People v. Banks

11 Citing cases

  1. People v. Thompson

    340 N.E.2d 631 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975)   Cited 12 times
    In People v. Thompson (1975), 35 Ill. App.3d 105, 340 N.E.2d 631, the defendant was arrested with a man carrying stolen property; the court concluded their presence together, even with the defendant's knowledge that the crime had been committed, was not alone sufficient.

    The mere presence of defendants in the alley with Harrison even with knowledge that a crime had been committed, without more, is insufficient to establish accountability. ( People v. Banks (1975), 28 Ill. App.3d 784, 329 N.E.2d 504; People v. Davis (1975), 27 Ill. App.3d 388, 326 N.E.2d 470.) The evidence against the defendants was entirely circumstantial. It is well established that "[t]o justify a conviction, circumstantial evidence must be of such a nature as to produce a reasonable and moral certainty that the accused committed the crime."

  2. People v. Reid

    136 Ill. 2d 27 (Ill. 1990)   Cited 248 times
    Holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in its response to the jury

    "Presence plus knowledge that a crime was being committed, without more, are [also] insufficient to establish accountability." People v. Banks (1975), 28 Ill. App.3d 784, 786. Nevertheless, "[a]ctive participation has never been a requirement for the imposition of criminal guilt upon the theory of accountability."

  3. People v. Collins

    265 Ill. App. 3d 568 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)   Cited 3 times
    Noting that armed robbery consists of all of the elements of robbery plus being armed with a dangerous weapon

    A common design can be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. ( Furby, 138 Ill. 2d at 457; People v. Reid (1990), 136 Ill.2d 27, 65, 554 N.E.2d 174; People v. Ruckholdt (1984), 122 Ill. App.3d 7, 12, 460 N.E.2d 847.) Although mere presence at the scene and knowledge that a crime is being committed are not a sufficient basis, without more, to establish accountability ( People v. Banks (1975), 28 Ill. App.3d 784, 786, 329 N.E.2d 504), those circumstances may be considered by the jury, along with other circumstances surrounding the crime, such as defendant's flight from the scene, defendant's failure to report the crime, words of agreement, active participation, or failure to oppose or disapprove of the commission of the crime. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 62; Ruckholdt, 122 Ill. App. 3 d at 10-11.

  4. People v. Mason

    211 Ill. App. 3d 787 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 4 times
    In Mason, the appellate court overturned the defendant's conviction of burglary because the only evidence against the defendant was that he was seen by a police officer in an alley adjacent to a garage that was apparently, but not conclusively, burglarized.

    The cases cited by defendant which were reversed for insufficient evidence support our conclusion that the instant evidence was insufficient to establish that defendant intended to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense. See generally Ramirez, 151 Ill. App.3d 731; People v. Thruman (1977), 52 Ill. App.3d 13, 367 N.E.2d 379; People v. Thompson (1975), 35 Ill. App.3d 105, 340 N.E.2d 631; People v. Banks (1975), 28 Ill. App.3d 784, 329 N.E.2d 504. See also People v. Perruquet (1988), 173 Ill. App.3d 1054, 527 N.E.2d 1334; People v. Underwood (1982), 108 Ill. App.3d 846, 439 N.E.2d 1080; People v. Rodriguez (1980), 89 Ill. App.3d 941, 412 N.E.2d 655.

  5. People v. Ortiz

    170 Ill. App. 3d 1083 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)   Cited 6 times
    Stating that if a defendant "elects to explain h[er] possession of stolen property, [s]he must offer a reasonable story or be judged by its improbabilities"

    • 1, 2 Defendant correctly argues that mere presence is insufficient to establish accountability for another's criminal acts. (See People v. Banks (1975), 28 Ill. App.3d 784, 329 N.E.2d 504.) Defendant also points out that the trial court found that he was not accountable for the burglary of Grafft's apartment and claims that because there was no evidence that he exerted control over Grafft's property he cannot be held accountable for theft merely because of his presence in the car. This argument ignores both the testimony of Carlson that there were two people loading the car and the trial court's statement that it did not believe defendant's testimony that he was not helping Toro.

