¶ 3 Many of the facts of this case have previously been recited in defendant's previous appeals. People v. Barker, No. 1-05-3483 (2008) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23); People v. Barker (Barker II), 403 Ill. App. 3d 515 (2010). We include here the facts relevant to the instant appeal. ¶ 4 Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first degree murder, home invasion, and two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault. The trial court sentenced defendant to 60 years' incarceration for murder, a concurrent 20 years' incarceration for home invasion, and two consecutive 20-year terms for aggravated criminal sexual assault. On direct appeal, this court vacated defendant's conviction and sentence for home invasion, but affirmed all other convictions and sentences.
¶ 11 Before proceeding, a brief overview of DNA profiling techniques is in order. In People v. Barker, 403 Ill.App.3d 515, 527–28, 342 Ill.Dec. 746, 932 N.E.2d 1207 (2010), the court observed as follows: “In its earliest form, DNA forensic technology focused on those parts of the DNA molecule where there is a significant variation of base pair patterns. [Citation.]
¶ 39 Y–STR testing examines the Y chromosome that is passed from father to son. People v. Zapata, 2014 IL App (2d) 120825, ¶ 11, 380 Ill.Dec. 646, 8 N.E.3d 1188 ; People v. Barker, 403 Ill.App.3d, 515, 527–28, 342 Ill.Dec. 746, 932 N.E.2d 1207 (2010) (citing and quoting Jules Epstein, “Genetic Surveillance”—The Bogeyman Response to Familial DNA Investigations,7D, 2009 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol'y, 141, 148 ). Y–STRs are short repeats found solely in the male-specific Y chromosome that code for male sex determination, spermatogenesis, and other male-related functions.
Therefore, defendant has established a prima facie case for postconviction DNA testing. Additionally, the requested test, Y-STR testing, was unavailable at the time of defendant's trial. See People v. Barker, 403 Ill. App. 3d 515 (2010). Therefore, the issue in this case is whether the requested Y-STR testing had the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence materially relevant to defendant's assertion of actual innocence. ¶ 26 Here, the stain on Humble's pants was a mix of Humble's blood and her unknown assailant's semen.
(Emphasis added). Defendant then stated, "For example, two DNA testing procedures, RFLP and mitochondrial (mtDNA) methods has [sic] been judicially recognized as generally accepted" by the scientific community, citing People v. Barker, 403 Ill. App. 3d 515 (2010). Barker in fact shows both of these DNA tests were scientifically available at the time of defendant's 2013 trial.
¶ 24 Successive section 116-3 motions are not impermissible. People v. Barker, 403 Ill. App. 3d 515, 522 (2010). However, res judicata will bar a successive section 116-3 motion if the same issue is raised in both motions.
Here, the State concedes that the gloves and sweatshirt were not previously subjected to DNA testing. ¶ 21 In this respect, we find the case at bar distinguishable from People v. Barker, 403 Ill.App.3d 515, 520–21, 342 Ill.Dec. 746, 932 N.E.2d 1207 (2010), cited by the State, where the evidence which defendant sought to be tested had been subjected to DNA testing at the time of trial. As such, defendant in Barker was subject to section 116–3(a)(2), which requires that defendant show that the requested testing was not available at the time of trial, and not to section 116–3(a)(1), which does not contain such a requirement.
Id. ¶ 14 "If a defendant can establish his prima facie case for section 116-3 testing, *** he must then establish that the testing requested was scientifically unavailable at the time of his trial." People v. Barker, 403 Ill. App. 3d 515, 524 (2010); 725 ILCS 5/116-3(a)(2) (West 2002). In his amended and revised section 116-3 motion, defendant requested mitochondrial DNA testing of the materials.
People ex rel. Madigan v. Petco Petroleum Corp., 363 Ill.App.3d 613, 623, 299 Ill.Dec. 333, 841 N.E.2d 1065, 1073 (2006). ¶ 18 Next, citing People v. Barker, 403 Ill.App.3d 515, 524, 342 Ill.Dec. 746, 932 N.E.2d 1207, 1215 (2010), the State asserts defendants forfeited their request to have the guardrail fingerprint run through the ISP's AFIS by including in their section 116–3 motion only a request to have it run through the FBI's IAFIS. In Barker, the trial court denied the defendant's section 116–3 motion for several specific types of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing.
People ex rel. Madigan v. Petco Petroleum Corp., 363 Ill. App. 3d 613, 623, 841 N.E.2d 1065, 1073 (2006). ¶ 18 Next, citing People v. Barker, 403 Ill. App. 3d 515, 524, 932 N.E.2d 1207, 1215 (2010), the State asserts defendants forfeited their request to have the guardrail fingerprint run through the ISP's AFIS by including in their section 116-3 motion only a request to have it run through the FBI's IAFIS. In Barker, the trial court denied the defendant's section 116-3 motion for several specific types of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing.