Opinion
No. 2-12-0258
08-19-2013
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SALVADOR AVILA, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court
of McHenry County.
No. 08-CF-146
Honorable
Gordon E. Graham,
Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices McLaren and Spence concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: Trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to file motion to suppress defendant's statement to police.
¶ 2 In October 2011, the circuit court of McHenry County found the defendant, Salvador Avila, guilty of aggravated battery of a child (720 ILCS 5/12-4.3(a) (West 2006)). He appeals, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to file a motion to suppress his statements to police. We affirm the defendant's conviction.
¶ 3 BACKGROUND
¶ 4 The defendant's daughter, Sophia Avila, was born on November 22, 2007. Her mother was Brenda Banuelos, the defendant's girlfriend. In January 2008, when she was about two months old, Sophia was admitted to Lutheran General Hospital. She was diagnosed with fractures of two ribs and her left femur and tibia. Photographs taken of her at that time also showed bruising to her abdomen. She was released a few days later. However, the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) was informed of her injuries. As part of the subsequent investigation, Sophia was placed in the care of Banuelos' mother, and the defendant was not supposed to have contact with her. ¶ 5 A few weeks later, on February 16, 2008, the defendant brought Sophia to Mercy Hospital in Harvard. She was not breathing and had no pulse at the time she arrived. She was placed on life support and then transferred to Rockford Memorial Hospital. She never became responsive, and on February 18, 2008, Sophia died. ¶ 6 The defendant was initially charged with one count of aggravated battery to a child (720 ILCS 5/12-4.3(a) (West 2006)) and one count of aggravated domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3 (West 2006)). In May 2008, the State filed an amended indictment charging the defendant with these same offenses as well as first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2006)). Just before trial, the State voluntarily dismissed the aggravated domestic battery charge. ¶ 7 A bench trial commenced on September 27, 2011, and included the following testimony. When the defendant brought Sophia to Mercy Hospital, Joseph Levenstein, an emergency room physician, asked him what had happened. According to Dr. Levenstein, the defendant told him that after Sophia woke up that morning, she had vomited a lot. Her heart started beating faster, and then it stopped, and the defendant brought her to the hospital within four or five minutes. (The hospital was about six blocks from Sophia's home.) ¶ 8 Dr. Levenstein testified that, on examination, Sophia's blood gases showed acidosis, which is evidence of lack of oxygenation for some time. He could not find a cause for Sophia's heart and breathing to have stopped, so he did a CT scan of her head, which revealed large amounts of fresh bleeding in the dura, subdural, and subarachnoid areas of her brain. Dr. Levenstein believed that a cerebral hemorrhage caused by a "severe assault" had caused her heart and breathing to stop, and that she had sustained irreversible brain damage. This was not consistent with the defendant's account that Sophia simply vomited and then stopped breathing. ¶ 9 The defendant and Banuelos first spoke to police at about 3:20 p.m. on February 16, at Rockford Memorial Hospital. According to Denise Pascoal of DCFS, who was present during the questioning, the defendant said that he had gone to Brenda's house about 10:20 that morning. Sophia was fussy and he gave her a bottle. She began to throw up, so he put her in a bouncer (an infant's reclining chair), but she "kind of fell to one side" and formula started coming out of her nose. Brenda yelled at him for giving Sophia the bottle, saying that it had been prepared the day before. A few minutes later, about 10:30 a.m., he saw that Sophia was not breathing, so he picked her up. When he picked her up, her limbs were limp. He put her in the car seat and drove her to the hospital without Banuelos. He then called Banuelos, and drove home and brought her to the hospital. In describing the events of that morning, the defendant did not mention shaking Sophia to revive her, or bumping her head on the car seat. Pascoal observed that, while the defendant was speaking, he was twitching constantly. ¶ 10 The defendant and Banuelos came to the Harvard police station on the evening of February 16. They were interviewed separately and the interviews were recorded. The defendant's interview began at about 11:15 p.m. and lasted about 75 minutes. ¶ 11 The defendant was interviewed by Harvard Police Detective Verle Leard and McHenry Police Detective John Birk. The interview began with Leard telling the defendant that, before they spoke with him, they needed to advise him of his rights:
