Opinion
E074137
08-27-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ROMAN EARL BARNES, Defendant and Appellant.
Richard Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Thomas S. Patterson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tamar Pachter and Nelson R. Richards, Deputy Attorneys General, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. Jason Anderson, District Attorney, and James R. Secord, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. FVA010870) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Charles J. Umeda, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions. Richard Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Thomas S. Patterson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tamar Pachter and Nelson R. Richards, Deputy Attorneys General, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. Jason Anderson, District Attorney, and James R. Secord, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
In 2018, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed into law Senate Bill No. 1437 (Senate Bill 1437), legislation that prospectively amended the mens rea requirements for the offense of murder and restricted the circumstances under which a person can be liable for murder under the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) Senate Bill 1437 also established a procedure permitting certain qualifying persons who were previously convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition the courts that sentenced them to vacate their murder convictions and obtain resentencing on any remaining counts. (Ibid.; see Pen. Code, § 1170.95)
All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
Defendant and appellant Roman Earl Barnes appeals from an order denying his petition to vacate a first degree murder conviction and obtain resentencing under the procedures established by Senate Bill 1437. The trial court granted the People's motion to strike defendant's petition after concluding the resentencing provision of Senate Bill 1437 invalidly amended Proposition 7 (Prop. 7, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978)) and Proposition 115 (Prop. 115, as approved by voters, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990)), voter initiatives that increased the punishments for persons convicted of murder and augmented the list of predicate offenses for first degree felony-murder liability, respectively.
Defendant argues Senate Bill 1437 is constitutional and therefore the order striking his petition for resentencing must be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. The People urge us to affirm the order striking defendant's petition and find Senate Bill 1437 unconstitutional on grounds that: (1) Senate Bill 1437 unlawfully amended Proposition 7; (2) Senate Bill 1437 invalidly amended Proposition 115; (3) the resentencing provision of section 1170.95 violates the separation of powers doctrine; and/or (4) the resentencing provision deprives crime victims the rights afforded them by the Victims' Bill of Rights Act of 2008, commonly known as Marsy's Law (Prop. 9, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2008)).
All published opinions addressing this issue have concluded that Senate Bill 1437 did not unconstitutionally amend either initiative. Most recently, in People v. Prado (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 480, People v. Bucio (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 300, 306 (Bucio), People v. Solis (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 762, 774-780 (Solis), and People v. Cruz (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 740, 753-759 (Cruz), our sister courts concluded that Senate Bill 1437 is constitutional. Previously, Division One of this court in People v. Lamoureux (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 241 (Lamoureux), review denied February 19, 2020, S259835, and People v. Superior Court (Gooden) (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 270 (Gooden), review denied February 19, 2020, S259700, concluded Senate Bill 1437 did not invalidly amend Proposition 7 and/or Proposition 115. The Lamoureux court also determined that the resentencing provisions of Senate Bill 1437 do not contravene separation of powers principles or violate the rights of crime victims.
Agreeing with the analyses and the conclusions set forth in the above-referenced opinions, we reverse the trial court's order granting the People's motion to strike defendant's resentencing petition and remand with directions to consider defendant's petition on its merits.
II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The factual background is taken from this court's nonpublished opinion in defendant's prior appeal, case No. E028010, which is part of the record on appeal in this case. (People v. Barnes (Jan. 15, 2002, E028010) [nonpub. opn.].)
A. Factual Background
On January 5, 1999, Mrs. Dresser was 85 years old. She lived alone in a house in Rialto, her home since 1944. In December, the month before, her house had been burglarized so she had installed a burglar alarm and bought a small watch dog.
On the evening of January 5, the fire department responded to an alarm at Mrs. Dresser's house. The firefighters arrived to find the house in flames. Some of the rooms were in disorder. The victim's charred body lay on the kitchen floor, her head and face covered by a blanket. The forensic pathologist determined she had died from blunt force trauma injury to the head. Her injuries were consistent with numerous blows from a brick. In the street near the victim's house, the police found a red plastic one-gallon gasoline can. The arson investigator determined the fire had been started with gasoline.
The police recovered the victim's property, including two VCRs and a laptop computer, from a trash can located at a nearby house occupied by defendant and his mother.
