People v. Austin

21 Citing cases

  1. People v. McCoy

    764 P.2d 1171 (Colo. 1988)   Cited 20 times
    Applying statute prospectively where effective date clause stated that amendments "shall apply to acts committed on or after" its effective date of July 1, 1985

    The general rule is that "[t]he test of value is the reasonable market value of the stolen article at the time of the commission of the alleged offense." People v. Austin, 185 Colo. 229, 233, 523 P.2d 989, 992 (1974). In Miller v. People, we held that "[w]here the stolen item, such as a credit card, has no market value in lawful channels, we conclude that other objective evidence of value may be admitted, including evidence of the 'illegitimate' market value."

  2. Jimenez v. Myers

    12 F.3d 1474 (9th Cir. 1993)   Cited 1 times

    Some states adopt a balancing approach, considering the inquiry as part of a broader question of coercion. Richardson v. State, 508 So.2d 289, 293-94 (Ala.Crim.App. 1987); People v. Austin, 185 Colo. 229, 523 P.2d 989, 993-94 (1974); State v. Cornell, 266 N.W.2d 15, 19 (Iowa 1978); White v. State, 95 Nev. 881, 603 P.2d 1063, 1065 (1979). In determining whether a particular state court procedure violates due process, it's highly relevant whether that state is alone in its view.

  3. Nevels v. State

    325 So. 3d 627 (Miss. 2021)   Cited 42 times
    In Nevels v. State, 325 So. 3d 627 (Miss. 2021), our Supreme Court made clear that "the law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence" and therefore abolished the use of "circumstantial evidence instructions" in purely circumstantial cases.

    Pa.Super. 78, 551 A.2d 239 (1988) ; People v. Bryant , 113 Ill.2d 497, 101 Ill.Dec. 825, 499 N.E.2d 413 (1986) ; State v. Adcock , 310 N.C. 1, 310 S.E.2d 587 (1984) ; Rumph v. State , 687 S.W.2d 489, 493 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) ; State v. Brown , 100 N.M. 726, 676 P.2d 253, 255 (1984) ; State v. Lerch , 296 Or. 377, 677 P.2d 678, 683-90 (1984) ; Hankins v. State , 646 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) ; State v. Smith , 37 Conn.Supp. 664, 434 A.2d 368, 370 (1981) ; State v. Derouchie , 140 Vt. 437, 440 A.2d 146 (1981) ; In re StandardJury Instructions in Criminal Cases , 431 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1981) ; State v. Eagle , 611 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1980) ; State v. Turnipseed , 297 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. 1980) ; State v. O'Connell , 275 N.W.2d 197 (Iowa 1979) ; State v. Roddy , 401 A.2d 23 (R.I. 1979) ; State v. Bell , 90 N.M. 134, 560 P.2d 925 (1977) ; State v. Bush , 58 Haw. 340, 569 P.2d 349 (1977) ; State v. Cowperthwaite , 354 A.2d 173 (Me. 1976) ; Bails v. State , 92 Nev. 95, 545 P.2d 1155 (1976) ; People v. Austin , 185 Colo. 229, 523 P.2d 989 (1974) ; State v. Draves , 18 Or.App. 248, 524 P.2d 1225 (1974) ; State v. Wilkins , 215 Kan. 145, 523 P.2d 728 (1974) ; People v. Bennett , 183 Colo. 125, 515 P.2d 466, 469 n.1 (1973) ; Henry v. State , 298 A.2d 327 (Del. 1972) ; Murray v. State , 249 Ark. 887, 462 S.W.2d 438, 442-43 (1971) ; State v. Harvill , 106 Ariz. 386, 476 P.2d 841, 844 (1970) ; Allen v. State , 420 P.2d 465 (Alaska 1966) ; Holland v. Commonwealth , 323 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Ky. 1959). ¶19.

  4. Moore v. State

    247 So. 3d 1198 (Miss. 2018)   Cited 14 times
    Cataloguing "overwhelming" "evidence supporting the verdict"

    1981) ; State v. Derouchie , 140 Vt. 437, 440 A.2d 146 (1981) ; Matter of Use by Trial Courts of Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases , 431 So.2d 594 (Fla. 1981) ; State v. Eagle , 611 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1980) ; State v. Turnipseed , 297 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. 1980) ; State v. O'Connell , 275 N.W.2d 197 (Iowa 1979) ; State v. Roddy , 401 A.2d 23 (R.I. 1979) ; State v. Bell , 90 N.M. 134, 560 P.2d 925 (1977) ; State v. Bush , 58 Haw. 340, 569 P.2d 349 (1977) ; State v. Cowperthwaite , 354 A.2d 173 (Me. 1976) ; Bails v. State , 92 Nev. 95, 545 P.2d 1155 (1976) ; State v. Gosby , 85 Wash.2d 758, 539 P.2d 680 (1975) ; Blakely v. State , 542 P.2d 857 (Wyo. 1975) ; People v. Austin , 185 Colo. 229, 523 P.2d 989 (1974) ; State v. Draves , 18 Or.App. 248, 524 P.2d 1225 (1974) ; State v. Wilkins , 215 Kan. 145, 523 P.2d 728 (1974) ; Henry v. State , 298 A.2d 327 (Del. 1972) ; Murray v. State , 249 Ark. 887, 462 S.W.2d 438, 442–43 (1971) ).--------

  5. Burleson v. State

    166 So. 3d 499 (Miss. 2015)   Cited 29 times
    Lamenting that "the most problematic aspect of the [circumstantial evidence] instruction is that the additional ‘reasonable hypothesis’ language suggests to the jury that the State is held to a distinct and higher burden of proof in cases lacking a confession from the defendant or eyewitness testimony to the gravamen of the offense"

    1980); State v. O'Connell, 275 N.W.2d 197 (Iowa 1979); State v. Roddy, 401 A.2d 23 (R.I.1979); State v. Bell, 90 N.M. 134, 560 P.2d 925 (1977); State v. Bush, 58 Haw. 340, 569 P.2d 349 (1977); State v. Cowperthwaite, 354 A.2d 173 (Me.1976); Bails v. State, 92 Nev. 95, 545 P.2d 1155 (1976); State v. Gosby, 85 Wash.2d 758, 539 P.2d 680 (1975); Blakely v. State, 542 P.2d 857 (Wyo.1975); People v. Austin, 185 Colo. 229, 523 P.2d 989 (1974); State v. Draves, 18 Or.App. 248, 524 P.2d 1225 (1974); State v. Wilkins, 215 Kan. 145, 523 P.2d 728 (1974); Henry v. State, 298 A.2d 327 (Del.1972); Murray v. State, 658 S.W.2d 438, 442–43 (Ark.1971), but see Ward v. State, 280 Ark. 353, 658 S.W.2d 379 (1983); State v. Harvill, 106 Ariz. 386, 476 P.2d 841 (1970); Allen v. State, 420 P.2d 465 (Alaska 1966); State v. Ray, 43 N.J. 19, 202 A.2d 425 (1964); Holland v. Commonwealth, 323 S.W.2d 411 (Ky.1959).

  6. People v. Shannon

    683 P.2d 792 (Colo. 1984)   Cited 2 times

    " (citation omitted) See also People v. Austin, 185 Colo. 229, 523 P.2d 989 (1974). This prosecutorial duty to disclose known exculpatory information is now codified in Rule 16 I (a)(3) of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure.

  7. State v. Roberts

    131 Ariz. 513 (Ariz. 1982)   Cited 36 times
    Finding judge's inquiry into the numerical division of the impasse and comment on the large amount of evidence did not result in coercion

    Under the totality of the circumstances rule, convictions will be reversed if the cumulative effect of the trial court's actions had a coercive influence upon the jury. E.g., Cornell v. Iowa, supra; White v. State, supra; Sharplin v. State, supra; People v. Austin, 185 Colo. 229, 523 P.2d 989 (1974); State v. Loberg, 73 S.D. 301, 42 N.W.2d 199 (1950). What conduct amounts to coercion is particularly dependent upon the facts of each case.

  8. Beaudoin v. People

    627 P.2d 739 (Colo. 1981)   Cited 4 times

    For purposes of the theft statute, section 18-4-401, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), "value" is generally proven by evidence of market value at the time and place of the theft. People v. Austin, 185 Colo. 229, 523 P.2d 989 (1974); Noble v. People, 173 Colo. 333, 478 P.2d 662 (1970); People v. Kolego, 38 Colo. App. 191, 554 P.2d 712 (1976). In this case, Mr. McLaughlin, an employee of Spekens Auto Salvage, testified that the market value of the car was $300 when he obtained possession of the vehicle.

  9. White v. State

    95 Nev. 881 (Nev. 1979)   Cited 12 times
    Finding no error in judicial inquiry where no answer was given, conversation was limited to substantial changes in balloting during deliberations, and judge did not urge jury to reach a verdict

    Finally, some states have required that there be a showing of prejudice based on the circumstances of each case. People v. Austin, 523 P.2d 989, 993-94 (Colo. 1974). Our approach to this type of claimed judicial error, in general, resembles the position of the Colorado court.

  10. People v. Elkhatib

    599 P.2d 897 (Colo. 1979)   Cited 1 times

    [1,2] It is well established in Colorado that the value of a stolen item is measured by its fair market value. People v. Austin, 185 Colo. 229, 523 P.2d 989 (1974); People v. Marques, 184 Colo. 262, 520 P.2d 113 (1974); People v. Paris, 182 Colo. 148, 511 P.2d 893 (1973); Noble v. People, 173 Colo. 333, 478 P.2d 662 (1970). Prior cases do not address the particular issue presented here, viz., whether amounts paid to obtain the cooperation of one believed to be a co-conspirator should be deducted in determining the value of stolen goods when the payments were returned to the owner of the goods.