"LEARD: Salvador, we have to ask you some questions. [Handing the defendant a document.] This is just a formality, just like you see on those TV shows.The defendant then signed the waiver form. ¶ 12 During the interview, the defendant gave the police several different versions of what had happened that morning. He began by saying that he had been at the house with Banuelos and Sophia. He was going to give Banuelos a ride to work and take Sophia to his mother's home for her to watch Sophia. Sophia was fussy, so he gave her a bottle. She did not finish it. She began throwing up, with vomit and mucus coming out of her nose and mouth. He placed her face down on his lap as he was sitting and patted her back. When he turned her back over and picked her up, she was not breathing. Her stomach was big and hard and her limbs were limp. He yelled to Banuelos that Sophia wasn't breathing and quickly took her to the hospital. At the hospital, a lady came out and asked him what happened. He told her. She asked if Sophia had fallen. He said no, Sophia had been on the bed the whole time, propped up on a pillow, until he put her on his lap. Then someone told him that he should go get Banuelos, and suggested that if they were Catholic, they might want to call a priest. He began crying, and went to pick up Banuelos. They returned to the hospital a few minutes later. People told them that they had gotten Sophia's heart going and were helping her breathe, but it didn't look good. Then Sophia was transported to Rockford, and they followed in the car. ¶ 13 Leard told the defendant that Leard had spoken to other people already and knew the defendant was lying about not having been at Banuelos' house earlier that morning. He then spoke louder, stating that Sophia was going to die, and that her brain was bleeding and her eyes were severely injured. He asked the defendant if he knew how that could happen, and when the defendant said no, Leard said "like this" and shook Birk by the shoulders. Then Birk spoke more softly to the defendant and asked him to tell the truth. ¶ 14 The defendant then admitted that he had slept over at Banuelos' house. In the morning, Banuelos was getting ready for work and he was taking care of Sophia. He gave her a bottle and put her in her infant car seat, and as he did so, her head knocked against the handle of the car seat, but not hard—she was not crying or anything. But then she began to throw up, and he took her out of the seat again, and burped and patted her just as he said. Birk told him that what happened to Sophia required more than just a little bump on the head. Birk told him that, when someone shakes a baby, the first thing that happens is that their eyes become torn, and this had happened with Sophia. Generally, this was caused by a fall or shaking. ¶ 15 The defendant denied "ever, ever" shaking Sophia. He again described putting Sophia in the car seat, bumping the back of her head on the handle as he was lowering her in. She started vomiting and he pulled her out again really fast. Birk again told him that what he had described did not account for the force necessary to cause Sophia's injuries, and that something else had to have happened. Birk stated that, "in that time frame, the only person the baby's with when she can be hurt, is with you." ¶ 16 The defendant said nothing else happened. He put her into the car seat, bumping her head; he took her out again and burped and patted her, then he put her back into the car seat. At that point she was not moving, so he tried moving her arms and squeezing her cheeks a little. Leard then confronted the defendant, saying he wished the defendant could see Sophia's CT scans, and told him that "the simple fact, the simple fact that no one in this world can dispute right now, nobody, is that something happened to cause those injuries today." ¶ 17 The defendant then said that, when he took Sophia out of the car seat after she vomited, she was limp, and he shook her a little, "not hard," to try to "get her to move." He demonstrated, shaking his hands back and forth in small jiggling movements. He was saying, "Come on, Sophie, come on," and listening to her heart beat, and it was going really fast, and then it began slowing down, and he just ran to the hospital. The detectives suggested that the defendant was not a bad guy who hurt Sophia on purpose but a good father, and