Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Mendocino County Super. Ct. No. SCWLCRCR0779246
Jones, P.J.
After the trial court denied his motion to suppress, appellant Xavier Anthony Baker pleaded no contest to possessing more than $100,000 in drug money. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.6, subd. (a).) On appeal, appellant contends the court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the warrantless search of his car, trunk, cell phone, and personal digital assistant (PDA) violated the Fourth Amendment. We affirm.
Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory references are to the Health and Safety Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In December 2007, the People filed an information charging appellant with transporting marijuana (§ 11360, subd. (a)) and possessing more than $100,000 in drug money (§ 11370.6, subd. (a)). Appellant moved to suppress “all evidence collected as a result of his detention and arrest,” contending: (1) there was no reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop; and (2) the detention was unreasonably prolonged. The motion to suppress did not specifically mention the search or seizure of appellant’s cell phone or PDA but it did seek to suppress “photographs, digital information, and sensory impressions....”
The facts are taken from the evidence presented at the hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress and from the court’s order denying the motion to suppress.
Prosecution Evidence
On December 20, 2007, Mendocino County Sheriff’s Deputy Jason Cox was parked at the intersection of Ryan Creek Road and Highway 101 near Willits, California. A drug-sniffing dog was in Cox’s car. Cox saw a Volvo sedan driving north along Highway 101, “approximately two car lengths behind the vehicle in front of it[.]” Cox determined that the Volvo had violated the Vehicle Code by following the car in front of it too closely. In addition, the Volvo had “dark tinted windows,” which prevented Cox from being able to tell whether the driver was wearing a seatbelt. As Cox began to follow the Volvo, it changed lanes without signaling.
Cox stopped the Volvo and saw a man, later identified as appellant, in the driver’s seat. When appellant rolled down his window, Cox smelled “the odor of fresh marijuana coming from the interior of the vehicle[.]” This alerted Cox “to the idea that [appellant] had possible contraband in the vehicle.” Cox also thought it was suspicious that appellant had “a temporary registration” sticker in his front window but did not have any paperwork from the Department of Motor Vehicles.
Cox asked appellant about the marijuana smell; he also asked appellant whether he had a medical reason for possessing marijuana. Cox asked appellant about the marijuana because appellant was “travelling in a direction that’s opposite of where his hometown is.... And it’s common for people to come to [the Mendocino] area to purchase large quantities of marijuana.” Based on his training and experience, Cox thought appellant’s behavior was “consistent with someone who [was] involved with drug trafficking[.]”
Appellant said “he had no marijuana and didn’t have a medical reason for marijuana.” At that point, Cox walked the drug-sniffing dog around the Volvo. The dog “alerted” on the left rear door of the car, which “indicat[ed] the presence of drugs.” Cox searched the interior compartment of the car and found marijuana in several locations, including approximately six grams of marijuana in the storage compartment of the rear passenger seat. Cox also searched the trunk, where he found a duffle bag containing a small amount of marijuana residue and a large box containing over $102,000.
In its order on appellant’s motion to suppress, the court described the evidence Cox found in appellant’s car as: “(1) [a] briefcase containing 38 grams of processed marijuana, a PDA[,] and $1,520 in cash; (2) loose in the vehicle 5.9 grams of processed marijuana, a charged stun-gun and a cell-phone; (3) in the trunk, a large duffle bag containing some residual marijuana and $102,860 banded in amounts of $5,000. [ ] Cox also located written documentation of what he described as summaries of financial transactions regarding marijuana purchases and sales, invoices in [appellant’s] name for the purchase of marijuana growing supplies and a business card from a Hollywood medical marijuana pharmacy.”
The court’s order also described how “Cox retrieved stored information from the cell phone and the PDA which he attributed to marijuana cultivation and selling operations. [¶] Sheriff’s deputies subsequently obtained a search warrant for the contents of the seized cell-phone and PDA. The supporting affidavit did not contain any reference to the on-site warrantless search of the cell-phone and PDA conducted by [ ] Cox nor to any of the information retrieved during that warrantless search.” Cox did not testify at the motion to suppress hearing about his search of the cell phone and PDA nor about the search warrant. Neither the search warrant nor the supporting affidavit is part of the appellate record.
