Opinion
May 2, 1996
Appeal from the County Court of Ulster County (Bruhn, J.).
Following his indictment for certain sex-related crimes, it was determined that defendant was an "incapacitated person" within the meaning of CPL 730.10 (1) and, on October 8, 1993, was committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Health. Thereafter, on October 29, 1993, it was determined that defendant was no longer an incapacitated person and this action was reinstated. Immediately prior to the commencement of the trial on March 9, 1994, defendant waived his right to a jury trial and elected to proceed pro se. After trial, he was convicted of the crimes of sexual abuse in the first degree and sexual abuse in the second degree, for which he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Defendant now appeals.
His initial argument is that County Court erred in failing to, sua sponte, order a competency hearing at the time of trial. We disagree since the record presents no reasonable grounds for County Court to have done so inasmuch as it had before it the recent psychiatric report indicating that defendant did not present symptoms of any major psychiatric conditions and was feigning mental illness to avoid criminal prosecution ( see, People v. Gensler, 72 N.Y.2d 239, 245, cert denied 488 U.S. 932; People v. Johnson, 208 A.D.2d 456, lv denied 85 N.Y.2d 863). Further, even though defendant made several inappropriate comments during the trial, his conduct, viewed in its entirety, cannot be reasonably interpreted as evincing an incapacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense ( see, People v. Rosebrough, 199 A.D.2d 1024, lv denied 83 N.Y.2d 857).
Having been found competent to proceed to trial, defendant was competent to waive his right to a jury trial and to elect to proceed pro se ( see, Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389). Thus, his invocation of these constitutional rights will be sustained provided it was knowingly and intelligently made ( see, People v Ryan, 82 N.Y.2d 497, 507; People v. Davis, 49 N.Y.2d 114, 119).
When a defendant voices a desire to proceed pro se, the trial court's only obligation is to insure that he or she is aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation ( see, People v. Simmons, 182 A.D.2d 1018). Likewise, it must ascertain if the defendant understands the nature and consequences of a waiver of a jury trial ( see, People v. Livingston, 184 A.D.2d 529, 530).
Here, the record discloses that County Court engaged in an extensive colloquy with defendant regarding these issues and that defendant, who is not a naif in the world of criminal justice, displayed an adequate understanding of the import of his decision and the perils he faced. Accordingly, we find that his election to proceed pro se and to waive a jury trial was knowingly and intelligently made and that County Court properly granted his application ( see, People v. Quinones, 192 A.D.2d 391, 392, lvs denied 82 N.Y.2d 724, 84 N.Y.2d 909; People v. Greany, 185 A.D.2d 376, 378, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 1027; People v. Livingston, supra, at 530).
In light of defendant's voluntary and counseled decision, he is in no position to argue that his counsel's representation was ineffective because he failed to object to defendant's assertion of his constitutional rights.
We have examined defendant's remaining contentions and find them unpersuasive. For these reasons, we affirm.
Mikoll, J.P., Mercure, Casey and Spain, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.