what happened was an accident. They assured him that they knew it was the latter. The defendant repeated, "I don't know, I don't know." He then repeated the same description of seeing her limp and becoming scared, and jiggling her to make her respond. ¶ 18 The police pushed, saying that something must have happened. The defendant said that, when he put her in the car seat after she bumped her head, he could see her throw up and then sort of "black out," and her head fell to one side. He panicked and picked her up to try to revive her, but she wouldn't do anything. The police asked how long the defendant thought he had shaken her to try to wake her up, and he said maybe four seconds. He also said that he had not told Banuelos any of this: he told her only that Sophia had thrown up and then stopped breathing. ¶ 19 Asked to explain again exactly what happened after he put Sophia in the car seat, the defendant said that her head fell to one side. He tried to set it up straighter but it lolled back to the side. He picked her up because she had a little vomit coming out of her mouth and nose, not a lot, and more came out of her onto him. Then he put her face down on his leg to burp her, and more vomit came out of her. At that point, he heard the air coming out of her but did not hear breath going in, and her arms were hanging limply. He held her underneath her armpits and shook her, saying, "Sophie, wake up, wake up," but she didn't move. He listened for a heartbeat and heard it going really fast, but "toward the end," he couldn't hear it and he ran Sophia to the hospital. ¶ 20 The defendant cried, and said that he felt so bad. The police assured him that he was not a bad person who had meant to hurt Sophia. The defendant said, "I think I did hurt her." When asked if perhaps he had shaken her harder than he intended, the defendant answered "maybe." He commented that he couldn't "remember half the things" that had happened because everything happened so quick. He then said that he felt like he should have just left her in the car seat and not tried to wake her up. Remorsefully, he said, "that's why I feel like I did this thing—because I was the only one there." He knew, though, that nothing he did was intentional to hurt Sophia. ¶ 21 At the request of the police, the defendant repeated his narrative, beginning at 1 a.m. on February 16. At the end, the police asked if he thought he had shaken Sophia hard enough to cause the damage they had talked about. The defendant said, "I think I did. But there's no explanation. So it was either me or it wasn't. I don't— To me, I don't think I did, I don't know, but if you guys say, you know, you don't know when your adrenalin's going like that, * * * I don't know, maybe I did shake her too hard. Maybe I did." But he thought it was a normal shake. ¶ 22 At trial, Banuelos testified that Sophia had been a normal baby. In February 2008, Banuelos was living with her parents. On February 15, the day before Sophia was taken to the hospital, she would not stop crying. Banuelos did not call a doctor about the crying. Banuelos was eventually able to soothe her, and she fell asleep. Banuelos stated that she could have caused the injuries to Sophia, but she denied shaking or throwing Sophia. The defendant spent the night with her. On February 16, she left about 9 a.m., leaving Sophia in the defendant's care. He was supposed to take Sophia to his mother's home. Sophia was fussy that morning. (Banuelos' trial testimony in this regard contradicted her statement to the police, in which she said that Sophia was happy and laughing when Banuelos left for work.) Later that morning, she received a call to go to Mercy Hospital. She went to the hospital and met the defendant, and they drove to Rockford Memorial Hospital together. She was worried that DCFS would take the baby away, because the defendant was not supposed to have contact with Sophia, and so they agreed that they would say Banuelos had been in the house when Sophia stopped breathing. ¶ 23 Leard testified that he had not spoken to any doctors and did not know the condition of Sophia's brain and eyes when he interviewed the defendant. He did not know how much shaking a child would have to be subjected to for the child to be injured. However, he believed that something had to have happened during the time that the defendant was alone with Sophia, because Banuelos had said Sophia was fine when she left. He did not have personal knowledge that something happened during that period, however. Leard wanted the defendant to believe that "science" could prove that he was the one who injured Sophia. ¶ 24 At trial, both sides presented substantial evidence regarding the