Opinion
H049745
07-29-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RAMESH SUNDARAM AZARIAH, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 211561
LIE, J.Penal Code section 4852.13 permits a trial court to grant a certificate of rehabilitation to an eligible applicant who has demonstrated, by his or her course of conduct, "rehabilitation and . . . fitness to exercise all of the civil and political rights of citizenship." (Pen. Code, § 4852.13, subd. (a).) A petition for a certificate of rehabilitation is "addressed to the trial court's discretion and the exercise of that discretion will be overturned only for manifest abuse that results in a miscarriage of justice." (People v. Zeigler (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 638, 667 (Zeigler).)" '[T]here is no circumstance under which the statutory scheme requires or guarantees issuance of a certificate of rehabilitation.'" (Id. at p. 668.) Indeed, when the trial court grants a petition for a certificate of rehabilitation, it is" 'essentially making a personal representation to the Governor that [the petitioner is] worthy of a pardon.'" (Ibid.)
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Ramesh Sundaram Azariah appeals from the denial of his fourth petition for a certificate of rehabilitation. Although he challenges the reasons the trial court was unconvinced by the merits of his petition, he establishes no abuse of discretion, and we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Between 1981 and 2006, Azariah sustained five felony convictions and 13 misdemeanor convictions. The felonies comprised passing fraudulent documents (§ 475), forgery (§ 470), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), false imprisonment (§ 236), and possession of a controlled substance (Health &Saf. Code, § 11350). Azariah served a prison term for his 1996 assault conviction, and was returned to prison in 2000 on a parole violation for battery causing great bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)), an offense which also resulted in a misdemeanor conviction. Azariah's last known contact with law enforcement was in 2009, when he was accused of battery but police reported the matter was "declined for prosecution."
Azariah first petitioned for a certificate of rehabilitation in 2010. The trial court denied the petition as premature in that section 4852.03 required seven years of rehabilitation from the time Azariah was discharged from custody for his most recent offense (§ 4852.03, subd. (a)(3)); the court also found that Azariah had failed to demonstrate the good conduct required for a certificate of rehabilitation. Azariah filed a second petition in December 2013 and a third less than two months later in February 2014. The trial court denied the petition again, reasoning that Azariah had failed to accept responsibility for his prior conduct.
The record on appeal does not reflect that the December 2013 petition was adjudicated independently of the February 2014 petition.
In 2019, Azariah filed the form petition at issue in this appeal, checking the applicable boxes describing the disposition of his three most recent felony cases, his discharge from parole or probation, and signing the certification that he had "lived an honest and upright life," "conducted [him]self with sobriety and industry," "exhibited good moral character," and "conformed to and obeyed all the laws of the land." (Italics omitted.) When asked in a subsequent interview about the steps he had taken toward rehabilitation, Azariah stated he had stopped using drugs and alcohol, continued attending Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, stayed on prescribed medications, completed paying child support for and reestablished a relationship with his now-adult daughter, and obtained several educational degrees. Azariah added that he now took" 'full responsibility for all of [his] actions.' "
The Santa Clara County District Attorney opposed the petition, arguing that Azariah had not been honest and forthright with the district attorney investigator (DA investigator) regarding his remorse and personal and financial circumstances. The district attorney also brought to the court's attention financial irregularities relating to the nonprofit company Azariah had founded with his father and on which he continued to serve as a board member, and discrepancies between Azariah's self-reported earnings and what his company reported in its income tax return. The district attorney further argued that Azariah's text messages to his ex-wife while his petition was pending belied his claim of rehabilitation. Azariah, upset that his ex-wife had spoken with the DA investigator, called her a "dirty rat" and advised her that "[i]n the circles I know that's the worst label a person can have." Azariah's ex-wife took the messages as a threat to her life and reported them to police.
The same DA investigator had also investigated Azariah's prior petitions.
Azariah disputed many of the district attorney's allegations. He did not deny sending the text messages to his ex-wife but disputed the characterization of these messages as threatening and accused his ex-wife of being a "heavy drinker and occasional pot smoker." Azariah included in his reply many letters of support, certificates, awards, and medical records, all tending to show Azariah's good character and rehabilitation.
