The general rule is that "[t]he test of value is the reasonable market value of the stolen article at the time of the commission of the alleged offense." People v. Austin, 185 Colo. 229, 233, 523 P.2d 989, 992 (1974). In Miller v. People, we held that "[w]here the stolen item, such as a credit card, has no market value in lawful channels, we conclude that other objective evidence of value may be admitted, including evidence of the 'illegitimate' market value."
Some states adopt a balancing approach, considering the inquiry as part of a broader question of coercion. Richardson v. State, 508 So.2d 289, 293-94 (Ala.Crim.App. 1987); People v. Austin, 185 Colo. 229, 523 P.2d 989, 993-94 (1974); State v. Cornell, 266 N.W.2d 15, 19 (Iowa 1978); White v. State, 95 Nev. 881, 603 P.2d 1063, 1065 (1979). In determining whether a particular state court procedure violates due process, it's highly relevant whether that state is alone in its view.
Pa.Super. 78, 551 A.2d 239 (1988) ; People v. Bryant , 113 Ill.2d 497, 101 Ill.Dec. 825, 499 N.E.2d 413 (1986) ; State v. Adcock , 310 N.C. 1, 310 S.E.2d 587 (1984) ; Rumph v. State , 687 S.W.2d 489, 493 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) ; State v. Brown , 100 N.M. 726, 676 P.2d 253, 255 (1984) ; State v. Lerch , 296 Or. 377, 677 P.2d 678, 683-90 (1984) ; Hankins v. State , 646 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) ; State v. Smith , 37 Conn.Supp. 664, 434 A.2d 368, 370 (1981) ; State v. Derouchie , 140 Vt. 437, 440 A.2d 146 (1981) ; In re StandardJury Instructions in Criminal Cases , 431 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1981) ; State v. Eagle , 611 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1980) ; State v. Turnipseed , 297 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. 1980) ; State v. O'Connell , 275 N.W.2d 197 (Iowa 1979) ; State v. Roddy , 401 A.2d 23 (R.I. 1979) ; State v. Bell , 90 N.M. 134, 560 P.2d 925 (1977) ; State v. Bush , 58 Haw. 340, 569 P.2d 349 (1977) ; State v. Cowperthwaite , 354 A.2d 173 (Me. 1976) ; Bails v. State , 92 Nev. 95, 545 P.2d 1155 (1976) ; People v. Austin , 185 Colo. 229, 523 P.2d 989 (1974) ; State v. Draves , 18 Or.App. 248, 524 P.2d 1225 (1974) ; State v. Wilkins , 215 Kan. 145, 523 P.2d 728 (1974) ; People v. Bennett , 183 Colo. 125, 515 P.2d 466, 469 n.1 (1973) ; Henry v. State , 298 A.2d 327 (Del. 1972) ; Murray v. State , 249 Ark. 887, 462 S.W.2d 438, 442-43 (1971) ; State v. Harvill , 106 Ariz. 386, 476 P.2d 841, 844 (1970) ; Allen v. State , 420 P.2d 465 (Alaska 1966) ; Holland v. Commonwealth , 323 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Ky. 1959). ¶19.
