Opinion
KA 02-00866.
Decided June 14, 2004.
Appeal from a judgment of the Erie County Court (Sheila A. DiTullio, J.), rendered April 3, 2002. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of robbery in the second degree (two counts).
LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (MATTHEW PETERDY OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
FRANK J. CLARK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BUFFALO (PAUL J. WILLIAMS, III, OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.
Before: PRESENT: HURLBUTT, J.P., SCUDDER, GORSKI, MARTOCHE, AND HAYES, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment entered upon a jury verdict convicting him of two counts of robbery in the second degree (Penal Law § 160.10, [2] [a]). Contrary to defendant's contention, County Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in limiting the scope of cross-examination of two of the People's witnesses on a collateral matter in order to impeach their credibility ( see People v. Pritchett, 248 A.D.2d 967, 968, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 929; see also People v. Scarola, 71 N.Y.2d 769, 777). Contrary to defendant's further contention, the court did not err in refusing to allow cross-examination of the victim on the issue whether he actually had $50 stolen from him. Such questioning would not have raised doubt with regard to an element of the crime charged, given that the victim testified that other property was also stolen from him ( see § 160.10). In any event, any error in the court's limitation of the cross-examination of those three prosecution witnesses is harmless ( see People v. Thomches, 172 A.D.2d 786; People v. Anderson, 168 A.D.2d 624, 625, lv denied 77 N.Y.2d 903; see generally People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 241-242).
Defendant's further contention concerning alleged prosecutorial misconduct on summation is not preserved for our review ( see CPL 470.05), and we decline to exercise our power to review that contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice ( see 470.15 [6] [a]). According the People the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the conviction ( see People v. Cintron, 95 N.Y.2d 329, 332; see also People v. Watson, 269 A.D.2d 755, lv denied 95 N.Y.2d 806). We further conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence ( see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495). Finally, defendant received the minimum sentence authorized by law, and thus the sentence cannot be considered unduly harsh or severe ( see People v. Harris, 4 A.D.3d 767, 768).