Opinion
12-10-2014
Seymour W. James, Jr., New York, N.Y. (Michael G. Taglieri of counsel), for appellant. Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Morgan J. Dennehy of counsel; Jacob Rosenberg on the brief), for respondent.
Seymour W. James, Jr., New York, N.Y. (Michael G. Taglieri of counsel), for appellant.
Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Morgan J. Dennehy of counsel; Jacob Rosenberg on the brief), for respondent.
Opinion Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Balter, J.), dated March 28, 2013, which, after a hearing, designated him a level three sexually violent offender and predicate sex offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6–C. ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
A court making a risk level determination pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (see Correction Law art. 6–C [hereinafter SORA] ) must “render an order setting forth its determinations and the findings of fact and conclusions of law on which the determinations are based” (Correction Law § 168–n[3] ). Here, the Supreme Court failed to adequately set forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law. However, since the record is sufficient for this Court to make its own findings of fact and conclusions of law, remittal is not required (see People v. Johnson, 118 A.D.3d 684, 986 N.Y.S.2d 860 ; People v. Brown, 116 A.D.3d 1017, 983 N.Y.S.2d 900 ).
“A defendant seeking a downward departure from the presumptive risk level has the initial burden of ‘(1) identifying, as a matter of law, an appropriate mitigating factor, namely, a factor which tends to establish a lower likelihood of reoffense or danger to the community and is of a kind, or to a degree, that is otherwise not adequately taken into account by the [SORA] Guidelines; and (2) establishing the facts in support of its existence by a preponderance of the evidence’ ” (People v. Wortham, 119 A.D.3d 666, 989 N.Y.S.2d 618, quoting People v. Wyatt, 89 A.D.3d 112, 128, 931 N.Y.S.2d 85 ; see People v. Gillotti, 23 N.Y.3d 841, 861, 994 N.Y.S.2d 1, 18 N.E.3d 701 ). Here, contrary to the defendant's contention, he failed to establish that his expected deportation was, “as a matter of law, an appropriate mitigating factor” (People v. Wyatt, 89 A.D.3d at 128, 931 N.Y.S.2d 85 ; see People v. Pavia, 121 A.D.3d 960, 993 N.Y.S.2d 782 ; People v. Romero, 113 A.D.3d 605, 977 N.Y.S.2d 900 ; People v. Kachatov, 106 A.D.3d 973, 973, 965 N.Y.S.2d 373 ). Accordingly, the defendant was not entitled to a downward departure from his presumptive risk level.
MASTRO, J.P., ROMAN, MILLER and MALTESE, JJ., concur.