1981) ; State v. Derouchie , 140 Vt. 437, 440 A.2d 146 (1981) ; Matter of Use by Trial Courts of Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases , 431 So.2d 594 (Fla. 1981) ; State v. Eagle , 611 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1980) ; State v. Turnipseed , 297 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. 1980) ; State v. O'Connell , 275 N.W.2d 197 (Iowa 1979) ; State v. Roddy , 401 A.2d 23 (R.I. 1979) ; State v. Bell , 90 N.M. 134, 560 P.2d 925 (1977) ; State v. Bush , 58 Haw. 340, 569 P.2d 349 (1977) ; State v. Cowperthwaite , 354 A.2d 173 (Me. 1976) ; Bails v. State , 92 Nev. 95, 545 P.2d 1155 (1976) ; State v. Gosby , 85 Wash.2d 758, 539 P.2d 680 (1975) ; Blakely v. State , 542 P.2d 857 (Wyo. 1975) ; People v. Austin , 185 Colo. 229, 523 P.2d 989 (1974) ; State v. Draves , 18 Or.App. 248, 524 P.2d 1225 (1974) ; State v. Wilkins , 215 Kan. 145, 523 P.2d 728 (1974) ; Henry v. State , 298 A.2d 327 (Del. 1972) ; Murray v. State , 249 Ark. 887, 462 S.W.2d 438, 442–43 (1971) ).--------
1980); State v. O'Connell, 275 N.W.2d 197 (Iowa 1979); State v. Roddy, 401 A.2d 23 (R.I.1979); State v. Bell, 90 N.M. 134, 560 P.2d 925 (1977); State v. Bush, 58 Haw. 340, 569 P.2d 349 (1977); State v. Cowperthwaite, 354 A.2d 173 (Me.1976); Bails v. State, 92 Nev. 95, 545 P.2d 1155 (1976); State v. Gosby, 85 Wash.2d 758, 539 P.2d 680 (1975); Blakely v. State, 542 P.2d 857 (Wyo.1975); People v. Austin, 185 Colo. 229, 523 P.2d 989 (1974); State v. Draves, 18 Or.App. 248, 524 P.2d 1225 (1974); State v. Wilkins, 215 Kan. 145, 523 P.2d 728 (1974); Henry v. State, 298 A.2d 327 (Del.1972); Murray v. State, 658 S.W.2d 438, 442–43 (Ark.1971), but see Ward v. State, 280 Ark. 353, 658 S.W.2d 379 (1983); State v. Harvill, 106 Ariz. 386, 476 P.2d 841 (1970); Allen v. State, 420 P.2d 465 (Alaska 1966); State v. Ray, 43 N.J. 19, 202 A.2d 425 (1964); Holland v. Commonwealth, 323 S.W.2d 411 (Ky.1959).
" (citation omitted) See also People v. Austin, 185 Colo. 229, 523 P.2d 989 (1974). This prosecutorial duty to disclose known exculpatory information is now codified in Rule 16 I (a)(3) of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Under the totality of the circumstances rule, convictions will be reversed if the cumulative effect of the trial court's actions had a coercive influence upon the jury. E.g., Cornell v. Iowa, supra; White v. State, supra; Sharplin v. State, supra; People v. Austin, 185 Colo. 229, 523 P.2d 989 (1974); State v. Loberg, 73 S.D. 301, 42 N.W.2d 199 (1950). What conduct amounts to coercion is particularly dependent upon the facts of each case.
For purposes of the theft statute, section 18-4-401, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), "value" is generally proven by evidence of market value at the time and place of the theft. People v. Austin, 185 Colo. 229, 523 P.2d 989 (1974); Noble v. People, 173 Colo. 333, 478 P.2d 662 (1970); People v. Kolego, 38 Colo. App. 191, 554 P.2d 712 (1976). In this case, Mr. McLaughlin, an employee of Spekens Auto Salvage, testified that the market value of the car was $300 when he obtained possession of the vehicle.
Finally, some states have required that there be a showing of prejudice based on the circumstances of each case. People v. Austin, 523 P.2d 989, 993-94 (Colo. 1974). Our approach to this type of claimed judicial error, in general, resembles the position of the Colorado court.
[1,2] It is well established in Colorado that the value of a stolen item is measured by its fair market value. People v. Austin, 185 Colo. 229, 523 P.2d 989 (1974); People v. Marques, 184 Colo. 262, 520 P.2d 113 (1974); People v. Paris, 182 Colo. 148, 511 P.2d 893 (1973); Noble v. People, 173 Colo. 333, 478 P.2d 662 (1970). Prior cases do not address the particular issue presented here, viz., whether amounts paid to obtain the cooperation of one believed to be a co-conspirator should be deducted in determining the value of stolen goods when the payments were returned to the owner of the goods.