Defense Evidence
Appellant denied violating the Vehicle Code on the day of the incident. Cox approached appellant’s car, and asked appellant why he was driving near Willits and whether he had registration paperwork. Cox “eventually” asked appellant whether he had marijuana in the car. Appellant denied having marijuana and told Cox he did not have a medical marijuana card, even though he had one in his glove compartment. At that point, Cox brought the drug-sniffing dog to the Volvo. According to appellant, it seemed like Cox “was motioning the dog to literally jump up on” the car. Then Cox searched the car.
On cross-examination, appellant conceded he had a 1999 conviction for possessing marijuana for sale but denied knowing there was marijuana in his car on the day of the incident. Appellant also denied knowing the rear passenger seat storage compartment contained nearly six grams of marijuana: he claimed he had attended a concert over the weekend and had “people in and out of [his] car the whole weekend.” Appellant admitted he knew there was a large amount of money in a duffle bag in the trunk but claimed the bag did not contain marijuana. Appellant did not give Cox permission to view any information on his Palm Pilot.
The Court’s Initial Ruling
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied the motion to suppress. It noted that appellant’s testimony regarding the circumstances of the traffic stop differed from Cox’s, but concluded appellant was “not entirely credible.” The court determined Cox had reasonable suspicion to detain appellant and to search his car. The court explained Cox had a “sufficient basis to stop the defendant for the purpose of investigating possible violations of the California Vehicle Code. [¶] When [Cox] went up to the open window... he detected the odor of raw marijuana. Based on that, he had probable cause to search the vehicle. So the motion to suppress the evidence is denied.”
At that point, defense counsel asked the court whether its ruling “include[d] the [P]alm [P]ilot[.]” The court ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs on whether Cox was “entitled to search or go into... the [P]alm [P]ilot or any kind of electronic equipment....”
Supplemental Briefing and the Court’s Ruling
The parties submitted supplemental briefing on whether Cox’s search of appellant’s cell phone and PDA violated the Fourth Amendment. Appellant contended his cell phone and PDA contained “photographic information” and “digitally memorialized private thoughts” and that that Cox should have obtained a warrant before viewing any information stored on the devices. In his memorandum of points and authorities, appellant claimed Cox located “a photo of a marijuana garden and digital notes suspected to relate to marijuana sales” during the “initial warrantless search” of the cell phone and PDA.
The prosecutor conceded Cox seized appellant’s cell phone and PDA and conducted a warrantless “partial initial search” during the traffic stop. The prosecutor contended, however, that the search was lawful for two reasons: (1) Cox searched both items incident to a lawful arrest; and (2) there was an independent source for the discovery of the evidence on the cell phone and PDA. Specifically, the prosecutor argued the “actual trial evidence obtained from a search” of appellant’s cell phone and PDA was lawfully obtained because the police obtained a warrant to search the items a few days after Cox seized them. Finally, the prosecutor complained that “[t]his issue was not raised in Defendant’s motion [to suppress] and it was not raised in a reply to the People’s opposition.”
In July 2008, the court denied the motion to suppress, again concluding Cox had probable cause to search appellant’s car and trunk. The court also concluded Cox had probable cause to search appellant’s cell phone and PDA. The court explained, “Upon the prior discovery of the quantities of marijuana, the amount of cash and its packaging, the charged stun-gun and the written financial data concerning marijuana purchases and sales, [ ] Cox had probable cause to believe defendant Baker was involved in the sale of marijuana. At that point[,] he had probable cause to search both the cell phone and the PDA for additional evidence relating to that crime. The fact that the information was stored on an electronic device rather than on paper is of little legal significance. The permissible scope of the search is not defined by the type of container or the degree of expectation of privacy as to its contents but by the reasons for the search.... The fact that Deputy Cox could have deferred his examination of the containers (cell-phone and PDA) until the issuance of a search warrant did not render his warrantless search invalid....” (Original italics.)
Appellant pleaded no contest to possessing more than $100,000 in drug money (§ 11370.6, subd. (a)) and the court placed him on probation for three years.
DISCUSSION
The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is well established. “We defer to the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment. [Citations.]” (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.) Cox Had Probable Cause to Search Appellant’s Car, Including the Trunk
Appellant concedes Cox had reasonable suspicion to stop his car. He contends, however, the court erroneously denied his motion to suppress because the warrantless search of his car, trunk, PDA, and cell phone violated the Fourth Amendment.