cause of the damage to Sophia's brain. As relevant here, that testimony included the following. Dr. Shaku Teas, a pathologist who testified for the defense, stated that there was microscopic evidence of subdural bleeding in Sophia's brain that was at least a few weeks old and possibly dated to the time of birth. Dr. Teas believed that the medical records from Sophia's earlier admission to Lutheran General noted a bulging fontanelle (the fontanelle is the soft spot in a baby's skull, and a bulging fontanelle can reflect intracranial pressure). Dr. Teas believed Sophia had chronic subdural bleeding. Dr. Teas also noted the current dispute within the medical community regarding the existence and indicators of "shaken baby syndrome." On cross examination, Dr. Teas conceded that the fibroblasts and iron she saw in Sophia's brain (which were evidence that some of the subdural bleeding had begun healing) could form in 48 hours, or within two to three days, and Sophia was in the hospital for 52 hours between her admission to Mercy Hospital at 11 a.m. on February 16 and her death at 2:26 p.m. on February 18. ¶ 25 Another defense expert, Dr. Ronald Uschinski, a clinical neurosurgeon, opined that Sophia's death was the result of a chronic subdural hematoma that had existed for weeks, or even months. He reached this conclusion based on the rapid growth in Sophia's skull circumference (which was in the 5th percentile at birth on November 22, 2007, but in the 50th percentile one week later, and in the 95th percentile at the time of her death), and based on the CT scans taken in January 2008 which showed a subdural hematoma. On cross-examination, Dr. Uschinski acknowledged that Sophia's head circumference remained in the 50th percentile on January 19, and that her overall height and weight at the end of January were in the 90th percentile. ¶ 26 Dr. Mark Peters, a forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy on Sophia, initially testified for the State, but was recalled for additional testimony by the defense. He testified that at the time of death Sophia had severe brain swelling, with her brain showing acute hemorrhaging along the top and bottom of the brain, including cerebral and subdural areas. In addition, Sophia had bilateral hemorrhaging of the retinas. He identified evidence of a point of impact on the left frontal area (the left forehead), and also noted bruises on the left cheek and above the left ear. He did not believe that these contusions were related to Sophia's medical treatment. There was a separate contusion from the intracranial pressure monitor. He saw no evidence of older brain traumas, but he did not perform a microscopic or histological examination as he saw no need for one in this case. When recalled by the defense, Dr. Peters testified that an infant with Sophia's injuries would appear fussy or vomit. An infant could go as long as three days after an injury before showing signs of illness. Dr. Marc Reyes, a neuropathologist who performed postmortem gross and microscopic examinations of Sophia's brain and portions of her spinal column, had opined that Sophia's brain injuries were about two-and-a-half days old, and Dr. Peters would defer to Dr. Reyes's expertise in this regard. ¶ 27 Dr. Amanda Fingarson, a consultant in child abuse pediatrics who was called by the State, testified that the earlier injuries to Sophia's ribs and left leg bones, as well as the bruising to her abdomen, were indicative of child abuse. Although doctors at Lutheran General had taken CT images of Sophia's brain during her admission in January 2008 and had not detected any bleeding or swelling in her brain at that time, Dr. Fingarson could see evidence of subtle subarachnoid bleeding. Subarachnoid bleeding of this kind would be reabsorbed and would cause only a headache, and would not have had any effect on Sophia's health in February 2008. However, it suggested an abuse problem. Dr. Fingarson opined that Sophia's injuries in February 2008 did not date back to birth or her earlier hospitalization in January, and could not be accounted for by any underlying disease or disorder. ¶ 28 The defendant testified at trial. He stated that Banuelos left for work at about 9 a.m., and after that, he was alone with Sophia. She was not crying, screaming, or irritable. He was getting her things together when he noticed that she had vomit on her mouth and seemed to be sleeping. He picked her up and burped her, and she threw up a little more. He put his ear to her chest and heard her heart beating slowly. She stopped breathing, and he drove her to the hospital, about three blocks away. He did nothing to hurt her. On cross-examination, the defendant