The police arrested defendant after midnight on January 7. They advised him of his Miranda rights, which he waived. In several recorded interviews, including a videotaped reenactment, defendant admitted that he had burglarized the victim's house in December. On that occasion, he had spent several hours in the house playing cat-and-mouse with the victim, who was hard of hearing. He had been drinking and felt panicked and scared. He urinated and defecated in one of the bedrooms. When he left, he took some property with him. He admitted returning on January 5 for several hours.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
The jury viewed the videotaped reenactment. Defendant explained he initially entered the house on January 5 to return Mrs. Dresser's dog. Once inside, he latched the front door. He did not see anyone but he heard a woman in another room talking to a dog and giving it dry food. Defendant started walking down the hallway and heard a loud thump, "[l]ike somebody stomped their foot." He found the phone disconnected. Then he heard yelling and screaming. Next he located the woman, lying on the kitchen floor, bleeding and moaning. When he thought she had died, he covered her with a blanket. He was scared because he had been in the house a few weeks before. So he grabbed a VCR and other items to make it seem like a burglary had occurred. He threw the items out the window and then left by the window. He also got a can of gasoline and sprinkled it inside while ransacking the house. Then he ignited the gasoline and departed.
B. Procedural Background
On May 19, 2000, defendant, who was 16 years old at the time the victim was killed and prosecuted as an adult, was convicted of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), first degree residential burglary (§ 459), and arson of an inhabited structure (§ 451, subd. (b)). As to the murder count, the jury found true the allegations that the murder was committed while defendant was engaged in the commission of first degree burglary (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of life without the possibility of parole, plus a consecutive determinate term of eight years in state prison.
On January 15, 2002, we affirmed the convictions.
In 2018, after defendant's judgment of conviction became final, the Legislature enacted and the Governor signed Senate Bill 1437, effective January 1, 2019. (See Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) Senate Bill 1437 amended the felony-murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to murder. Senate Bill 1437 also added section 1170.95, which allows those "convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory . . . [to] file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner's murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts . . . ." (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).)
On February 22, 2019, defendant in propria persona filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95.
On April 26, 2019, the People filed a motion to strike defendant's petition for resentencing on grounds that the amendments effectuated by Senate Bill 1437 were unconstitutional and violated the separation of powers between the judiciary and the Legislature.
On July 17, 2019, defendant's appointed counsel filed an opposition to the People's motion to strike the petition for resentencing. Defendant's counsel also requested the court make a finding that a prima facie showing had been made.
A hearing on defendant's petition for resentencing was held on September 27, 2019. At that hearing, the following colloquy occurred between the trial court, the prosecutor, and defense counsel:
"THE COURT: . . . although the defendant, according to the People, was the only perpetrator of the offense, the Prosecutor did argue felony murder to the jurors and there was nothing specified in the verdicts saying what theory was relied on by the jurors returning the verdict.
"[THE PROSECUTOR]: Even if the theory relied on was felony murder, he was the only perpetrator and also, then, the actual killer. So it still would not apply.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: But I think the reason why the DA argued felony murder was because the confession indicated 'we,' two actors. So the DA did say something to the effect of, You know, even if he wasn't the killer, he's still guilty under a felony murder theory. That does leave him an avenue for relief. He may not [be] successful based on the merits, but I believe we made a prima facie showing."
The trial court agreed with defense counsel that defendant had made a prima facie showing for relief. However, the court ultimately struck defendant's petition for resentencing, finding Senate Bill 1437 unconstitutional, without reaching the merits of defendant's petition, and denied the petition.
On October 30, 2019, defendant timely appealed the order denying his section 1170.95 petition and finding Senate Bill 1437 unconstitutional. The Attorney General permitted the Office of the District Attorney of San Bernardino County to represent the People's interests in this appeal and, for its part, filed an amicus curiae brief defending the constitutionality of Senate Bill 1437.
III
DISCUSSION
A. General Background of Senate Bill 1437
On September 30, 2018, the Governor signed Senate Bill 1437. "The legislation, which became effective on January 1, 2019, addresses certain aspects of California law regarding felony murder and the natural and probable consequences doctrine by amending Penal Code sections 188 and 189, as well as by adding Penal Code section 1170.95, which provides a procedure by which those convicted of murder can seek retroactive relief if the changes in law would affect their previously sustained convictions." (People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 722 (Martinez).)
An uncodified section of the law expressing the Legislature's findings and declarations states the law was "necessary to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life." (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) It further provides that the legislation was needed "to limit convictions and subsequent sentencing so that the law of California fairly addresses the culpability of the individual and assists in the reduction of prison overcrowding, which partially results from lengthy sentences that are not commensurate with the culpability of the individual." (Id., § 1, subd. (e).)
