Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Humboldt County Super. Ct. No. CR084666
Richman, J.
The People appeal from the order dismissing criminal charges against defendant Anthony James Baker after the trial court granted his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5. We conclude that the granting of the motion was error, and therefore the dismissal order must be reversed.
BACKGROUND
The record of the uncontradicted evidence received at the suppression hearing conducted on August 5, 2009, may be summarized as follows:
The sole witness was Eureka Police Officer Wayne Rabang, who testified that while on patrol on the evening of May 21, 2008, he observed a vehicle that had “multiple cracks” in the windshield, going “from the passenger’s side to the driver’s side.” Because the cracks were sufficiently large to obstruct the driver’s vision through the windshield, Officer Rabang “performed an enforcement stop on the vehicle, ” which had three occupants: a woman driver, a male in the front passenger seat, and another male in the back seat.
Officer Rabang further testified that “[b]ecause all the occupants [were]... detained, I asked for identification from all three subjects.” The driver established her identity “by descriptors from her California driver’s license, ” and the front seat passenger “[t]hrough his California identification card.” Defendant, the rear seat passenger, produced a “California Parole ID card.” “[O]nce I got the identification from all three subjects, I went back to my patrol vehicle, and I did... checks for... local and federal warrants on the subjects.”
While the checks were being run, Officer Rabang observed that “the subjects started doing or conducting further hand movements inside the vehicle, ” i.e., “[m]oving around as if searching or placing objects somewhere inside the vehicle.” Beginning with the driver, Officer Rabang “removed each subject individually” from the vehicle. The check on the front seat passenger showed that he was on parole, “so I immediately detained him in handcuffs and seated him into the rear of my patrol vehicle.”
Officer Rabang testified that he then “had Mr. Baker exit the rear of the vehicle. As he stepped out of the vehicle, he stated that he had a knife on his side.” “I basically spun him... to where his right side was toward me so I could lift his coat and take possession of the knife, which I did.” The officer retrieved a fixed-blade knife of approximately six inches in length. Defendant was then “[d]etained in handcuffs.” During a search conducted incident to defendant’s arrest, Officer Rabang discovered cannabis concentrate in a necklace defendant was wearing.
Officer Rabang testified on cross-examination that he did not suspect that defendant had a knife until defendant stated “I have a knife” when getting out of the vehicle. Notwithstanding defendant’s producing his “Parole ID card, ” Officer Rabang had not verified that defendant was in fact on parole when he searched defendant and discovered the knife. He first saw movements inside the vehicle as he was effecting the stop. He described the movements as “basically... lead[ing] me to believe that the person’s hiding something... you know, pushing something under the seat.”
On August 10, 2009, the trial court filed a minute order stating simply that “The Motion to Suppress Evidence is granted.” That same day, the prosecution advised the court that in light of the ruling on the suppression motion it was “not able to proceed, ” whereupon the court dismissed the charges of possessing a dirk or dagger (Pen. Code, § 12020, subd. (a)(4)) and concentrated cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357, subd. (a)).
The following day the prosecution filed a notice purporting to appeal “from the minute order... granting the Motion to Suppress Evidence.” That order is not appealable (People v. Smith (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 604, 605, fn. 1), but an appeal from a dismissal order does have the requisite statutory authorization. (Pen. Code, § 1238, subd. (a)(7); People v. Gazali (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1417, 1420-1421; People v. Yarbrough (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1650, 1653.) In accordance with the principle that a notice of appeal is to be liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency, we treat the notice as perfecting a valid appeal from the ensuing order of dismissal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2); People v. Mayer (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1101, 1106, fn. 1.)
DISCUSSION
Having carefully reviewed the record and the briefs, we conclude that the order of dismissal must be reversed because it was error for the trial court to grant defendant’s suppression motion. Our reasons follow.
Both sides agree that Officer Rabang had a reasonable basis for making the vehicle stop, the windshield cracks furnishing legitimate cause for him to conclude that the vehicle was not in compliance with Vehicle Code section 26710. (See People v. Vibanco (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1, 8 [“It is... unlawful to operate any motor vehicle on a public street when the windshield is in such a defective condition as to impair the driver’s vision. (Veh. Code, § 26710)”].) Although the driver of a halted vehicle is the person obviously responsible for a traffic infraction which is the basis for the stop, passengers in the vehicle are likewise deemed detained, and thus seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. (Brendlin v. California (2007) 551 U.S. 249, 256-258; Maryland v. Wilson (1997) 519 U.S. 408, 413-414 (Wilson).)
