Opinion
2d Crim. B325028
12-14-2023
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. OSCAR RODOLFO BARRASCOUT, Defendant and Appellant.
Mi Kim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez and John Yang, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court County of Ventura No. CR26509 Gilbert A. Romero, Judge
Mi Kim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez and John Yang, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
GILBERT, P. J.
Oscar Rodolfo Barrascout appeals a superior court order denying his petition to be eligible for a youth offender parole hearing. (Pen. Code, § 3051.) In 1990, he was convicted of first degree murder (§ 187), robbery (§ 211), and burglary (§ 459), and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). When he committed these crimes, he was 22 years of age. We conclude, among other things, that the statutory provision that disqualifies Barrascout from eligibility for a youth offender parole hearing (§ 3051, subd. (h)) because of his LWOP sentence does not violate equal protection of the law. We affirm.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTS
In 1990, the People filed a felony complaint alleging that Barrascout committed murder by killing Gregory Darnel Minor in the commission of robbery and burglary. Barrascout was convicted of first degree murder, robbery, and burglary. He was sentenced to LWOP.
On August 10, 2020, Barrascout filed a "motion for record development hearing" in the superior court seeking an order for his eligibility for a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051. He claimed that statute expressly excluded him for eligibility for a youth offender parole hearing because he had an LWOP sentence. He claimed this statutory exclusion violated his constitutional right to equal protection of the law.
The trial court denied the motion. It ruled: "Defendant's equal protection claim fails because he has not demonstrated the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner. There is a long history of distinguishing someone like Barrascout, who was 22 years old at the time of his controlling offense, and juveniles.... Criminal sentencing has also long distinguished between LWOP and lesser sentences."
We affirmed Barrascout's conviction. We held that the statutory provision that disqualifies him from eligibility for a youth offender parole hearing (§ 3051, subd. (h)) because of his LWOP sentence does not violate equal protection of the law. (People v. Barrascout (Apr. 14, 2022, B312462) [nonpub. opn.].)
Barrascout filed another motion for eligibility for a youth offender parole hearing. The trial court denied that motion.
DISCUSSION
Law of The Case
"' "[W]here, upon an appeal, the [reviewing] court, in deciding the appeal, states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, that principle or rule becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal ...." '" (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 786.) But "the doctrine will not be adhered to where its application will result in an unjust decision." (Id. at p. 787.)
Barrascout claims our prior decision is unjust in light of People v. Hardin (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273, review granted January 11, 2023, S277487. Hardin held that section 3051, subdivision (h), which excludes young adults who receive LWOP for eligibility for a youth offender parole hearing, violates equal protection. The court said, "[W]hile for some purposes it might be reasonable to view special circumstance murder differently from murder with no special circumstance finding, that is not a rational basis for the distinction in eligibility for a youth offender parole hearing made by section 3051." (Id. at p. 290.)
We disagree with Hardin. It departs from the established line of appellate decisions that have rejected constitutional challenges to the validity of the exclusion required by section 3051. The decision fails to appreciate the constitutional authority of the California Legislature to establish eligibility requirements for criminal rehabilitative programs. It usurped the Legislature's authority in this area by essentially rewriting section 3051. Moreover, Barrascout has not shown that his constitutional rights were violated,
Equal Protection
The Legislature enacted the youth offender parole hearing to generally benefit defendants who were 25 years of age or younger when they committed their offenses. (§ 3051, subd. (a)(1).) "The legislative history suggests the Legislature was motivated by dual concerns: that lengthy life sentences did not adequately account for, first, the diminished culpability of youth, and second, youthful offenders' greater potential for rehabilitation and maturation." (In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427, 434.)
But not all offenses committed by youthful offenders qualify for this statutory benefit. Section 3051, subdivision (h), provides, in relevant part, "This section shall not apply . . . to cases in which an individual is sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for a controlling offense that was committed after the person had attained 18 years of age."
Barrascout was convicted of first degree murder and was sentenced to LWOP. He committed his offenses when he was 22 years of age. He is not eligible for a youth offender parole hearing by the express terms of this statute.
This statutory exclusion does not violate Barrascout's right to equal protection. "The first step in an equal protection analysis is to determine whether the defendant is similarly situated with those who are entitled to [the benefit provided under law]." (People v. Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 884, 888.)"' "Persons convicted of different crimes are not similarly situated for equal protection purposes." '" (In re Williams, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 435, italics omitted.) They" 'can be punished differently'" consistent with equal protection standards. (Ibid.)" '[O]nly those persons who are similarly situated are protected from invidiously disparate treatment.'" (Cervantes, at p. 888.)
In our prior decision, we noted that Barrascout claimed, "[W]hen the Legislature expanded section 3051's parole eligibility mechanism to reach young adults up to the age of 25, its expressly stated rationale was to account for neuroscience research that the human brain - especially those portions responsible for judgment and decision making - continues to develop into a person's mid-20s." (People v. Barrascout, supra, B312462.) He claimed, "Measured against this legislative purpose, youthful first degree special circumstance murderers are similarly situated with youthful first degree murderers." (Ibid.)
