Opinion
F040750.
7-22-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. AUGUSTINE LOZANO AYALA, Defendant and Appellant.
M.D. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, and James B. Damrell, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant Augustine Lozano Ayala was convicted of one count of battery on a police officer causing injury (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (c)(1)) and two counts of resisting arrest (§ 69).
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
The issue presented is one of causation. Ayala insists that his battery conviction must be reversed because there was no evidence that his actions directly caused the injury suffered by the officer. Specifically, Ayala argues that because he merely resisted arrest, and did not strike, kick, punch, or push the officer, he did not cause the officers injury. According to Ayala, the fact that the officer was injured in the struggle to subdue him does not constitute "causing injury" as required by the statute. We disagree and affirm.
Ayala also argues that the jury was erroneously instructed. This argument is based on the assertion that there was no evidence to support the claim that he caused injury to a police officer. Therefore, lacking any evidence of causation, the jury should not have been instructed on the elements of battery. Resolution of the primary issue necessarily resolves this issue.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
The facts in this case are not seriously in dispute. Nor are they for the most part relevant to the issue presented by Ayala. Ayala was apparently driving down a two-lane road when he came upon an unmarked police vehicle occupied by Detectives Paul Edward Garcia and Leslie Steve Sziraki. Ayala desired to drive faster than the detectives, so he attempted to pass them. He slowed when he was next to the detectives vehicle, began shouting at the detectives and presented a single digit salute. When a vehicle approached from the opposite direction, Ayala slammed on his brakes and swerved into the lane occupied by the detectives. The detectives swerved onto the shoulder to avoid a collision.
After the oncoming vehicle passed, Ayala resumed his position in the lane utilized by oncoming traffic and the detectives returned to the roadway. The detectives slowed to pull behind Ayala and instigate a traffic stop. Ayala also slowed, preventing the detectives from pulling behind him. When both cars came to a stop, the detectives exited their vehicle, identified themselves as detectives for the sheriffs department, and ordered Ayala to pull onto the shoulder of the road. Ayala departed as quickly as his vehicle would travel. The detectives pursued.
The chase approached speeds of 90 miles per hour and ended when Ayala pulled into a driveway near his house. Ayala was standing outside his vehicle when the detectives approached with drawn guns and ordered Ayala to lie on the ground. Ayala remained standing. The detectives holstered their weapons and approached Ayala to handcuff him. Ayala resisted, swinging and kicking at both detectives but missing. Each detective grabbed one of Ayalas arms. Szirakis weapon fell to the ground while struggling to detain Ayala. When Sziraki let go of Ayala to retrieve his weapon, Ayala attempted to pull away from Garcia. Garcia felt his arm go numb. The three eventually fell to the ground, with each detective holding one of Ayalas arms. Garcias shoulder required medical treatment and forced him to miss a few days of work. Before Ayala was transported to the sheriffs department, he had to be subdued by either mace or pepper spray after he began kicking the panel between the front and back seats of the patrol vehicle.
Ayala was charged and convicted of one count of violation of section 243, subdivision (c), and two counts of violation of section 69. His 3 year 8 month sentence on these counts was increased by one year because he previously served a prison term. (§ 667.5)
DISCUSSION
Subdivision (c)(2) of section 243 states, in pertinent part, "When the battery specified in paragraph (1) is committed against a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties, ... and the person committing the offense knows or reasonably should know that the victim is a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties, the battery is punishable by ...." Subdivision (c)(1) of section 243 states, in pertinent part, "When a battery is committed against a custodial officer, ... engaged in the performance of his or her duties, ... and the person committing the offense knows or reasonably should know that the victim is a ... custodial officer, ... and an injury is inflicted on that victim, the battery is punishable by ...."
Ayala contends that the phrase "an injury is inflicted on that victim" requires an affirmative action intended to cause injury. He reasons that since he did not take an affirmative action intending to cause injury, such as kicking, striking, punching, etc., his conduct did not come within subdivision (c) of section 243.
This issue presents two questions. First, does section 243, subdivision (c)(2) require that the prosecution establish that Ayalas conduct was the direct cause of Garcias injury or only a proximate cause of the injury? Second, was Ayalas conduct the cause of Garcias injury, utilizing the standard established in answering the first question?