Prior to Senate Bill 1437's enactment, a person who knowingly aided and abetted a crime, the natural and probable consequence of which was murder or attempted murder, could be convicted of not only the target crime but also of the resulting murder or attempted murder. (People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 161; In re R.G. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 141, 144 (R.G.).) "This was true irrespective of whether the defendant harbored malice aforethought. Liability was imposed '"for the criminal harms [the defendant] . . . naturally, probably, and foreseeably put in motion." [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (R.G., at p. 144.) "The purpose of the felony-murder rule [was] to deter those who commit[ted] the enumerated felonies from killing by holding them strictly responsible for any killing committed by a cofelon, whether intentional, negligent, or accidental, during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of the felony." (People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 197.) Aider and abettor liability under the doctrine was thus "vicarious in nature." (People v. Chiu, at p. 164.)
Senate Bill 1437 "redefined 'malice' in section 188. Now, to be convicted of murder, a principal must act with malice aforethought; malice can no longer 'be imputed to a person based solely on [his or her] participation in a crime.' (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)" (R.G., supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 144.) "Senate Bill 1437 also amended section 189, which defines first and second degree murder, by, among other things, adding subdivision (e). Under that subdivision, a participant in enumerated crimes is liable under the felony-murder doctrine only if he or she was the actual killer; or, with the intent to kill, aided and abetted the actual killer in commission of first degree murder; or was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life." (People v. Munoz (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 738, 749; § 189, subd. (e); Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3; People v. Lopez (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1099-1100, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S258175; Martinez, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 723.) "Senate Bill 1437 thus ensures that murder liability is not imposed on a person who did not act with implied or express malice," or—when the felony-murder doctrine is at issue—"was not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life." (People v. Munoz, at pp. 749-750; Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subds. (f), (g); People v. Anthony (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1147; Martinez, at p. 723.)
Senate Bill 1437 also added section 1170.95, which permits persons convicted of murder under a felony murder or natural and probable consequences theory to petition in the sentencing court for an order vacating their convictions and allowing defendant to be resentenced. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4; Martinez, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 723.) An offender may file a section 1170.95 petition if he or she was prosecuted under a felony murder or natural and probable consequences theory, but under amended sections 188 or 189, could not have been convicted of first or second degree murder. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).) If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief, the trial court must conduct a hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction and to recall the sentence and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts. (§ 1170.95, subds. (c), (d)(1); Martinez, at pp. 723-724.) At such a hearing, both the prosecution and the defense may rely on the record of conviction or may offer new or additional evidence. (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(3).) "[T]he burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing." (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(3); Martinez, at pp. 723-724.)
If the petitioner is found eligible for relief, the murder conviction must be vacated and the petitioner resentenced "on any remaining counts in the same manner as if the petitioner had not been [sic] previously been sentenced, provided that the new sentence, if any, is not greater than the initial sentence." (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(1).) If the petitioner is found eligible for relief, but "murder was charged generically[ ] and the target offense was not charged," the petitioner's murder conviction must be "redesignated as the target offense or underlying felony for resentencing purposes." (§ 1170.95, subd. (e).)
B. Constitutionality of Senate Bill 1437
Proposition 7 had increased the penalties for first and second degree murder and expanded the list of special circumstances that, if found true, would require a sentence of death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Proposition 115 expanded the number of crimes to which the felony-murder rule would apply and made numerous changes to various statutes to protect the rights of crime victims and witnesses in criminal cases.
Defendant and the Attorney General both contend Senate Bill 1437 and section 1170.95, as enacted by Senate Bill 1437, did not unconstitutionally amend Propositions 7 and 115. The People reassert the same arguments that they had made to the trial court. They argue Senate Bill 1437 unconstitutionally amends Propositions 7 and 115 by decreasing the number of people who are subject to conviction, and thus punishment, for murder. The People also contend that the resentencing petition process established under Senate Bill 1437, specifically section 1170.95, violates the separation of powers doctrine and that the resentencing provision is in direct conflict with Proposition 9 or Marsy's Law.
The Attorney General notes that it "is providing a uniform defense of the law."
After conducting a de novo review (People v. Luo (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 663, 680), we agree with defendant and the Attorney General that Senate Bill 1437 did not unconstitutionally amend Propositions 7 and 115, and/or violate the separations of powers doctrine, Proposition 9, or Marsy's Law. Since the trial court's ruling in this case, constitutional challenges to Senate Bill 1437 have been rejected. (See generally Lamoureux, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th 241; Gooden, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th 270; Solis, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th. 762; Cruz, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th 740; Bucio, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th 300.)
A statute enacted by voter initiative may be amended or repealed by the Legislature only with the approval of the electorate, unless the initiative statute provides otherwise. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (c).) "[D]espite the strict bar on the Legislature's authority to amend initiative statutes, judicial decisions have observed that this body is not thereby precluded from enacting laws addressing the general subject matter of an initiative. The Legislature remains free to address a '"related but distinct area"' [citations] or a matter that an initiative measure 'does not specifically authorize or prohibit.' [Citations.]" (People v. Kelly (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1008, 1025-1026 (Kelly), italics omitted.)