It may be true that" 'both groups committed their crimes before their prefrontal cortexes reached their full functional capacity.'" (People v. Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769, 779.) But the issue here is not exclusively determined by the neuroscience effect on the brain. It is whether the Legislature could properly distinguish between young adult LWOP murderers and others based on the different nature of the crimes and the defendants who committed them.
Those young adults who commit special circumstance first degree murder and receive LWOP sentences fall within a special and unique category. They are not similarly situated with youthful offenders who commit lesser offenses. They are also not similarly situated with juvenile LWOP defendants. (People v. Acosta, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 779.) "The Legislature has prescribed an LWOP sentence for only a small number of crimes." (In re Williams, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 436) "These are the crimes the Legislature deems so morally depraved and so injurious as to warrant a sentence that carries no hope of release for the criminal and no threat of recidivism for society." (Ibid., italics added.) Barrascout is not similarly situated with those who receive youth offender parole hearings.
Legislature enactments are initially "clothed in a presumption of constitutionality." (People v. Cruz (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 664, 675.) They may exceed constitutional authority where they are arbitrary or irrational. But where the classification does not infringe on constitutional rights or cross "suspect" classification "lines," it will be upheld "if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification." (Ibid.)
"[T]he Legislature is afforded considerable latitude in defining and setting the consequences of criminal offenses." (Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 887.)" 'A classification is not arbitrary or irrational simply because there is an "imperfect fit between means and ends"' [citation], or 'because it may be "to some extent both underinclusive and overinclusive." '" (Ibid.)
A legislative classification that treats different classes of defendants differently may be supported by a rational state goal of improving "public safety." (People v. Cruz, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 679.) "In excluding LWOP inmates from youth offender parole hearings, the Legislature reasonably could have decided that youthful offenders who have committed such crimes - even with diminished culpability and increased potential for rehabilitation - are nonetheless still sufficiently culpable and sufficiently dangerous to justify lifetime incarceration." (In re Williams, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 436.)
Moreover, there is an additional "rational basis for distinguishing between juvenile LWOP offenders and young adult LWOP offenders: their age." (People v. Acosta, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 779.) Age has long been a rational basis upon which to make constitutionally permissible sentencing distinctions. (Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 471.)
For the group of youthful LWOP defendants, the Legislature may rationally decide to apply only the statutory benefits to the youngest members of that group - those under 18. "By drawing the line at a defendant's 18th birthday, the Legislature has chosen to target the youngest, and presumably most deserving, of the group of youthful offenders whose brains were still developing and whose judgment had not yet matured. While young adults share many of the attributes of youth, they are by definition further along in the process of maturation, and the law need not be blind to the difference." (In re Jones (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 477, 482.) "The Legislature could reasonably decide that for those convicted of LWOP crimes, the line should be drawn at age 18 ...." (Id. at p. 483.)
Consequently, appellate courts have concluded that the young adult LWOP exclusion in section 3051 is not unconstitutional. (People v. Morales (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 326, 347 [section 3051's "line drawn at 18 is a rational one"]; People v. Jackson (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 189, 192 ["the carve out to section 3051 for offenders such as defendant serving an LWOP sentence for special circumstance murder is not an equal protection violation"]; People v. Acosta, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 780 ["the statute, on its face, does not violate equal protection"]; In re Williams, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 436 [the exclusion of adult youthful LWOP defendants from youth offender parole hearings was rational and not unconstitutional].)
Other Issues
Barrascout claims his LWOP conviction violates the California Racial Justice Act of 2020. (§ 745.) But he did not raise this issue with an evidentiary motion in the trial court. The statute allows a defendant to file a motion to support the claim of racial discrimination, to have an evidentiary hearing, and to make a record for appeal. (Id., subd. (c)(1).) A defendant may seek relief under the act "if he makes a plausible case, based on specific facts, that any of the four enumerated violations of section 745, subdivision (a) could or might have occurred." (Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 144, italics added.) Here there is no record to support a factual claim of racial discrimination or violations of any of the four enumerated provisions of this act. Because there was no showing of compliance with the statute, no specific factual claim, and no evidentiary record, he cannot prevail on this issue solely by making conclusory assertions in an appellate brief. (Ibid.; In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 880.)
Barrascout claims that because he received an LWOP sentence when he was 22 years of age, the sentence is cruel and unusual punishment. But he did not make an evidentiary showing in the trial court on this issue. (In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 880.) Moreover, courts have rejected this claim for adult LWOP murder defendants over the age of 18. (People v. Abundio (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1220; People v. Argeta (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1482.)
We have reviewed Barrascout's remaining contentions and we conclude he has not shown grounds for reversal. There was no trial court error.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
We concur: YEGAN, J., BALTODANO, J.