" The State challenges only the circuit court's affirmative answer to the third question. In support of its position, the State relies primarily on its contention that the one case that found simultaneous possession to trigger compulsory joinder, People v. Baker, 77 Ill.App.3d 943, 33 Ill.Dec. 831, 397 N.E.2d 164 (1979), is distinguishable. The State contends that the holding by the Fourth District in Baker should be limited to simultaneous possession of narcotics.

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 3-3. Here, the defendant argues that the instant charges were barred by section 3-4 of the Code because: (1) the present charges were known to the Tazewell County State's Attorney's office at the time of the first Tazewell County charge; (2) the first Tazewell County charge, which was dismissed on double jeopardy grounds, was an "acquittal" within the meaning of section 3-4(b) of the Code; and (3) the former charge and the latter charges were based on the same act. See Peoplev. Baker (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 943, 397 N.E.2d 164 (which held that possession of a controlled substance and possession of cannabis were but a single act of possession within the meaning of the compulsory joinder statute). • 2 We agree that the present charges are barred.

Therefore, elements-based analyses of issues such as the one act, one crime doctrine and double jeopardy are independent of the separate issue of whether multiple offenses are based on the same act for compulsory joinder. See, e.g., People v. Flaar, 366 Ill.App.3d 685, 688–92, 304 Ill.Dec. 88, 852 N.E.2d 338 (2006) (applying different analyses for double jeopardy and compulsory joinder issues); People v. Baker, 77 Ill.App.3d 943, 945, 33 Ill.Dec. 831, 397 N.E.2d 164 (1979) (explaining that circuit court did not determine whether possession of controlled substance was separate offense, “but rather determined that there was but a single act of possession within the statute concerning compulsory joinder”). We observe that in People v. Davis, 381 Ill.App.3d 614, 618, 320 Ill.Dec. 499, 887 N.E.2d 643 (2008), and People v. Davis, 328 Ill.App.3d 411, 414, 262 Ill.Dec. 657, 766 N.E.2d 277 (2002), the appellate court erroneously applied the definition of “act” employed in the context of the one act, one crime doctrine to the context of compulsory joinder; these decisions are hereby overruled.

Accordingly, the charges were subject to compulsory joinder. See also People v. Hiatt, 229 Ill. App.3d 1094, 1097 (1992) (possession of a videotape containing child pornography and possession of photos of different children were single act of possession); People v. Mitsakopoulos, 171 Ill. App.3d 198, 200-01 (1988) (compulsory joinder applied to theft and forgery charges based on the defendant's unauthorized control over the proceeds of a check); People v. Baker, 77 Ill. App.3d 943, 944-45 (1979) (simultaneous possession of a controlled substance and possession of cannabis were same act of possession for purposes of compulsory joinder). We agree with defendant that the misdemeanor and felony DUI charges were based on the same act.

And while the offense charged in the second indictment does involve the same conduct of the defendant on December 7, 1979, the prosecution on the second indictment requires "proof of a fact not required on the other prosecution" (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 3-4(b)(1)) — that is, proof that the premises were under the control of Arementa Ervin. The defendant cites People v. Baker (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 943, for support of his position that the burglary for which the defendant is now charged should have been joined with the first prosecution. In People v. Baker the appellate court affirmed the trial court's order dismissing an indictment for unlawful possession of a controlled substance.

Hiatt, 229 Ill.App.3d at 1097, 172 Ill.Dec. 372, 595 N.E.2d 733. In coming to this conclusion, the trial court analogized to People v. Baker, 77 Ill.App.3d 943, 33 Ill.Dec. 831, 397 N.E.2d 164 (1979), stating: "The defendant's possession of the videotape and the photographs was part of the same course of conduct and were really a 'single act of possession,' just as in Baker where the defendant possessed two different types of illegal drugs that were uncovered in the same search."

Accordingly, we hold that the separate convictions and concurrent sentences were proper. Defendant relies on People v. Baker (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 943, 397 N.E.2d 164, in which the court held that simultaneous possession of cannabis and a controlled substance constituted the same offense for purposes of compulsory joinder. We find Baker distinguishable.

(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 3-3(b); People v. Davis (1982), 104 Ill. App.3d 120, 432 N.E.2d 947; People v. Baker (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 943, 397 N.E.2d 164.) Nevertheless, it does not appear from the record that the State joined the charges in a single prosecution.

" (See also this court's decisions on compulsory joinder in People v. Baker (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 943, 397 N.E.2d 164, and People v. Murray (1982), 106 Ill. App.3d 50, 435 N.E.2d 772.) The authority for a trial court to grant a "conditional" or "partial" directed verdict so as to leave an included offense of that charged before the court is not apparent. Although the defendant argues that the trial court's action in entering a directed verdict on the charged offense left the court without jurisdiction to proceed, I conclude that the crux of the problem is the absence of any charge left pending, by the operation of the law, after the entry of a directed verdict on the only charged offense.

However, once the initial prosecution has resulted in either a conviction or acquittal on any of the charges known to the prosecutor, the State may not thereafter amend the information by adding charges for which the defendant could have been convicted and which should have been joined in the initial prosecution. ( People v. Mullenhoff (1965), 33 Ill.2d 445, 448-49, 211 N.E.2d 744, 746; People v. Murray (1982), 106 Ill. App.3d 50, 52, 435 N.E.2d 772, 773-74; People v. Baker (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 943, 944-45, 397 N.E.2d 164, 166, appeal denied (1980), 79 Ill.2d 632.) In Mullenhoff, an acquittal on the charge of deviate sexual assault barred a subsequent prosecution for attempted rape since both crimes were known to the prosecution and were based upon a single act.