"The core requirement for all three degrees of robbery under the Penal Law is proof that the defendant forcibly stole property from another" (People v. Lopez, 73 N.Y.2d 214, 219). Here, although the theft of the complainant's beeper began as a larceny, it escalated into the crime of robbery when the codefendant threatened to use physical force against the complainant for the purpose of "[p]reventing or overcoming resistance to the * * * retention [of the property] immediately after the taking" (Penal Law § 160.00; see, People v. Jones, 282 A.D.2d 382; People v. Bachmann, 237 A.D.2d 897; People v. Thomas, 226 A.D.2d 120; People v. Henry, 204 A.D.2d 187; People v. Letterlough, 203 A.D.2d 589). Furthermore, the prosecution presented legally sufficient evidence that the codefendant was "aided by a person actually present" (Penal Law § 160.10) in his commission of the theft, thus raising the offense to robbery in the second degree.

We cannot say that the jury failed to give the evidence the weight it should be accorded (see, People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495). The conviction of robbery in the first degree (Penal Law § 160.15) is supported by legally sufficient evidence (see, People v. Bachmann, 237 A.D.2d 897, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 855). County Court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the prosecutor to inquire of defendant, if he chose to testify, whether he had been previously convicted of various crimes and prohibiting inquiry into the nature of the convictions and their underlying facts (see, People v. Dunn, 203 A.D.2d 962, lv denied 83 N.Y.2d 966). We have examined defendant's remaining contentions and conclude that they lack merit.

The conviction of robbery in the first degree (Penal Law § 160.15) is supported by legally sufficient evidence (see, People v. Bachmann, 237 A.D.2d 897, 654 N.Y.S.2d 521, lv. denied 90 N.Y.2d 855, 661 N.Y.S.2d 181, 683 N.E.2d 1055). County Court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the prosecutor to inquire of defendant, if he chose to testify, whether he had been previously convicted of various crimes and prohibiting inquiry into the nature of the convictions and their underlying facts (see, People v. Dunn, 203 A.D.2d 962, 612 N.Y.S.2d 1001, lv. denied 83 N.Y.2d 966, 616 N.Y.S.2d 19, 639 N.E.2d 759).

Importantly, the grand jury was also entitled to infer that the defendant's use of force was not to defend themselves since Mr. Garcia was already disarmed, but was used in furtherance of overcoming resistance by Mr. Garcia from retaking his cellphone. (see People v Miller, 178 AD3d 422, [1st Dept 2019] [jury could infer defendant's violent response to victim's attempt to reclaim property incompatible with behavior of person who had innocently obtained property.]; People v Bachmann , 237 AD2d 897 [4th Dept 1997].[evidence that defendant, after leaving store with stolen property, pushed and punched store's loss prevention agent and told agent and store employee that he had a gun established that defendant's use of physical force and threatened use thereof was for purpose of retaining property.].) The grand jury was also entitled to infer the defendants’ use of force was sufficiently proximate in time to the original robbery so as to satisfy the requirement of immediacy.

Defendant retained the property stolen, so the problem of abandonment in People v. Nixon, 156 A.D.2d 144 (1st Dept. 1989) is not present here. People v. Smith, 79 N.Y.2d 309 (1992); People v. Bachmann, 237 A.D.2d 897 (4th Dept. 1997); People v. Rudelt, 6 A.D.2d 640, 642 (3d Dept. 1958). See generally, Dixon v. State, 673 A.2d 1220, 1226-27 (Del. 1996).

Defendant retained the property stolen, so the problem of abandonment in People v Nixon (156 AD2d 144 [1st Dept 1989]) is not present here. (People v Smith, 79 NY2d 309 [1992]; People v Bachmann, 237 AD2d 897 [4th Dept 1997]; People v Rudelt, 6 AD2d 640, 642 [3d Dept 1958]; see generally, Dixon v State, 673 A2d 1220, 1226-1227 [Del 1996].) [2] Model Penal Code § 222.1 (1) (1962) defines "in the course of committing a theft" as including "in an attempt to commit theft or in flight after the attempt or commission."