Here, Cox had probable cause to search the passenger compartment of appellant’s car because he smelled marijuana during the traffic stop and because his drug-sniffing dog indicated the car contained contraband. It is well settled that a law enforcement officer has “probable cause to search [a] defendant’s car for marijuana” after he or she “smell[s] the odor of marijuana” during a traffic stop. (People v. Strasburg (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1059; People v. Dey (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1320-1322.) Appellant does not appear to contend otherwise. Instead, he relies on Arizona v. Gant (2009) ___ U.S. ___ [129 S.Ct. 1710] (Gant) where the United States Supreme Court recently held that “[p]olice may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.” (Id. at p. 1723.)
Appellant’s reliance on Gant is puzzling. Here, Cox did not search appellant’s car incident to arrest. Moreover, the Gant court specifically noted that “[i]f there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-821 [ ] (1982) [(Ross)], authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found.” (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1721.) Gant has no application here because Cox had probable cause to believe the car contained marijuana. As a result, Cox could lawfully search the passenger compartment of appellant’s car. (Ibid.)
Cox also had probable cause to search appellant’s trunk. As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the discovery of contraband in the passenger compartment of a defendant’s car provides probable cause for a warrantless search of the defendant’s trunk. (Ross, supra, 456 U.S. at p. 825 [“[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.”]; see also People v. Hunter (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 371, 375, 382 [officer had probable cause to search the trunk of defendant’s car after seeing marijuana in the passenger compartment; circumstances of officer’s discovery of marijuana in the passenger area did not foreclose “more drugs being found in the trunk as well, and marijuana is a drug that can be concealed in a variety of containers that might be concealed in a trunk”].)
Dey is instructive. In Dey, the court concluded the police officer had probable cause to search the trunk after finding marijuana in the passenger compartment of the defendant’s car. (Dey, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1320, 1322.) The court explained, “a person of ordinary caution would conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion that even if defendant makes only personal use of the marijuana found in [the passenger compartment of the car], he might stash additional quantities for future use in other parts of the vehicle, including the trunk. Such a suspicion is sufficient for a search of the trunk.” (Id. at p. 1322.) The same is true here. Cox found marijuana in the passenger compartment of appellant’s car. He also thought appellant’s behavior was “consistent with someone who [was] involved with drug trafficking[.]” As a result, Cox had probable cause to search the trunk of appellant’s car to determine whether it contained “additional quantities” of marijuana. (Ibid.; Ross, supra, 456 U.S. at p. 800; Hunter, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 382.)
The Court Did Not Err in Denying the Motion to Suppress the Evidence Found on Appellant’s Cell Phone and PDA
Appellant also appears to contend the search of his cell phone and PDA were unlawful. Notably, appellant does not challenge the lower court’s conclusion that Cox had probable cause to search “some contents of the PDA and the cell phone obtained on-site[.]” Instead, and without citing any authority, appellant contends “[t]he fact that the prosecution later obtained a search warrant for the complete contents of the PDA and the cell phone is not sufficient to establish that the contents of those devices would have been independently discovered.”
Even if we assume Cox illegally searched appellant’s cell phone and PDA during the traffic stop, appellant’s argument fails because the sheriff’s deputies utilized an “independent source” — a search warrant — to search appellant’s cell phone and PDA. (See People v. Bennett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 373, 389.) “The independent source doctrine applies in California. [Citations.] If, after some illegal conduct, the police obtain a search warrant they would have sought without that conduct, and none of the supporting documents cites information derived from that conduct, application of the doctrine is relatively easy: The court need not suppress evidence found in the resulting search. ‘Because “[n]one of the information on which the warrant was secured was derived from or related in any way to the initial [unlawful conduct],”... the search warrant was “a ‘means sufficiently distinguishable’ to purge the evidence of any ‘taint’ arising from the [unlawful conduct].”’” [Citations.]” (People v. Weiss (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1073, 1078.)
We may affirm the trial court’s decision on any ground supported by the record. (People v. Rogers (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1136, 1162, fn. 14; People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 449.)
Here, the parties agree Cox conducted a warrantless search of appellant’s cell phone and PDA during the traffic stop. According to appellant, Cox saw “a photo of a marijuana garden and digital notes suspected to relate to marijuana sales” during his “initial warrantless search” of the cell phone and PDA. A few days later, sheriff’s deputies obtained a search warrant for the contents of the cell phone and PDA. The affidavit in support of the search warrant did “not contain any reference to the on-site warrantless search of the cell-phone and PDA conducted by [ ] Cox nor to any of the information retrieved during that warrantless search.”
