The classic definition of a concealed weapon is one which is hidden from ordinary observation. People v. Barksdale, 14 Ill. App.3d 415, 302 N.E.2d 718, 722 (1973); People v. Colson, 14 Ill. App.3d 375, 302 N.E.2d 409, 410 (1973); Smith v. State, 18 Md. App. 612, 308 A.2d 442, 444 (1973); People v. Jackson, 43 Mich. App. 569, 204 N.W.2d 367, 368 (1972); State v. Pettit, 20 Ohio App.2d 170, 49 Ohio Opinions 2d 200, 252 N.E.2d 325, 328 (1969). This definition comports with the plain meaning of subsection ( l) and we reject defendant's suggestion that "concealed weapon" is a term of art by which Congress intended to imply a common law requirement of intent.
We find that the conduct of the police officers was constitutionally reasonable. See, State v. Delmondo, supra; State v. Onishi, 53 Haw. 593, 499 P.2d 657 (1972); State v. Goudy, 52 Haw. 497, 479 P.2d 800 (1971); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. Pearce, 356 F. Supp. 756 (D.C.E.D. Pa. 1973); Bailey v. United States, 389 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Gilbert v. United States, 366 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. Ragsdale, 470 F.2d 24 (5th Cir. 1972); Flores v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.App.3d 219, 94 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1971); Irwin v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.3d 423, 82 Cal. Rptr. 484, 462 P.2d 12 (1969); State v. Junious, 30 Cal.App.3d 432, 106 Cal.Rptr. 344 (1973); Restani v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.3d 320, 91 Cal.Rptr. 429 (1970); State v. Taras, 19 Ariz. App. 7, 504 P.2d 548 (1972); People v. Barksdale, 14 Ill. App.3d 415, 302 N.E.2d 718 (1973); People v. Loveland, 71 Misc.2d 935, 338 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1972); People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32 (1964).Terry, supra at 30.
Further, it was not unreasonable for the police to visually check the car for passengers, as under the circumstances the police had reason to be suspicious and therefore more cautious than they might be with a mere traffic violation. ( People v. Barksdale (1973), 14 Ill. App.3d 415, 302 N.E.2d 718.) The open interior of the car was, of course, in plain view even though it was illuminated by light from the officer's flashlight.
This statute has been construed and applied in a number of cases, all involving instances in which a weapon was either fully or partly hidden under or inside another object in a vehicle. (See People v. Latson, 5 Ill. App.3d 1100, 284 N.E.2d 436; People v. Zazzetti, 6 Ill. App.3d 858, 286 N.E.2d 745; People v. Barksdale, 14 Ill. App.3d 415, 302 N.E.2d 718.) These instances differ from the case before us where the weapon was on the rear floor of an automobile in open view.
Likewise, we reject defendant's contention that his knowledge of the presence of the weapon was not proven. It is well established that such knowledge may be inferred from the circumstantial evidence presented at trial. ( People v. Barksdale, 14 Ill. App.3d 415, 302 N.E.2d 718; People v. Williams, 132 Ill. App.2d 806, 270 N.E.2d 144.) The jury knew that the complainant had been robbed at gunpoint only minutes before defendant was arrested.
When Officer Green felt what he thought was a dangerous weapon underneath the mattress, it was reasonable that he conduct a search of the area in order to protect himself or prevent escape. ( People v. Brown, 38 Ill.2d 353, 231 N.E.2d 577; People v. Barksdale, 14 Ill. App.3d 415, 302 N.E.2d 718.) That the weapon recovered also turned out to be contraband does not make the search any the less reasonable. People v. Pruitt, 79 Ill. App.2d 209, 223 N.E.2d 537.
His ownership and control of the car together with the numerous items of criminal paraphernalia found in the car permit a reasonable inference that he too had knowledge of the weapons. The totality of the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to find all of the defendants guilty of knowingly carrying a revolver concealed in an automobile in violation of section 24-1 of the Criminal Code. People v. McKnight, 39 Ill.2d 577, 237 N.E.2d 488, cert. denied, 394 U.S. 993; People v. Zazzetti, 6 Ill. App.3d 858, 286 N.E.2d 745; People v. Barksdale, 14 Ill. App.3d 415, 302 N.E.2d 718. Defendants Truelock and Jenkins argue that the shotguns, which were located in the trunk of the automobile owned by Ehn, were situated in an area over which they had no immediate and exclusive control and that they were not proved to have had knowledge of the presence of the shotguns.