Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. F15113
Duffy, J.
Defendant Brian Anthony Bamber was found after a contested hearing to have committed a probation violation—driving on a suspended license in violation of Vehicle Code section 14601. The court reinstated probation but terminated defendant’s previous eligibility for Proposition 36 treatment and ordered him to serve 120 days in jail with 91 days credit for time served. Defendant timely appealed and we affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 12, 2007, defendant pleaded guilty to one felony count of possession of a controlled substance. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)(1).) His sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation for three years with various conditions, among them that he enter and complete a proposition 36 program and that he “[t]otally abstain from [the] use of alcohol/intoxicants,” that he not possess drug paraphernalia, that he submit his person, residence, vehicle, personal effects, and areas within his dominion or control to search and seizure at any time without probable cause or a warrant “as to alcohol/contraband,” and that he submit to drug testing.
The record includes only the minute order that lists these probations terms. It does not include a reporter’s transcript of the hearing at which probation was granted or any written agreement signed by defendant consenting to the terms of probation, both or either of which would normally include the catch-all condition that the probationer obey all laws. This term does not appear in the minute order.
On April 30, 2007, Deputy Leonetti of the Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Office pulled over a blue Chevrolet Cavalier on Water Street for a Vehicle Code violation. Defendant was driving the car. The deputy asked for defendant’s driver’s license and registration but defendant told him that those items were in another vehicle owned by him. The deputy then ran defendant’s name and birth date through the NetCom dispatch system and discovered that his license had been suspended but that notification to defendant of this fact was apparently lacking.
But then Deputy Leonetti radioed Chief Deputy Parker, who told him that he had arrested defendant on April 5, 2007, for possession of heroin and that during the course of that arrest, Chief Deputy Parker had personally informed defendant that his driver’s license had been suspended. Chief Deputy Parker had been watching an area in Santa Cruz known for drug activity when he saw defendant drive up, get out of his van, and quickly walk down a trail. Chief Deputy Parker ran a check of the van’s license plates to discover the identity of the registered owner, which led him to defendant, and then he discovered that defendant’s driver’s license had been suspended but that notification of this fact had not yet been provided and that defendant was on probation and subject to search and other conditions. When defendant returned to his van, Chief Deputy Parker informed him that his driver’s license was suspended and that he could no longer drive and arrested him for the felony drug violation.
Chief Deputy Parker testified that written notice of the suspension had been served but that the notice had been “returned unclaimed.” A certified copy of a Department of Motor Vehicles record was received in evidence, which indicated that defendant’s license had been suspended on March 14, 2007, and that notice of suspension had been mailed to defendant’s address on file with the Department on March 18, 2007, an address that apparently was no longer good.
Deputy Leonetti having confirmed with Chief Deputy Parker that defendant had received prior actual notice of his license suspension, Deputy Leonetti issued defendant a citation for driving with a suspended license in violation of Vehicle Code section 14601, which would also constitute a violation of the terms of his probation, assuming the terms of probation included that he obey all laws.
On December 23, 2007, a probation hold was placed on defendant when he was arrested for violations of Health and Safety Code section 11350 (unlawful possession of controlled substance), Business and Professions Code section 4140 (unlawful possession of hypodermic needle or syringe), and Vehicle Code section 23152 (driving under the influence). He remained in custody until January 28, 2008, when he was released on his own recognizance (OR) pending a probation-violation hearing set for March 13, 2008, at which defendant was ordered to be personally present. Defendant failed to appear for the hearing and his OR was revoked and a bench warrant issued. On March 24, 2008, defendant moved to reinstate his OR, which was denied, and he was remanded to custody. On April 2, 2008, defendant was again released on OR pending a probation violation hearing set for April 25, 2008, and then continued to May 9, 2008. The probation-violation hearing was again continued to June 6, 2008, and defendant was again ordered to personally appear. He failed to do so on that date and his OR was again revoked and a bench warrant issued. On June 12, 2008, defendant was again granted release on his own recognizance pending the continued probation-violation hearing set for June 27, 2008, when the matter finally went forward.
At the beginning of the hearing, the court asked whether the basis of the probation violation was that defendant had “failed to obey all laws,” to which the district attorney responded, “[T]hat’s correct, on his probation terms.” There was no objection by defendant’s counsel that such had not been made a condition of defendant’s probation. We accordingly infer that the conditions of defendant’s probation did indeed include that he obey all laws even though this fact does not appear in our appellate record. Even if this catch-all provision were not included among the terms of his probation, we would deem him to have forfeited this objection by failing to have raised it below.
Defendant’s testimony appeared to dispute that his license was properly suspended at the time Deputy Leonetti cited him on April 30, 2007. But he admitted that Chief Deputy Parker had told him of the suspension when he arrested him on April 5, 2007. The court found that defendant had knowledge of the suspension and had understood this fact just as if he had received written notice of the suspension from the Department of Motor Vehicles. The court further found by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant had “violated the terms and conditions of his probation in that he drove a motor vehicle when his license was suspended or revoked and he had knowledge of that fact.”
The drug charges for which defendant had been arrested in December 2007 were apparently not pursued with the People only pursuing the probation violation.
On July 24, 2008, the court reinstated probation, deleted the requirement that defendant complete the Proposition 36 program, and then terminated probation. Defendant was ordered to serve 120 days in jail with 91 days credit for time served. He timely appealed under Penal Code section 1237, subdivision (b), which provides for the appealability of orders after judgment.
DISCUSSION
We appointed counsel to represent defendant in this court. Appointed counsel filed an opening brief that stated the case and the facts but raised no specific issues and requested this court to conduct an independent review of the record under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). On October 1, 2008, we notified defendant by letter sent to the street address provided on his notice of appeal of his right to submit written argument on his own behalf within 30 days. That letter was returned unopened with the handwritten notation “N.A.T.A.,” which we understand to indicate “not at this address,” on the envelope along with a yellow postal sticker dated October 14, 2008, and marked “return to sender, attempted—not known, unable to forward.” Defendant had provided an alternate address on his notice of appeal, which was “c/o Main Jail” in Santa Cruz.
After we had received back our letter to defendant sent to the street address, we attempted to locate him through his counsel. Counsel responded to us by letter dated October 16, 2008 that mail she had sent to defendant at the street address provided on his notice of appeal, which she believed to be a homeless shelter, had been returned to her. Her office also contacted the “Santa Cruz County jail to determine whether [defendant] was in custody” but her legal assistant was told that he was not. Counsel further indicated that she does not have “contact information for any relatives or other parties through whom [defendant] may be reached.”
Accordingly, we have attempted through every reasonable avenue to provide defendant with notice of his right to present written argument on his own behalf within 30 days in view of his counsel’s assertion of no specific issues on appeal. But by his failure to provide his counsel of record or this court with his contact information, defendant has forfeited that right.
We have reviewed the entire record under Wende. Based upon this review, we have concluded that there is no arguable issue on appeal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J., McAdams, J.