"After review of the evidence, the memoranda, pleadings, and files," the trial court denied Azariah's petition. First, the trial court found that Azariah "minimizes his own conduct and blames others for the crimes." In addition, the investigations attendant upon Azariah's successive petitions "exposed additional facts" that "have not lessened the court's concerns regarding the credibility of [Azariah's] expressions of remorse" but instead "increased those concerns." The court concluded that Azariah "has yet to acknowledge his own responsibility for the crimes, despite his statements to the contrary."
The trial court next questioned whether Azariah was presently law abiding. The court found that Azariah's statements about his earnings were "inconsistent" and made it "impossible for the court to determine what his actual earnings from the business were." For example, Azariah's nonprofit company "reported no salary paid to anyone at a time that [Azariah] claimed he was earning a salary of about $20,000 per year." And while Azariah denied any allegations of financial irregularity relating to the company, he refused to permit the DA investigator to examine his personal income tax returns. The court relatedly questioned whether Azariah was supporting himself, noting that he was seeking child support from his ex-wife, who "resides in a small apartment . . . and works a low[-]paying job, while [Azariah] pays minimal rent to reside in a large home in Palo Alto." The court also noted the discrepancies the DA investigator had uncovered in Azariah's reported personal circumstances, including Azariah's failure to disclose a trip to Europe and his possession of a new model Tesla.
Finally, the court expressed concern for the "disturbing text messages sent by [Azariah] to [his ex-wife]. [The ex-wife] viewed the texts as intimidating and threatening. She was reluctant to speak with the DA investigator due to fear of retaliation by [Azariah]." Azariah's "explanations for the texts [did] not ameliorate the court's concerns."
Acknowledging "the many positive aspects of [Azariah's] life since 2006," the court ultimately concluded Azariah "has not cleared the statutory hurdles required" for a certificate of rehabilitation. The court denied the petition with leave to reapply in five years. (See § 4852.11.) Azariah timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
To be eligible for a certificate of rehabilitation under section 4852.01 et seq., the applicant "shall live an honest and upright life, shall conduct himself or herself with sobriety and industry, shall exhibit a good moral character, and shall conform to and obey the laws of the land." (§ 4852.05.) Azariah argues that the trial court erroneously credited unsubstantiated concerns from the DA investigator regarding financial irregularities in Azariah's company and earnings, considered improper or irrelevant facts, gave undue weight to statements Azariah had made in connection with prior petitions, and failed to consider the letters, certificates, awards, and medical records he submitted in support of his current petition. We disagree and address each of these arguments in turn.
1. The Trial Court Was Entitled to Rely on the DA Investigator's Report of Irregularities in Azariah's Earnings and his Company's Financial Statements
Azariah argues that the trial court erred in relying on unsubstantiated information the DA investigator provided relating to the financial status of Azariah's company, and by crediting the investigator's unsupported representation that Azariah had reported income that stood at odds with the company's tax return.
To begin, we disagree with Azariah's characterization of the DA investigator's report as unsubstantiated. In his initial report, the DA investigator explained that in attempting to reconcile some of the "unusual" financial information Azariah provided to him, he examined the publicly available records for Azariah's company, which revealed that the company's tax-exempt status was suspended as of 2019. The DA investigator also examined the company's tax records for fiscal year 2016, which showed that the company did not pay compensation to any of its board members, noting that "[t]his was during the same period of time that [Azariah], a board member, claims to have received a salary."
While the DA investigator did not attach the financial records he examined to his report, he was not required to do so. The statutory provisions setting forth the process for obtaining a certificate of rehabilitation "give trial courts a great deal of discretion in determining the extent of the evidence presented at a hearing on a petition for a certificate of rehabilitation." (Zeigler, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 664). For example, the trial court "may, but is not required to, order the production of the records listed in section 4852.1." (Zeigler, at p. 664) The court may also, "but is not required to, order the district attorney to investigate the petitioner's residence, criminal record, and conduct during the period of rehabilitation and report to the court on such matters." (Ibid.)