The court’s order denying the motion to suppress is less specific: it states Cox “retrieved stored information from the cell phone and the PDA which he attributed to marijuana cultivation and selling operations.”
The independent source doctrine applies here. As we have noted, the court’s order specifically recites that the affidavit in support of the search warrant did not contain information obtained during Cox’s initial search of appellant’s cell phone and PDA. Appellant does not contend otherwise. Instead, he claims the “discovery of sufficient evidence to believe [he] was engaged in drug trafficking only arose after Cox conducted the warrantless search of... some of the contents of the PDA[.]” The problem with this argument is that it has no evidentiary support. To the contrary, the court determined that Cox searched appellant’s cell phone and PDA after he found evidence — including marijuana, a stun-gun, and written documentation regarding appellant’s purchase and sale of marijuana — in appellant’s car. As a result, appellant’s argument — unsupported by a citation to any evidence or any authority — fails to establish the search warrant was not supported by probable cause apart from the information Cox found on appellant’s cell phone and PDA on the day of the incident. We therefore conclude the independent source doctrine applies here.
The Detention Was Not Unduly Prolonged
Appellant’s second complaint is the warrantless search of his car “was the product of an unlawful prolonged detention and thus was unreasonable.” “[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” (Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 500.) There is no hard-and-fast limit delineating the amount of time that is reasonable; “the reasonableness of each detention period must be judged on its particular circumstances.” (Williams v. Superior Court (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 349, 358.) A traffic stop is unconstitutional if it is “‘extended beyond what is reasonably necessary under the circumstances which made its initiation permissible.’” (People v. McGaughran (1979) 25 Cal.3d 577, 586, quoting Willett v. Superior Court (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 555, 559 (Willett).)
According to appellant, the detention “became prolonged” when Cox performed a “perimeter search of the car” with the drug-sniffing dog and then searched the car. The only case appellant cites to support his argument is People v. McGaughran, supra, 25 Cal.3d at page 586. There, a police officer stopped the defendant for driving the wrong way on a one-way street. (Id. at p. 581.) Over a three- to four-minute period, the officer discussed the traffic violation with the defendant but did not issue a ticket. Then the officer performed a warrant check of the defendant and his passenger which took another 10 minutes. (Ibid.) Upon learning both the defendant and the passenger had warrants, the officer called for assistance and asked for confirmation of the warrants. The officer received confirmation approximately 20 to 25 minutes later, arrested the defendant, and searched his car. (Ibid.)
The California Supreme Court held the 10-minute period during which the police officer conducted the warrant check was an unlawful detention. (McGaughran, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 586.) The court reasoned that “‘an investigatory detention exceed[s] constitutional bounds when extended beyond what is reasonably necessary under the circumstances which made its initiation permissible.’” (Ibid., quoting Willett, supra, 2 Cal.App.3d at p. 559.) The court explained, “the event that made the initial detention permissible was defendant’s conceded violation of the one-way traffic pattern. All that was ‘reasonably necessary’ to deal with the offense, however, was for [the officer] to examine defendant’s license and registration, explain the violation, and then issue either a citation or a warning. The additional period of detention for the purpose of seeking out unrelated arrest warrants in the name of defendant or his passenger was not ‘reasonably necessary’ to that process, and hence ‘exceeded constitutional limitations’ under the foregoing rule.” (Id. at p. 587, fn. omitted.)
“The clear intent of McGaughran is to preclude officers from imposing a general crime investigation upon the detained traffic offender that is not ‘reasonably necessary’ to completion of the officer’s traffic citation duties unless the officer has an independent reasonable suspicion that the driver has committed unrelated offenses.” (Williams, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d at p. 358.) Here, Cox pursued his investigation in a “‘diligent and reasonable manner.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Williams (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 949, 960.) He told appellant the basis for the traffic stop, asked appellant why he was in Mendocino County, and whether he possessed registration documents for his car. When Cox smelled marijuana about 30 seconds into the traffic stop, he suspected appellant possessed marijuana and may have been involved in drug trafficking. As a result, he reasonably prolonged the detention to determine whether appellant possessed marijuana. (People v. Russell (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 96, 102 [“Circumstances which develop during a detention may provide reasonable suspicion to prolong the detention”].) Accordingly, we conclude the detention was not unduly prolonged.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Needham, J.Bruiniers, J.