acknowledged that he had lied to the police. He saw Sophia lose consciousness. He shook her to try to revive her. He also bumped her head on the car seat once or maybe twice. He admitted that he falsely told the police that he never, ever shook Sophia. ¶ 29 The bench trial took place over seven days. As part of it, the trial court viewed recordings of the police interviews with the defendant and Banuelos. Although additional testimony by the defendant, Banuelos, treating physicians, and expert witnesses was presented, we omit it here as not directly relevant to the issues raised on appeal. ¶ 30 On October 14, 2011, the trial court found the defendant guilty of aggravated battery to a child and not guilty of murder. In announcing its findings from the bench, the trial court stated that it had reviewed all of the evidence, including the exhibits, the recordings of the defendant's and Banuelos' statements to the police, and its notes regarding the testimony given. The trial court found that, at the time she arrived at the hospital at about 11 a.m., Sophia was not breathing and did not have a pulse. Sophia had been fussy, but Banuelos thought she was generally fine when Banuelos left for work that morning. The defendant was alone with her for about one-and-a-half to two hours immediately before taking her to the hospital. The defendant's accounts of what happened were inconsistent as to "whether the child was breathing, when the child stopped breathing, whether the child vomited and, if so, to the amount" and were also inconsistent "as to the times as well as whether or not he shook the child." The trial court noted that the defendant had both denied and admitted to shaking the child, and there was some variance in how hard he thought he had shaken her. The defendant also admitted lying and concocting a story with Banuelos about what happened. ¶ 31 The trial court commented that this "was mostly a circumstantial evidence case." It found that all of the treating physicians agreed that Sophia had sustained severe trauma and that the trauma had been inflicted intentionally. All of the nontreating expert witnesses, including the defense experts, agreed that Sophia had undergone severe trauma, including "multiple non-accidental hemorrhages." There were "various hematomas, both recent and some older ones," in Sophia's brain. The defense experts and the State experts disagreed as to the when the hemorrhages in the brain had occurred. ¶ 32 Weighing all of the evidence, the trial court found that "there was a recent trauma" to Sophia. As to the cause of that trauma, the trial court noted that "there was only one possible witness to the trauma"—the defendant—and he had indicated that he did shake Sophia, although his statements varied regarding how hard he shook her. The trial court again noted the inconsistencies in the defendant's accounts, and noted that the defendant admitted to the police that he had not told Banuelos that he had bumped Sophia's head. The trial court also found that the defendant's accounts of events were "not supported by the medical facts as Sophia presented to the hospitals." ¶ 33 The trial court also took note of the defense theory that Sophia's death was the result of preexisting trauma or some other medical condition that dated from before the morning of February 16, perhaps related to her expanding head circumference. The trial court rejected this theory, because Sophia's treating physicians at birth, at her one-month checkup, and at the January 2008 hospitalization had expressed no concern over her head circumference or her overall condition (apart from her fractured ribs and leg bones in January 2008). Moreover, despite the evidence of old subdural hematomas, Banuelos herself said that Sophia was generally a good baby and seemed normal in her first few months. Sophia had also been fine, although perhaps a little fussy, on the morning of February 16. The trial court found that "Defendant from his acts knew that he had gone too far," noting that he had said "Maybe, with my adrenalin, I shook her too hard." Accordingly, the trial court found the defense theory was "not consistent with the evidence of a recent acute trauma to the child." ¶ 34 The defendant filed a posttrial motion in which he argued, among other things, that a recent federal case, Aleman v. Village of Hanover Park, 662 F.3d 897 (7th Cir. 2011), supported granting a new trial. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced the defendant to 12 years' imprisonment, and then denied the defendant's motion to reconsider his sentence. This appeal followed.
DEFENDANT: Mm-hmm.
LEARD: Okay. I've just got to read you those before we talk, okay?
DEFENDANT: Okay.