Given the breadth of this discretion, the trial court was entitled to rely on the DA investigator's account of Azariah's financial records without further investigation or inquiry. (People v. Lockwood (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 222, 229 [when considering a petition for a certificate of rehabilitation, the trial court is entitled to "rel[y] on the evidence it deem[s] most credible" without further inquiry or verification].) We note that nothing in the record suggests that the DA investigator's report was inaccurate, misleading, or fraudulent. And in a proceeding where Azariah bears the burden of convincing the trial court of his rehabilitation, it was up to Azariah to dispel any concerns the court had relating to his earnings and financial practices. Although Azariah was entitled to keep his personal tax returns private, he had but declined an opportunity to meet his burden as the petitioner by permitting the DA investigator to inspect his personal tax returns. Under these circumstances, the trial court was entitled to consider the DA investigator's report in determining that Azariah had not adequately supported his petition.
2. The Trial Court Properly Considered Evidence Relating to Azariah's Personal and Financial Circumstances
Azariah next argues that the trial court "relied upon irrelevant or improper circumstances" in that the court should not have credited his ex-wife's statement that he had sought an order compelling her to pay him child support despite her poorer financial position. Azariah also argues that whether he supported himself, the type of car he drove, and the type of travel he engaged in had no bearing on the extent of his rehabilitation.
We again disagree. Section 4852.05 requires an applicant for a certificate of rehabilitation to "live an honest and upright life," "conduct himself . . . with sobriety and industry," "exhibit a good moral character," and "conform to and obey the laws of the land." The statute gives the trial court broad discretion in determining whether these statutory prerequisites have been met. (§ 4852.13.) While a good-faith claim for child support would not of itself reflect on the question of rehabilitation, the trial court was required to consider Azariah's industry and honesty. We understand the court's contrast between the ex-wife's lifestyle and Azariah's as reflecting its concern that Azariah's child support claim might be based on incomplete information about Azariah's finances and source of income. Given Azariah's "documented criminal history of violence against women," the threatening text messages he sent to his ex-wife during the pendency of his petition, and Azariah's earlier statement to the DA investigator that the parents' equal custodial time made child support unnecessary, the court was within its discretion to at least consider whether Azariah's child support claim represented a retaliatory filing rather than a genuine attempt to secure resources on behalf of the couple's children.
At oral argument, Azariah challenged the denial of his petition as based on no more than a hunch, but this inverts the burden of proof: it was Azariah's burden to allay any doubts about his rehabilitation, not the court's to persuade him (or a reviewing court) of the validity of those doubts.
Azariah's vehicle choice and travel plans similarly do not bear directly on his rehabilitation. But his honesty does, as do his industry and good moral character. (§ 4852.05.) In evaluating these statutory factors, the trial court was entitled to consider whether discrepancies between Azariah's self-report and information from the DA's investigation suggested a lack of candor that undermined the petition. Thus, the trial court acted within its discretion to be concerned that Azariah told the DA investigator that he "drove only his 2006 compact sedan" but was "frequently observed during this investigation driving a new Tesla Model X." The court was also entitled to consider Azariah's failure to disclose to the DA investigator his "extended trip to Europe" during the pendency of the petition, when his financial dealings and lifestyle were under investigation.
3. The Trial Court Properly Considered Both Azariah's Current and Prior Statements
Azariah argues that in finding that he had failed to accept responsibility for his conduct, the trial court erroneously relied on statements he had made in connection with prior petitions. Instead, Azariah argues, the court should have limited its consideration to statements from his most recent petition-specifically, statements in which he claimed to "take[] full responsibility."
