Opinion
2021-03870
06-17-2021
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Gilberto Ballester-Perez, Appellant.
Theodore J. Stein, Woodstock, for appellant. David J. Clegg, District Attorney, Kingston (Joan Gudesblatt Lamb of counsel), for respondent.
Calendar Date: May 7, 2021
Theodore J. Stein, Woodstock, for appellant.
David J. Clegg, District Attorney, Kingston (Joan Gudesblatt Lamb of counsel), for respondent.
Before: Egan Jr., J.P., Lynch, Pritzker, Reynolds Fitzgerald and Colangelo, JJ.
Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Ulster County (Williams, J.), rendered December 8, 2017, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree.
In full satisfaction of a four-count indictment, defendant pleaded guilty to the reduced charge of course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree and purportedly waived his right to appeal. Consistent with the terms of the plea agreement, County Court sentenced defendant to a prison term of seven years, to be followed by 10 years of postrelease supervision. Defendant appeals.
Contrary to defendant's contention, we find that defendant's waiver of appeal was knowing, voluntary and intelligent (see People v Thomas, 34 N.Y.3d 545, 559-564 [2019]; People v Bradshaw, 18 N.Y.3d 257, 264-265 [2011]; People v Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d 248, 256 [2006]). The record reflects that defendant was advised that a waiver of appeal was a condition of the plea agreement and that he understood the terms of the plea agreement. "County Court carefully explained the right to appeal and the appellate process and made clear that the waiver of appeal was a separate, additional requirement of the plea agreement, which was distinct from the trial-related rights that he had been advised were automatically forfeited by his guilty plea" (People v Thomas, 190 A.D.3d 1157, 1158 [2021]; see People v Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d at 256). Defendant also signed a written waiver of appeal in open court and assured the court that he had reviewed it with counsel and that he understood its terms and had no questions about the rights that he was giving up. The written waiver stated that it applied "to all legal issues that can be waived under the law" and provided examples of the types of issues that would be precluded. "[A]lthough the allocution and written waiver did not expressly state that certain appellate issues survive an appeal waiver, we are satisfied that 'the counseled defendant understood the distinction that some appellate review survived'" (People v Thomas, 190 A.D.3d at 1158, quoting People v Thomas, 34 N.Y.3d at 561; accord People v Hernandez, 188 A.D.3d 1357, 1357 [2020], lv denied 36 N.Y.3d 1057 [2021]; see People v Martin, 179 A.D.3d 1385, 1386 [2020]). Inasmuch as "there is no mandatory litany that must be used in order to obtain a valid waiver of appellate rights," we are satisfied from this record that defendant's waiver was knowing, intelligent and voluntary (People v Johnson, 14 N.Y.3d 483, 486 [2010]; see People v Thomas, 34 N.Y.3d at 564; People v Daniels, 193 A.D.3d 1179, 1179 [2021]; People v Thomas, 190 A.D.3d at 1158-1159). Defendant's challenge to the sentence as harsh and excessive is therefore foreclosed by his valid appeal waiver (see People v Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d at 256; People v Budnack, 155 A.D.3d 1658, 1658 [2017], lv denied 30 N.Y.3d 1114 [2018]; People v Vasquez, 137 A.D.3d 1636, 1637 [2016], lv denied 27 N.Y.3d 1076 [2016]).
Egan Jr., J.P., Lynch, Pritzker, Reynolds Fitzgerald and Colangelo, JJ., concur.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.