each of these cases, a complaint, information, or indictment had been filed.
Despite this appellation, and although contemnors are entitled to certain constitutional protections, conduct that is found to be offensive to the authority and dignity of the court pursuant to C.R.C.P. 107 is not criminal conduct, and contempt is not a statutory criminal offense. Bloom v. State of Ill., 391 U.S. 194, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968); People v. Barron, 677 P.2d 1370 (Colo. 1984); Kourlis v. Port, 18 P.3d 770 (Colo.App. 2000); Benninghoven v. Dees, 849 P.2d 906 (Colo.App. 1993); see Vela v. District Court, 664 P.2d 243 (Colo. 1983).
When the maximum sentence does not exceed six months in prison, the alleged contemnor is not entitled to a jury trial. People v. Barron, 677 P.2d 1370 (Colo. 1984). Upon advising defendant of her rights prior to the hearing on the contempt citation, the trial court also indicated that she would not be subjected to more than six months in jail.