The State's argument in this regard is persuasive. Although a court of review will not disturb the judgment below unless it is "palpably against the weight of the evidence," where a conclusion opposite of the court's finding is clearly called for by the record, the trial court's decision may be reversed. People v. Bafia (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 710, 712, 445 N.E.2d 878-79. • 4 In the present cases, the manifest weight of the evidence points clearly toward findings of probable cause.

Reasonable grounds for such a request are to be determined by the officer's observations of the defendant, even where those observations are made after the driving occurs. People v. Wolsk (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 112, 454 N.E.2d 695; People v. Bafia (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 710, 445 N.E.2d 878. • 4 In the present case, the arresting officer observed defendant staggering in her home, outside, and at the police station.

) The decision of the trial court in this regard will not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Bafia (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 710, 712, 445 N.E.2d 878, 879. • 2, 3 As noted, the court found the deputy did not have reasonable grounds to believe the defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol.

The court found that the defendant's speeding did not constitute probable cause to arrest the defendant for DUI. The court refused to consider the circumstances subsequent to the stop. From the court's dismissal of the complaint, the State appeals. At an implied-consent hearing, the State must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe the defendant was DUI. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-501.1.) For arrest purposes, reasonable grounds and probable cause are synonymous, and are based upon whether the officer has sufficient information to believe the defendant was DUI. ( People v. Bafia (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 710, 445 N.E.2d 878.) The officer may base his reasonable belief on observations following the act of driving ( 112 Ill. App.3d 710, 717, 445 N.E.2d 878), and need not have actually seen the defendant drive to reasonably conclude that he was DUI ( People v. Wolsk (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 112, 454 N.E.2d 695).

His plea was therefore relevant to the issue of whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that he was driving under the influence. People v. Bafia (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 710, 445 N.E.2d 878. The record, including the remarks of the trial court following the stipulation, clearly indicate that there was no real question on this issue, but the court nevertheless entered a finding of no probable cause in an exercise of judicial leniency.

• 3 As used in the statute, "reasonable grounds" is synonymous with "probable cause." ( People v. Bafia (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 710, 716, 445 N.E.2d 878.) A guilty plea to a traffic offense such as DUI is a judicial admission, which, although not conclusive proof, is proper evidence against the defendant in a civil proceeding arising from the same incident. ( People v. Bafia (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 710, 716; People v. Powell (1982), 107 Ill. App.3d 418, 419.) In an implied-consent hearing, the admission is relevant to proving that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe the defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol.

Moreover, parties often stipulate that the same evidence offered at trial be considered in a subsequent implied consent hearing. See, e.g., People v. Bafia (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 710, 445 N.E.2d 878. The issues to be determined at an implied consent hearing are:

"A judicial finding is not against the manifest weight of the evidence unless from the record an opposite conclusion is clearly evident." People v. Bafia, 112 Ill. App. 3d 710, 712 (1983). However, "a reviewing court remains free to undertake its own assessment of the facts in relation to the issues presented and may draw its own conclusions when deciding what relief should be granted."

The court in Wolsk relied on People v. Bafia, which stands for the general notion that an officer may rely on circumstantial evidence to establish probable cause and, therefore, "circumstances observed after the act of driving offer reasonable grounds upon which to conclude a defendant was driving while intoxicated." People v. Bafia, 112 Ill. App. 3d 710, 717 (1983). "Road rage," by definition, typically implies violence from one driver to another.

Such a judgment will not be found to be against the manifest weight of the evidence unless the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. ( People v. Houlihan (1988), 167 Ill. App.3d 638, 642; People v. Bafia (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 710, 712.) A police officer may make a valid investigatory stop, even though there is no probable cause for an arrest, where the officer's decision is based on specific and articulable facts which, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant an investigative intrusion.