The distinction between direct and proximate cause can be demonstrated with a simple hypothetical. For example, if Garcia fell while chasing Ayala and injured his knee, Ayalas conduct would be a proximate cause of Garcias injury but not a direct cause. By fleeing, Ayala set in motion an uninterrupted sequence of events that caused Garcias injury. However, Ayala did not directly cause Garcias injury because he did not do anything that caused Garcia to fall. On the other hand, if Ayala kicked Garcia in the knee, Ayalas conduct would be the direct cause of Garcias injury.
Two cases involving different statutes assist in resolving the question of whether section 243, subdivision (c) requires direct or proximate causation. In People v. Rodriguez (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 341, the issue was whether a prior conviction constituted a strike under the three strikes law. (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i).) Section 667, subdivision (d) states that the three strikes law applies to any felony defined as a serious felony in section 1192.7. Section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8) defines a serious felony as any felony in which "the defendant personally inflicts great bodily injury on any person, other than an accomplice ...." The defendant was convicted of violating section 148.10, which criminalizes willfully resisting a peace officer, proximately causing death or serious bodily injury to the peace officer. The officer was injured when he struck his head on a curb while tackling the fleeing defendant.
The trial court instructed the jury with both a direct cause instruction ("a person personally inflicts injury to another when he directly performs [an] act or acts that cause the physical injury") and a proximate cause instruction ("A cause of injury is an act that sets in motion a chain of events that proceed a direct, natural and possible consequence of the act, the injury, and without which the injury would not occur"). (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at pp. 346-347.) The appellate court held these conflicting instructions error. (Id. at pp. 347-348.) "The problem with the instruction is that the definition of cause is inaccurate in this context. To personally inflict an injury is to directly cause an injury, not just to proximately cause it. The instruction was wrong because it allowed the jury to find against Rodriguez if the officers injury was a direct, natural and probable consequence of Rodriguezs action, even if Rodriguez did not personally inflict the injury." (Ibid.)
The issue was also addressed in People v. Jackson (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 574. The defendant was charged with violating section 273.5, which criminalizes the willful infliction of corporal injury upon a cohabitant resulting in a traumatic condition. The injury to the defendants cohabitant occurred during an argument between the two but resulted when the cohabitant tripped over a curb while trying to get away from the defendant.
The appellate court held that when the Legislature used the term "willful infliction," it intended to require direct causation of the injury, and this injury was not directly caused by the defendant. "If the victim fell as a direct result of the blows inflicted by appellant, we would conclude that appellant inflicted the corporal injury she suffered in the fall. Or if the Legislature had defined Penal Code section 273.5 in broader terms, rather than willfully inflicts, we would conclude that it intended to extend criminal liability to the direct, natural and probable consequences of the battery. Since it appears that the Legislature intended section 273.5 to define a very particular battery, we conclude the section is not violated unless the corporal injury results from a direct application of force on the victim by the defendant. It necessarily follows that the evidence in this case was insufficient to prove that appellant inflicted corporal injury on his girlfriend within the meaning of Penal Code section 273.5." (People v. Jackson, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 580, fn. omitted.)
The Legislature used much broader language in section 243, subdivision (c) than in either section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8) section or 273.5. Section 243 only requires that an injury be inflicted on the victim. It does not specify that the injury must be personally inflicted (§ 1192.7) or willfully inflicted (§ 273.5). Therefore, we conclude that section 243, subdivision (c)(2) is violated when a battery is committed against an officer and an injury is inflicted, either directly or as a proximate result of the defendants conduct.
The above conclusion renders resolution of the second issue straightforward. There was ample evidence that Garcia was injured as a result of Ayalas conduct. It was during the struggle to detain Ayala that Garcia stated he felt his shoulder "go numb." Therefore, the injury occurred, at a minimum, as a proximate result of Ayalas conduct, providing substantial evidence of causation.
We note that this is also substantial evidence that Ayalas conduct was the direct cause of Garcias injury. Ayalas action of struggling directly caused the injury. Direct causation does not require a kick or a punch, nor or does it require the injury be intended. It merely requires that the injury occur as a direct result of the defendants conduct. (People v. Jackson, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 580.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.