Id. at 501–02.Another criminal restitution case involving recovery of damages to a police car is People v. Barnett , 237 A.D.2d 917, 654 N.Y.S.2d 918, 919 (1997). The court in this case held that restitution for damage to a police car was not a reimbursement for normal, voluntarily incurred operating costs; instead, the restitution "covered the cost of repairing a police car that was damaged as a direct result of defendant’s criminal conduct."
Many courts have required defendants to pay restitution to police departments when they damage police vehicles. See United States v. Washington, 434 F.3d 1265, 1268-70 (11th Cir. 2006) (defendant required to pay restitution to police department for damage to police cars caused during armed robbery); United States v. Reichow, 416 F.3d 802, 805 (8th Cir. 2005) (defendant ordered to pay restitution for damage defendant caused to police car); State v. Dillon, 637 P.2d 602, 608-09 (Or. 1981) (defendant ordered to pay restitution to police department for damage caused by defendant's collision with police car); People v. Barnett, 654 N.Y.S.2d 918, 919 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (defendant required to pay restitution to New York State Police Department tocover "the cost of repairing a police car that was damaged as a direct result of defendant's criminal conduct").
The HCSD did not suffer any unexpected harm as a result of Defendant's criminal conduct. Cf. People v. Barnett, 237 A.D.2d 917, 919 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (affirming a county court order requiring a defendant to pay restitution to reimburse the police for damage which the defendant had caused to a police car, finding that such damage was not a normal cost of providing law enforcement services).
See Dillon, 637 P.2d at 608. In People v. Barnett, 654 N.Y.S.2d 918 (N.Y.App.Div. 1997), the appellate court affirmed a county court order requiring a defendant to pay restitution to reimburse the police for damage which the defendant had caused to a police car, finding that such damage was not a normal cost of providing law enforcement services. Id. at 919.
They contrast the government's entitlement to restitution when it is a victim as a direct result of criminal conduct (such as when a suspect causes damage to a police vehicle) from the collateral expenses that are normally incurred for regular law enforcement activities. See City of Centerville v. Knab, 2019-Ohio-1903, ¶¶ 24-34, 136 N.E.3d 808, 814-16 (2019); State v. Shears, 920 N.W.2d 527, 539 (Iowa 2018); People v. Ford, 2016 IL App (3d) 130650, ¶ 29, 49 N.E.3d 954, 959-60 (2016); State v. Storlie, 2002 WI App 163, ¶ 8, 256 Wis. 2d 500, 505, 647 N.W.2d 926, 928 (2002); People v. Barnett, 237 A.D.2d 917, 918, 654 N.Y.S.2d 918, 919 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); State v. Depaoli, 835 P.2d 162, 163-64 (Utah 1992). Under this reasoning, lab fees for drug testing are not considered to be appropriate for restitution because a state's lab is not a "victim" of the crime committed.
Here, defendant drove his vehicle head-on into a marked police vehicle operated by a police sergeant, causing significant damage to the police vehicle. Thus, "the restitution did not reimburse the police for the normal operating costs of law enforcement that are voluntarily incurred . . .; instead, it covered the cost of repairing a police [vehicle] that was damaged as a direct result of defendant's criminal conduct" ( People v Barnett, 237 AD2d 917, 918, lv denied 90 NY2d 855; see People v Cruz, 81 NY2d 996, 997-998).
Municipal entities may, as crime victims, receive restitution in the disposition of criminal proceedings based not only upon their involuntary incurrence of an out-of-pocket loss, but also from legal obligations directly and causally related to the crime itself ( see People v Cruz, 81 NY2d 996, 998). Accordingly, municipalities have received restitution in their capacity as crime victims to compensate them for, inter alia, obligatory costs of medical treatment and sick leave for a police officer injured by criminal activity ( see People v Cruz, 81 NY2d at 998), lost tax revenue caused by criminal tax fraud ( see People v Nelson, 38 AD3d 472, 473), and repair costs for municipal property damaged by criminal conduct ( see People v Barnett, 237 AD2d 917, 918). By contrast, municipalities have been denied restitution for expenses incurred in prosecuting crime ( see People v Stacey, 173 AD2d 960, 962; People v Pfaudler, 164 AD2d 873; People v Purcell, 161 AD2d at 812-813), extraditing defendants ( People v Dulanski, 175 AD2d 672), transporting prisoners ( see People v Watson, 197 AD2d 880; People v Snow, 180 AD2d 698, 699; People v Raines, 157 AD2d 874, 875), and providing electronic monitoring programs ( see People v Bennor, 228 AD2d 745), as such expenses are voluntarily incurred within the usual and customary scope of governmental operations.
Where a defendant pleads guilty, "evidence to support the restitution amount generally can only be found in the [plea] agreement itself or the minutes of the plea allocution" ( People v. Consalvo, 89 N.Y.2d 140, 144). Here, defendant made no statement at the plea proceeding or at sentencing to support the amount of restitution imposed by the court ( see, People v. White, 266 A.D.2d 831, 832; People v. Barnett, 237 A.D.2d 917, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 855). In addition, the court improperly relied on unsworn victim impact statements ( see, People v. White, supra, at 832).
In determining the amount of restitution, the court relied on estimates submitted by the victim to repair his vehicle that was damaged as a result of defendant's criminal conduct. Defendant did not plead guilty with the knowledge that the court would order restitution, nor did he agree to the amount of restitution ordered by the court at sentencing; indeed, at no time did defendant admit that he damaged the vehicle ( see, People v. Barnett, 237 A.D.2d 917, 918, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 855; cf., People v. Kim, 91 N.Y.2d 407, 410-411; People v. Rocklin, 265 A.D.2d 920, 921, lv denied 94 N.Y.2d 906). We therefore modify the judgment by vacating the amount of restitution, and we remit the matter to Supreme Court for a hearing to determine the amount of restitution ( see, People v. Dibble [appeal No. 2], 277 A.D.2d 969 [decided Nov. 13, 2000]).
County Court erred in ordering defendant to pay restitution in the amount of $152,062.94 without holding a hearing on that issue. Defendant made no statement at the plea proceeding or at sentencing to support the amount of restitution ordered by the court ( see, People v. Consalvo, 89 N.Y.2d 140, 144-145; People v. Barnett, 237 A.D.2d 917, 918, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 855). The court improperly relied on amounts recited in the presentence report ( see, People v. Bernier, 197 A.D.2d 882; People v. Millar, 144 A.D.2d 1032, 1032-1033).