Because Proposition 7 did not authorize the Legislature to amend it (People v. Cooper (2002) 27 Cal.4th 38, 41, 44), and because Senate Bill 1437 passed the Assembly without the necessary votes for legislative amendment of Proposition 115 (People v. Superior Court (Pearson) (2010) 48 Cal.4th 564, 567 (Pearson); Gooden, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 277), Senate Bill 1437 would be unconstitutional, if it constitutes an "amendment" to Proposition 7 or Proposition 115. (See Proposition 103 Enforcement Project v. Quackenbush (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1473, 1483-1484 (Quackenbush) [the Legislature may amend a statute enacted by the initiative process "only if the voters specifically gave the Legislature that power, and then only upon whatever conditions the voters attached to the Legislature's amendatory powers"].) "An amendment is a legislative act designed to change an existing initiative statute by adding or taking away from it some particular provision." (People v. Cooper, at p. 44.)
The People cite Quackenbush, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th 1473 for the standard that an amendment is "'"'any change of the scope or effect of an existing statute, whether by addition, omission, or substitution of provisions, which does not wholly terminate its existence, whether by an act purporting to amend, repeal, revise, or supplement, or by an act independent and original in form.'"'" (Quackenbush, at pp. 1484-1485.) This language was taken from Franchise Tax Board v. Cory (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 772, 776-777. In Kelly, supra, 47 Cal.4th at page 1026, the California Supreme Court declined to "endorse any such expansive definition" of the term "amendment." Therefore, the cases in which the appellate court concluded a statute constituted an amendment based on an "expansive definition" of amendment are of less precedential value to our analysis.
To determine if Senate Bill 1437 constitutes an amendment to Proposition 7 or Proposition 115, "we simply need to ask whether it prohibits what the initiative authorizes, or authorizes what the initiative prohibits." (Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 571.) Division One of this court recently answered this question in the negative in Gooden, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th 270, and reaffirmed its conclusion in Lamoureux, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th 241. This Division and this District have found the analysis in Gooden and Lamoureux persuasive. We continue to follow that analysis here.
In Solis and Cruz, Division Three of this court also rejected the People's arguments. The Solis court explained: "A statute enacted by voter initiative may be amended or repealed by the Legislature only with the approval of the electorate, unless the initiative statute otherwise provides. [Citation.] '"[T]he purpose of California's constitutional limitation on the Legislature's power to amend initiative statutes is to 'protect the people's initiative powers by precluding the Legislature from undoing what the people have done, without the electorate's consent.'"'" (Solis, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 771.)
"For purposes of article II, section 10 of the California Constitution, legislation amends an initiative if it '"'change[s] an existing initiative statute by adding or taking from it some particular provision.'"' [Citations.] '[T]his does not mean that any legislation that concerns the same subject matter as an initiative, or even augments an initiative's provisions, is necessarily an amendment for these purposes. "The Legislature remains free to address a '"related but distinct area"' [citations] or a matter that an initiative measure 'does not specifically authorize or prohibit.'" [Citations.] In deciding whether this particular provision amends Proposition 115, we simply need to ask whether it prohibits what the initiative authorizes, or authorizes what the initiative prohibits.'" (Solis, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 771-772.)
With respect to Proposition 7, the Fourth Appellate District, Division Three held: "Proposition 7 provided greater penalties for those convicted of murder and increased the number of special circumstances that could form the basis of a sentence of death or life in prison without parole. In contrast, Senate Bill No. 1437 changed the elements of murder by limiting the circumstances in which malice can be implied, thereby restricting the application of the felony-murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Senate Bill No. 1437 is neither inconsistent with Proposition 7, nor does it circumvent the electorate's intent." (Solis, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 779; see Cruz, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 755-756.)
With respect to Proposition 115, the appellate court concluded: "Senate Bill No. 1437 . . . limits liability for felony murder and murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to an individual who is the actual killer, or who had the intent to kill and undertook specific actions to assist in commission of the murder, or who was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. These limitations do not directly modify or amend the language of Proposition 115." (Solis, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 781; see Cruz, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 759-761.)
In Gooden, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th 270, Division One of this court concluded "Senate Bill 1437 was not an invalid amendment to Proposition 7 or Proposition 115 because it neither added to, nor took away from, the initiatives." (Id. at p. 275.) Gooden noted Senate Bill 1437 does not speak to the penalties for murder; rather, it amends the mental state required for murder. (Gooden, at p. 287.)