But this argument presumes the trial court had to credit Azariah's current statements and take them in isolation, when to the contrary the court's duty was to "conduct[] a thorough inquiry into the applicant's conduct and character from the time of the underlying crimes through the time of the certificate of rehabilitation proceeding." (People v. Ansell (2001) 25 Cal.4th 868, 887, italics added.) This is what the trial court did here, considering Azariah's current statements-generalized expressions of remorse and acceptance of "full responsibility"-against his prior statements proffering specific factual assertions about his prior crimes that minimized his conduct. Having considered all these statements alongside other evidence of Azariah's conduct, the court declined to credit Azariah's current expressions of remorse and responsibility. On this record, we cannot say that the court's credibility determination was arbitrary, whimsical, or capricious, or that it "exceeded the bounds of reason." (Zeigler, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 667.)
Even if the trial court were limited to considering only Azariah's current statements, our conclusion would remain unchanged: We understand the trial court's conclusion that Azariah continued to "minimize[] his own conduct and blame[] others" as reflecting an implicit determination that even Azariah's current factual account of certain of his crimes continued to belie his claims of rehabilitation. We discern no basis to second-guess this determination. The trial court could permissibly rely on aspects of Azariah's most current statement to find a lack of rehabilitation. (People v. Blocker (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 438, 445 [no abuse of discretion when trial court denies certificate of rehabilitation based solely on applicant's failure to accept responsibility].)
Finally, the trial court was entitled to consider Azariah's text messages to his ex-wife, in which he called her a "dirty rat" and advised her that "[i]n the circles I know that's the worst label a person can have." The DA investigator's report noted that upon receiving the messages, Azariah's ex-wife "was concerned that her safety and possibly her life may have been threatened, as she was aware of the dangerous, unsavory persons with criminal behavior that [Azariah] knew in her neighborhood." But even disregarding the recipient's subjective interpretation, the trial court could construe Azariah's angry sense of entitlement to his ex-wife's silence-in a law enforcement investigation of his rehabilitation-as undermining his claims of "an honest and upright life" and "good moral character." (§ 4852.05.) Because the trial court's interpretation of the text messages was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, the court permissibly found a lack of rehabilitation based on these alone.
Because the trial court could permissibly determine on this record that Azariah failed to show sincere remorse for his conduct, continued to minimize his responsibility for certain crimes, and continued to engage in threatening conduct, the court acted within its discretion in denying his petition.
4. Azariah Has Failed to Show Error in The Trial Court's Consideration of his Rehabilitation Evidence
Finally, Azariah argues that the trial court erred by failing to reference the letters of support, certificates, awards, and medical records he submitted in support of his petition, and by failing to articulate a reason for discounting this evidence. But "[t]he court is presumed to have considered all of the relevant factors in the absence of an affirmative record to the contrary." (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310.) Thus, in Myers, defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss strike priors under section 1385 because the court did not consider mitigating factors such as defendant's age, the remoteness of the strike prior, or the nonviolent nature of the current offense. (Myers, at pp. 308-309.) The Court of Appeal affirmed, explaining that because defense counsel had submitted a memorandum setting forth the mitigating factors and argued these factors before the trial court, the court must be presumed to have considered the factors, and "the fact that the court focused its explanatory comments on the violence and potential violence of [defendant's] crimes does not mean that it considered only that factor." (Id. at p. 310.)
For support, Azariah directs us to Johns v. City of Los Angeles (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 983. Johns is inapposite because it was premised on an interpretation of Code of Civil Procedure section 657, which requires the trial court in granting a motion for new trial to "file a written statement of the grounds and reasons therefor." (Johns, at pp. 987, 998-999.) No similar statutory command exists for denial of a petition for a certificate of rehabilitation.
Here, too, there is no "affirmative record" that the trial court excluded Azariah's evidence or otherwise refused to consider it. Indeed, in its order denying Azariah's petition, the court acknowledged "the many positive aspects of [Azariah's] life since 2006," evidence of which appeared only in Azariah's submissions to the court.
We discern no error in the trial court's consideration of Azariah's evidence in support of his rehabilitation.
III. DISPOSITION
The order denying the petition for a certificate of rehabilitation is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: GREENWOOD, P.J., GROVER, J.