People v. Ayers

4 Citing cases

  1. People v. Garrett

    2019 IL App (1st) 162908 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019)

    defendant acknowledges on appeal, we have held that a trial court need not give a "mere presence" instruction where, as here, the court also instructs the jury on Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 5.03 (4th ed. 2009), as that instruction incorporates the "essence" of a mere presence instruction. People v. Nutall, 312 Ill. App. 3d 620, 609-610 (2000); see also People v. Ayers, 264 Ill. App. 3d 757, 760 (1993); People v. Wilson, 257 Ill. App. 3d 670, 697-98 (1993). Although defendant attempts to distinguish Nutall and similar cases on the basis that the present case implicates a trial court's more immediate duty to correct manifest confusion, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that its response was a better explanation of the relevant law than defendant's proposal.

  2. People v. LaMotte

    2017 Ill. App. 143692 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017)   Cited 1 times

    "[T]he essence of the 'mere presence' instruction was already incorporated in or encompassed by [the standard IPI instruction]—which advise the jury that a defendant must be found innocent unless the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that before or during the commission of the defined offense he/she, with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of that offense, knowingly solicited, aided, abetted, agreed or attempted to aid the other person in the planning or commission of it-and that the juries were, therefore, fully and accurately apprised of the law constituting the theory of defense, i.e., that mere presence at the scene of a crime or during its commission is insufficient to sustain a conviction." See also People v. Ayers, 264 Ill. App. 3d 757, 760 (1993); People v. Wilson, 257 Ill. App. 3d 670, 697-98 (1993); Nutall, 212 Ill. App. 3d at 634-35(rejecting the defendant's non-IPI instruction on mere presence where the standard IPI accountability instruction contained the essence of the "mere presence instruction").

  3. People v. Ransom

    319 Ill. App. 3d 915 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001)   Cited 10 times
    Concluding that evidence of victim's reaction to viewing the defendant's photograph was "highly probative" of the identity of her attacker

    " Instead, the State referred to it as a "photo book." See People v. Ayers, 264 Ill. App.3d 757, 759, 636 N.E.2d 600, 601-02 (1993) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing mention of "photos," "photographs," and "photo books" while admonishing the State not to refer to the defendant's prior arrest photo as a "mug shot" or "mug photo"). Further, the court did not allow the book to go back to the jury room during deliberations.

  4. People v. Nutall

    312 Ill. App. 3d 620 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)   Cited 48 times
    Rejecting defendant's non-IPI instruction on mere presence because jury was given IPI instructions on "the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, the definition and elements of [the offense] and the proof necessary to find defendant guilty under an accountability theory"

    The argument of whether a defendant is entitled to a non-IPI jury instruction regarding "mere presence" as it applies to the offense of accountability has been addressed and rejected several times prior to this case. See People v. Ayers, 264 Ill. App.3d 757, 760, 636 N.E.2d 600 (1993); People v. Wilson, 257 Ill. App.3d 670, 697-98, 628 N.E.2d 472 (1993) (rejecting defendant's non-IPI instruction on mere presence since the jury was adequately instructed on defendant's theory of the case and because the standard IPI accountability instruction contains the essence of the "mere presence instruction"); see also Thomas, 175 Ill. App.3d 521, 529, 529 N.E.2d 1071 (1988) (holding "that the essence of the `mere presence' instruction was already incorporated in or encompassed [by the standard IPI instruction] — which advise the jury that a defendant must be found innocent unless the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that before or during the commission of the defined offense he/she, with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of that offense, knowingly solicited, aided, abetted, agreed or attempted to aid the other person in the planning or commission of it — and that the juries were, therefore, fully and accurately apprised of the law constituting th