LEARD: You want me to read them to you?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
LEARD: [Takes the document back from the defendant.] Sure. I know you can read, but [inaudible].
You've got the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court or other proceeding.
DEFENDANT: Mm-hmm.
LEARD: You've got the right to talk to a lawyer before you're asked any questions concerning this matter—
DEFENDANT: [Nodding head]
LEARD: —and have your lawyer with you before, during or after questioning. And if you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you at no cost to you by a judge before you are questioned if you wish. Do you understand all those?
DEFENDANT: Yup. Umm, what's this for?
LEARD: What's that?
DEFENDANT: What did you say this was for?
LEARD: This is just a formality. It's something we have to do to anybody who comes in here, okay?
BIRK: It's your Miranda rights. By law, we're required to read them to you—
DEFENDANT: Yup. [Nodding.] Yeah, yeah.
BIRK: —and make sure you understand them. You understand them, right?
DEFENDANT: Yeah, yeah, yeah, I understand them.
LEARD: Okay, if you understand all those rights and are willing to talk to us, sign on that line. [Handing the defendant the Miranda waiver form.]"
¶ 35 ANALYSIS
¶ 36 The sole issue raised on appeal is the defendant's claim that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because his attorney did not move to suppress his statement to the police. In order to prevail on such a claim, the defendant must demonstrate "that the unargued suppression motion was meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability" that the outcome of the trial would have been different if the evidence had been suppressed. People v. Harris, 182 Ill. 2d 114, 146 (1998); see also People v. Henderson, 2013 IL 114040, ¶ 15. ¶ 37 In order to show that a motion to suppress his statement to the police would have been "meritorious," that is, that such a motion would have succeeded (Henderson, 2013 IL 114040, ¶ 12), the defendant must establish that his statements were not voluntary in the legal sense of that term. The test of voluntariness is whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the statement was made "freely and voluntarily, without compulsion or inducement of any kind, or whether the individual's will was overborne at the time of the confession." People v. Murdock, 2012 IL 112362, ¶ 29 (quoting People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 437 (2001)). ¶ 38 The defendant argues that his admissions of culpability to the police—that he shook Sophia, and perhaps could have caused her injuries—were not voluntary. He begins by complaining that Leard's comments that the Miranda warnings were "just a formality" inappropriately downplayed the importance of the warnings. In support of this complaint, he cites People v. Alfaro, 386 Ill. App. 3d 271, 306 (2008). We agree that police undermine the effectiveness of Miranda warnings, which are designed to protect fundamental constitutional rights, when they characterize the warnings as "a formality." However, Alfaro involved very different facts, in that the defendant there was questioned at length twice before he was ever given Miranda warnings (which the interviewing police officer referred to as "a formality"), and this court found that the evidence gave rise to an inference that the State deliberately employed a "question first, warn later" approach. Id. No such tactic is evident here, and the defendant has not cited any case law suggesting that calling the warnings "a formality" is, by itself, sufficient to render a confession involuntary. Moreover, Birk immediately followed Leard's comments with comments that treated the matter more seriously, explaining that these were the defendant's Miranda rights and that by law the police were required to read them to the defendant and make sure he understood them. ¶ 39 The defendant next argues that his confession was rendered involuntary because the police misrepresented the science of "shaken baby syndrome," telling him that for a baby to display the kind of brain and eye injuries that Sophia did, the abuse must have occurred earlier that day, while Sophia was in his care. He argues that this misrepresentation so seriously distorted his understanding that it led him to believe, wrongly, that he must have been the cause of Sophia's injuries, and to "confess" this. ¶ 40 The difficulty with this argument is that, as the defendant concedes, "[t]he fact that a confession was procured by deception or subterfuge does not invalidate the confession as a matter of law." People v. Melock, 149 Ill. 2d 423, 450 (1992) (suppression of statement not warranted on ground that polygraph