Below, and here, defendant has maintained that a “second detention” occurred when Officer Rabang asked the occupants for identification. Indeed, it is the heart of defendant’s argument for affirmance. But this is a false dichotomy. “Asking questions is an essential part of police investigations, ” and “a routine and accepted part” of detentions. (Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cty. (2004) 542 U.S. 177, 185-186.) Asking a properly detained person for identification is without consequence for Fourth Amendment purposes, and does not constitute a different detention requiring separate justification. (See Muehler v. Mena (2005) 544 U.S. 93, 100-102; INS v. Delgado (1984) 466 U.S. 210, 216; People v. Vibanco, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th 1, 13-14 and authorities cited.) Thus, there was no “second detention, ” only a lawful continuation of the traffic stop detention whose validity defendant concedes.
The United States Supreme Court recognizes that “danger to an officer from a traffic stop is likely to be greater when there are passengers in addition to the driver in the stopped car.” (Wilson, supra, 519 U.S. 408, 414.) And, as that court has recently explained, “the risk of a violent encounter in a traffic-stop setting ‘stems not from the ordinary reaction of a motorist stopped for a speeding violation, but from the fact that evidence of a more serious crime might be uncovered during the stop.’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he motivation of a passenger to employ violence to prevent apprehension of such a crime is... every bit as great as that of the driver.’ ” (Arizona v. Johnson (2009) ___ U.S. ___ [129 S.Ct. 781, 787] (Johnson) quoting Wilson, supra, at pp. 413-414.) Therefore, “an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the stop.” (Wilson, supra, at p. 415.) For reasons of officer safety, this may be done “as a matter of course.” (Id. at p. 410.)
The final stage of our analysis requires a brief digression concerning the standards governing our review. “We defer to the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment.” (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.) Here, the trial court made no express factual determinations. And, because the evidence is not in dispute on any salient factual issues, we exercise our independent review to determine whether Officer Rabang’s seizure of the knife and arrest of defendant comported with the Fourth Amendment. (See People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 596-597 & fn. 1; People v. Balint (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 200, 205; People v. Ferguson (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 367, 371.) And conclude that it did.
The crucial point is, of course, the discovery of the knife. After defendant was ordered out of the vehicle, he told Officer Rabang that he was in possession of a knife. Because, as has been shown, that command was valid, there can be no question of treating it-as defendant does-as the tainted fruit of a constitutional violation. Once defendant started to emerge from the vehicle, having made that statement, it would have been entirely reasonable for Officer Rabang to take it at face value. That alone would provide the basis for a lawful pat search for that weapon. (See Johnson, supra, ___ U.S. ___ [129 S.Ct. 781, 784].) The movements of the vehicle’s occupants, even if confined to those observed by Officer Rabang after the stop was effected, could only increase his unease and apprehension for his safety. Once he discovered the knife concealed on defendant’s person, Officer Rabang ‘s knowledge-or lack of knowledge-about defendant’s actual status as a parolee became immaterial, because the knife was a “dirk or dagger” stabbing instrument, the possession of which is categorically prohibited by Penal Code section 12020 to citizen and parolee alike. With the arrest valid, a search incident thereto was likewise valid, and defendant makes no attempt to argue otherwise. This makes the discovery of the illegal substance in defendant’s necklace unimpeachable.
Defendant insists that this case is “legally indistinguishable” from People v. Spicer (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 213. Not true. In Spicer, the Court of Appeal held that a passenger in a car stopped for a traffic violation was detained when the officer asked for her driver’s license. (Id. at pp. 220-221.) The passenger’s gun possession conviction was reversed because the officer “had no reasonable basis for suspecting her of any crime” at the time he was searching her purse and discovering the gun. (Id. at p. 216.) However, Spicer has been overtaken by subsequent developments. As already shown, it is now accepted that a passenger is detained when a vehicle is stopped, and that asking a passenger for identification is a permissible part of that detention. “The police need not have... cause to believe any occupant of the car is involved in criminal activity.” (Johnson, supra, ___ U.S. ___ [129 S.Ct. 781, 784].) Spicer is therefore very much legally distinguishable.
Finally, the United States Supreme Court has recently held that “An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop [i.e., asking for a passenger’s identification]... do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.” (See Johnson, supra, ___ U.S. ___ [129 S.Ct. 781, 788].) Defendant makes no claim that the detention was unreasonably extended by Officer Rabang’s inquiries.
DISPOSITION
The order of dismissal is reversed.
We concur: Kline, P.J., Lambden, J.