With respect to Proposition 7, the Gooden court explained: Senate Bill 1437 did not amend Proposition 7 because it did not "address the same subject matter [as Proposition 7]. It did not prohibit what Proposition 7 authorizes by, for example, prohibiting a punishment of 25 years to life for first degree murder or 15 years to life for second degree murder. Nor did it authorize what Proposition 7 prohibits by, for instance, permitting a punishment of less than 25 years for first degree murder or less than 15 years for second degree murder. In short, it did not address punishment at all. Instead, it amended the mental state requirements for murder, which 'is perhaps as close as one might hope to come to a core criminal offense "element."'" (Gooden, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 282, quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 493.)
Because Senate Bill 1437 and Proposition 7 concerned different subjects, the Gooden court concluded Proposition 7 did not foreclose the Legislature from enacting Senate Bill 1437 to amend the mental state requirements for murder under the felony-murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Gooden, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pp. 282-286.) Gooden's analysis applied to all the legislative amendments effectuated by Senate Bill 1437, including section 1170.95. (Gooden, at p. 286.)
Gooden, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pages 287 and 288, similarly found Senate Bill 1437 does not amend Proposition 115, which made more offenses eligible for felony murder. The Gooden court explained, again, Senate Bill 1437 "did not augment or restrict the list of predicate felonies on which felony murder may be based" but instead "amended the mental state necessary for a person to be liable for murder." (Gooden, at p. 287.) The court thus concluded that because Senate Bill 1437 does not amend Propositions 7 and 115, it does not violate article II, section 10, subdivision (c), of the California Constitution, which provides that the Legislature may amend or repeal an initiative statute only with voter approval, unless the original initiative permits amendment or repeal without voter approval. (Gooden, at pp. 279, 289.)
In Lamoureux, the same appellate court used the same analysis as it had in Gooden to again conclude Senate Bill 1437 did not unconstitutionally amend the earlier enacted initiatives. (Lamoureux, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 246.) The Lamoureux court further concluded that "the resentencing provision of Senate Bill 1437 does not contravene separation of powers principles or violate the rights of crime victims." (Ibid.)
The Lamoureux court explained, first, the bill was part of a broad penal reform to ensure our state's murder laws fairly address individual culpability and to reduce prison overcrowding. (Lamoureux, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pp. 247, 256.) Having such a purpose, any interference with the executive's power of clemency is merely incidental and not an impermissible encroachment on the core functions of the executive. (Id. at p. 256.) Second, the bill does not intrude on a core function of the judiciary by allowing prisoners serving final sentences to seek relief. To the extent retroactive reopening of final judgments implicates individual liberty interests, Senate Bill 1437 does not present any risk to those interests. (Lamoureux, at p. 261.) "On the contrary, it provides potentially ameliorative benefits to the only individuals whose individual liberty interests are at stake in a criminal prosecution," the criminal defendant. (Ibid.) Also, the legal landscape is rife with legislation allowing petitioners to reopen final judgments of conviction without regard to their finality as of the effective date of the legislation, for example, Propositions 36 and 47. (Lamoureux, at pp. 262-263.)
Regarding crime victims' rights as included in Marsy's Law, the court in Lamoureux, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pages 264 to 266 explained, although Marsy's Law established a victim's right to prompt and final conclusion to postjudgment proceedings, Marsy's Law did not foreclose postjudgment proceedings altogether. (Lamoureux, at p. 265.) The court also noted section 1170.95 does not deprive victims of safety-related rights because trial courts may consider that factor when resentencing the defendant on any remaining counts. (Lamoureux, at pp. 265-266.)
The analyses and holdings in Solis and Cruz apply equally here, as do the holdings of Gooden and Lamoureux. We agree with the reasoning in these cases, and likewise conclude Senate Bill 1437 is constitutional and does not violate Propositions 7 and 115, the separation of powers doctrine, and/or Marsy's Law. We reject the People's reasons to depart from the conclusions reached in Gooden and Lamoureux. Therefore, we conclude the trial court erred in finding Senate Bill 1437 unconstitutional and striking defendant's resentencing petition under section 1170.95 without reaching its merit. We offer no opinion as to whether the trial court should issue an order to show cause or grant the relief requested in the petition.
The People requested judicial notice of ballot and legislative materials pertaining to Senate Bill 1437, Proposition 7, Proposition 115, and other proposed legislation. We deny the request as unnecessary to the disposition of this appeal.
IV
DISPOSITION
The trial court's postjudgment order striking defendant's section 1170.95 resentencing petition is reversed. The matter is remanded with directions to consider the merits of defendant's petition under section 1170.95.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J. We concur: MILLER
Acting P. J. FIELDS
J.