  6. People v. Beals

    165 Ill. App. 3d 955 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)   Cited 3 times

    Mitts maintains that without Moore's testimony, the evidence shows only that Mitts was a customer at the station when it was robbed; that he bought and paid for $3 worth of gas; that he said nothing to the robber and the robber said nothing to him. Mitts argued that mere presence at the scene of a crime does not prove accountability for the crime ( People v. Marquis (1974), 24 Ill. App.3d 653, 664, 321 N.E.2d 480, appeal denied (1975), 58 Ill.2d 595); nor does presence coupled with the knowledge that a crime is being committed prove accountability for a crime ( People v. Banks (1975), 28 Ill. App.3d 784, 786, 329 N.E.2d 504). The State claims that defendant Mitts was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, as the testimony showed that he both planned and helped carry out the robbery and received a share of the proceeds. In our view, the testimony offered by Troy Moore, along with that of the victim, Carlos Carlin, and the independent witness, Luis Masson, proved defendant Mitts guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

  7. People v. Kelly

    411 N.E.2d 1012 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)   Cited 5 times

    The infirmities urged by defendant in the relevant evidence of both witnesses are insufficient to render it a nullity. • 2 Defendant suggests that mere presence at the scene of a crime does not make a person accountable for the criminal acts of another ( People v. Banks (1975), 28 Ill. App.3d 784, 785, 329 N.E.2d 504); however, proof of a common design can be drawn from the circumstances surrounding commission of the act ( People v. Gray (1980), 87 Ill. App.3d 142, 408 N.E.2d 1150; People v. Mertens (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 791, 396 N.E.2d 595). Even disregarding the evidence of defendant's active restraint of Campana, the jury could have inferred his participation in the crime from the character of his presence and other attendant circumstances, including his affiliation with Tinsley and the others in the group ( People v. Morgan (1977), 67 Ill.2d 1, 8, 364 N.E.2d 56, cert. denied (1977), 434 U.S. 927, 54 L.Ed.2d 287, 98 S.Ct. 411; People v. Crutcher (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 239, 243, 390 N.E.2d 571; People v. Cole (1977), 50 Ill. App.3d 133, 142, 365 N.E.2d 133). We find no basis for reversal on this ground.

  8. People v. Mancl

    55 Ill. App. 3d 41 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)   Cited 8 times

    Mere presence at the scene of a crime, even with knowledge the crime is being committed, is insufficient to find criminal accountability. ( People v. Owens (4th Dist. 1975), 32 Ill. App.3d 893, 337 N.E.2d 60; People v. Banks (1st Dist. 1975), 28 Ill. App.3d 784, 329 N.E.2d 504.) On the other hand, one may aid and abet without actively participating in the overt act. ( People v. Rybka (1959), 16 Ill.2d 394, 158 N.E.2d 17.) "Evidence that a defendant voluntarily attached himself to a group bent on illegal acts with knowledge of its design supports an inference that he shared the common purpose and will sustain his conviction as a principal for a crime committed by another in furtherance of the venture."

  9. People v. Thruman

    367 N.E.2d 379 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)   Cited 5 times
    In People v. Thruman (1977), 52 Ill. App.3d 13, 367 N.E.2d 379, the suspect was likewise only present in the home of another subsequently charged with burglary.

    In addition, the mere presence of Plum at Thruman's residence, even with the knowledge that a crime had been committed, without more, is insufficient to establish any accountability of Plum for this theft. People v. Banks (1975), 28 Ill. App.3d 784, 329 N.E.2d 504. • 4 The evidence against Plum consists entirely of circumstantial evidence.

  10. People v. Curtis

    360 N.E.2d 122 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)   Cited 4 times

    The mere presence of Curtis and Romaker is insufficient to establish accountability even if they had knowledge that the crime had been committed. People v. Dalton (1934), 355 Ill. 312, 189 N.E. 265; People v. Banks (1975), 28 Ill. App.3d 784, 329 N.E.2d 504; People v. Thompson (1975), 35 Ill. App.3d 105, 340 N.E.2d 631. • 3 With respect to defendant Whitmore, the evidence was stronger.