Opinion
E065628
02-28-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DILLON CARTER BALL, Defendant and Appellant.
Steven A. Brody, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and Karl T. Terp, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1302926) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Becky Dugan, Judge. Reversed. Steven A. Brody, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and Karl T. Terp, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Dillon Carter Ball appeals from the superior court's order denying his petition under Penal Code section 1170.18 to reduce his forgery conviction to a misdemeanor. The People concede, and this court agrees, that the superior court erred when it determined the conviction was not eligible for reduction.
Section references are to the Penal Code except where otherwise indicated.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
On July 12, 2013, defendant possessed a counterfeit $100 bill with the intent to defraud another person.
On August 12, 2013, the People filed a felony complaint charging defendant with a single count of unlawfully making, passing, uttering, publishing or possessing a counterfeit bill with the intent to defraud another person. (§ 476.) The People also alleged defendant had a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)) for robbery (§ 211).
On July 16, 2014, defendant pled guilty to the charged crime and admitted the strike prior. The court imposed a first strike sentence of one year four months.
On May 15, 2015, defendant filed a section 1170.18 petition to reduce his conviction to a misdemeanor. The People responded that defendant was not entitled to the relief requested. The People marked the box on the response form indicating, "Other," and hand wrote, "$100 counterfeit bill." On September 4, 2015, the court denied the petition, indicating: "476—counterfeit bill; not a qualifying felony."
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues, and the People concede, that the superior court erred when it found defendant's forgery conviction involving a counterfeit $100 bill is not eligible for reduction to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47. We agree.
"The voters approved Proposition 47 at the November 4, 2014 general election, and it became effective the next day." (People v. Diaz (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1328.) "Proposition 47 'was intended to reduce penalties for "certain nonserious and nonviolent property and drug offenses from wobblers or felonies to misdemeanors." ' " (T.W. v. Superior Court (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 646, 652.) " 'In interpreting a voter initiative . . . we apply the same principles that govern statutory construction. [Citation.] Thus, "we turn first to the language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning." [Citation.] The statutory language must also be construed in the context of the statute as a whole and the overall statutory scheme [in light of the electorate's intent]. [Citation.] When the language is ambiguous, "we refer to other indicia of the voters' intent, particularly the analyses and arguments contained in the official ballot pamphlet." [Citation.]' [Citation.] In other words, 'our primary purpose is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the voters who passed the initiative measure.' " (People v. Briceno (2004) 34 Cal.4th 451, 459.)
Proposition 47 added section 1170.18 to the Penal Code; subdivision (a) provides: "A person who, on November 5, 2014, was serving a sentence for a conviction, whether by trial or plea, of a felony or felonies who would have been guilty of a misdemeanor under the act that added this section ('this act') had this act been in effect at the time of the offense may petition for a recall of sentence before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case to request resentencing in accordance with Sections 11350, 11357, or 11377 of the Health and Safety Code, or Section 459.5, 473, 476a, 490.2, 496, or 666 of the Penal Code, as those sections have been amended or added by this act." Under section 1170.18, subdivision (b), the trial court first determines whether the petition has presented a prima facie case for relief under section 1170.18, subdivision (a). If the petitioner satisfies the criteria in subdivision (a), then he will be resentenced to a misdemeanor, unless the court, within its discretion, determines the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk to public safety. (§ 1170.18, subd. (b).)
Section 476 provides that, "Every person who makes, passes . . . any fictitious or altered bill, note . . . is guilty of forgery." (Italics added.) Section 476 is punished under section 473, which is entitled, "Punishment of forgery." Proposition 47 added subdivision (b) to section 473, which now provides that a "person who is guilty of forgery related to a . . . bank bill, note . . . where the value of the . . . bank bill, note . . . does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950) [is guilty of a misdemeanor, unless the defendant has one or more prior convictions under section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv)]." (Italics added.) We conclude that the term "bill" in section 476 is synonymous with the term "bank bill" in section 473, and thus defendant's conviction for forgery involving a $100 bill under section 476 is eligible for reduction to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47.
This conclusion is supported by two recent appellate decisions, one from this court. In People v. Mutter (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 429, the defendant was convicted of violating a different forgery statute, section 475, which prohibits a person from possessing or receiving counterfeit currency with the intent to pass it, knowing it to be counterfeit. This court found the defendant eligible under Proposition 47 after concluding that the term "bank bill" in section 473, subdivision (b), refers to our modern paper currency, as opposed to the term's archaic meaning: "a written promise on the part of the bank to pay the bearer a certain sum of money." (Mutter, at p. 435.) Our colleagues in the Second Appellate District, Division Five, came to a similar conclusion in People v. Maynarich (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 77, 80-81, which also involved forgery under section 475. That court found the defendant eligible for resentencing under Proposition 47 because counterfeit currency found in the defendant's possession qualified as bank bills or notes within the meaning of section 473, subdivision (b).
We see no reason to diverge from the reasoning of the two above cases—counterfeit currency is a bank bill or note under section 473, and so defendant's forgery conviction under section 476 qualifies for reduction to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47.
DISPOSITION
The trial court's order denying defendant's petition is reversed. If defendant is still serving his sentence, the trial court shall resentence defendant to a misdemeanor, unless the court in its discretion determines resentencing defendant would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (§ 1170.18, subd. (b).) If defendant has already completed serving his sentence, then the trial court is directed to reduce defendant's felony conviction to a misdemeanor.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Retired judge of the Riverside Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. --------
J. We concur: RAMIREZ
P. J. McKINSTER
J.