technician falsely told defendant that he failed polygraph test). Indeed, courts have repeatedly held that police falsehoods regarding the evidence against the persons being questioned do not, standing alone, render the confession involuntary. See, e.g., People v. Holland, 121 Ill. 2d 136, 154 (1987) (false statement by police that defendant's car was found in alley where rape occurred, and he would have to explain this, did not invalidate confession); People v. Kashney, 111 Ill. 2d 454, 466 (1986) (assistant State's attorney falsely told defendant that his fingerprints had been found at the crime scene); People v. Martin, 102 Ill. 2d 412, 427 (1984) (police interviewer falsely stated that defendant had been identified by a witness as the "triggerman"); People v. Torry, 212 Ill. App. 3d 759, 767 (1991) (police falsely told defendant that the blood of both murder victims had been found on his clothing). Rather, although police deception weighs against finding that a confession was voluntary, it is only one of many factors to be weighed in determining voluntariness. Melock, 149 Ill. 2d at 450. ¶ 41 The defendant cites to People v. Payton, 122 Ill. App. 3d 1030, 1031-21 (1984), in which the appellate court stated that police deception is sufficient by itself to invalidate a confession. However, Payton was issued prior to the supreme court's decision in Melock, and relies on earlier precedent (People v. Stevens, 11 Ill. 2d 21, 27 (1957)) that is contrary to Melock. Moreover, by acknowledging that Stevens's holding was contrary to its later holding in Melock(149 Ill. 2d at 450), the supreme court implicitly abrogated the holding of Stevens. We therefore find the defendant's reliance on Payton misplaced, and adhere to Melock's holding that police deception is only one factor to be considered in determining the voluntariness of a confession. ¶ 42 The defendant contends that Leard and Birk misrepresented the facts when they told him that it was indisputable that something had happened earlier in the day to cause Sophia's injuries, and he argues that this misrepresentation was qualitatively different than the misrepresentations in the cases cited above because it bore the imprimatur of "science." In support, the defendant cites Aleman, a recent federal case in which a reviewing court found that a false statement by police had "destroyed the information required for *** rational choice," making the accused's supposed "confession" worthless as evidence. Aleman, 662 F.3d at 906. ¶ 43 Although there is some superficial factual similarity between Aleman and this case, Aleman was a civil suit for false arrest and malicious prosecution. It thus involved a different legal issue entirely—whether the police had probable cause to arrest Aleman on the basis of his "confession" during previous questioning. Aleman was a day care provider. He had been caring for an 11-month old child for three days. The infant had been lethargic and feverish on the first two days. On the third day, the infant began gasping for air and then collapsed, showing no signs of life. Aleman picked the child up and shook him gently to elicit a response, and then performed CPR and called 911. He was arrested, and during his interview, the police told Aleman that the doctors all agreed that the infant would have become unconscious immediately after being shaken. Aleman then "confessed" that, "if the only way to cause [the injuries] is to shake that baby, then, when I shook that baby, I hurt that baby *** I admit it. I shook that baby too hard." Aleman was charged with aggravated battery to a child, and was released on bond. After the infant died, he was charged with murder, re-arrested, and imprisoned awaiting trial. However, the case against Aleman fell apart, and there was evidence that one police officer had concealed information and misdirected the investigation in an effort to shield the child's mother from suspicion. Aleman then sued the village and various individuals for false arrest and malicious prosecution. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and Aleman appealed. ¶ 44 Reviewing the evidence, the Seventh Circuit upheld Aleman's first arrest as being supported by probable cause, in that the infant had been in his care at the time the infant became unresponsive. Id. at 904. However, Aleman's second arrest (on the charge of murder) lacked probable cause because most of the evidence supporting it was the direct result of police obstruction and misdirection of the investigation. Id. The Seventh Circuit then considered whether the remaining evidence—Aleman's "confession" that he must have shaken the infant too hard—provided probable cause for his second arrest. It was in this context that the court commented that, "[n]ot being a medical expert, Aleman could not contradict what was represented to him as settled medical opinion." Id. at 906. Thus, Aleman's eventual "confession" was the unreliable product of misinformation that was fed to Aleman, not a valid confession that could provide probable cause to arrest Aleman, and the false-arrest claim related to that arrest could not be summarily dismissed. Id. at 907. ¶ 45 As can be seen, the focus in Aleman was on the reliability of a confession induced by police misrepresentation of medical science. Id. ("A confession so induced is worthless as evidence, and as a premise for an arrest"). However, as the Seventh Circuit itself noted, "[t]he question of coercion [or voluntariness] is separate from that of reliability." Id. at 906. This same point was made with greater force in Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961), in which the Supreme Court reversed a conviction because, in determining whether the defendant's confession was admissible, the trial court had wrongly taken into account the reliability of the confession—its "probable truth or falsity." The Court emphasized that whether a confession is admissible turns solely on whether it was voluntary, without regard to its reliability. Id. at 545. Thus, the only focus for a trial court making a suppression determination is whether "the behavior of the State's law enforcement officials was such as to overbear petitioner's will to resist and bring about [a] confession[] not freely self-determined." Id. Accordingly, Aleman's focus on the evidentiary value of a confession cannot be imported into the determination of whether the confession is voluntary, nor can Aleman serve as the basis for a motion to suppress. ¶ 46 Rather, as the Supreme Court held, the focus in a suppression motion must be on whether the conduct of the police, viewed in its totality, overrode the defendant's will. Id. Here, the police minimized the importance of the Miranda warnings and falsely told the defendant that the evidence (bolstered by allusions to "science") showed that he must have caused Sophia's injuries, either by shaking her or causing a substantial impact. We view this latter deception as comparable to the cases noted above, in which the police similarly lied to defendants, telling them that evidence linked them to the crime. See Melock, 149 Ill. 2d at 450; Holland, 121 Ill. 2d at 154; Kashney, 111 Ill. 2d at 466; Martin, 102 Ill. 2d at 427; Torry, 212 Ill. App. 3d at 767. As such, it is one factor weighing against finding the defendant's statements to be voluntary. Melock, 149 Ill. 2d at 450. Leard's characterization of the Miranda warnings as "just a formality" also weighs somewhat against a finding of voluntariness (Alfaro, 386 Ill. App. 3d at 306), although this factor is mitigated by Birk's explanatory comments immediately afterward. ¶ 47 However, the remaining factors to be considered in a suppression motion weigh in favor of finding that the defendant's statement was voluntary. These include factors relating to the defendant himself (the defendant's age, intelligence, background, experience, education, mental capacity, and physical condition at the time of questioning) and the circumstances of the questioning (the legality and duration of the detention, whether the suspect was given Miranda warnings, and the duration of the questioning). People v. Richardson, 234 Ill. 2d 233, 253-54 (2009); In re J.J.C., 294 Ill. App. 3d 227, 234 (1998). In this case, the defendant has not argued that any of these other factors show that his statement was involuntary. From this, and from our own review of the evidence, we find that these factors weigh in favor of finding that the defendant's statements were voluntary. His interactions with the police, as recorded on the DVD of the interview, showed him to be alert, intelligent, fluent, and under no obvious mental or physical constraints. He has not raised any argument that his detention was illegal. Although Leard minimized the importance of the Miranda warnings, he did receive them, and he appeared to have understood them. His interrogation lasted only a little over an hour, and he was offered rest breaks and something to drink. ¶ 48 Considering all of the circumstances of the defendant's interrogation, we find that any suppression motion brought by the defendant's trial counsel would not have been successful. Accordingly, his attorney's failure to move to suppress caused him no prejudice, and his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel lacks merit. Henderson, 2013 IL 114040, ¶ 15.
¶ 49 CONCLUSION
¶ 50 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County. ¶ 51 Affirmed.