Opinion
1999-11612
Argued January 31, 2002.
February 25, 2002.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Dunlop, J.), rendered December 2, 1999, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Andrew C. Fine, New York, N.Y. (Karen M. Kalikow of counsel), for appellant.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Nicoletta J. Caferri, Matthew Schechter, and Eric Manganelli of counsel), for respondent.
Before: FRED T. SANTUCCI, J.P., MYRIAM J. ALTMAN, ANITA R. FLORIO, GLORIA GOLDSTEIN, JJ.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his Batson claim (see, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79) with respect to the prosecutor's peremptory challenge of prospective juror number seven. We disagree. In determining whether a party has exercised peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner, the courts have utilized a three-step process (see, People v. Payne, 88 N.Y.2d 172, 181; People v. Allen, 86 N.Y.2d 101, 104). In this case, the prosecutor satisfied her burden under step two of the test by profferring race-neutral reasons for the exercise of her peremptory challenge. Accordingly, the burden of persuasion then shifted to the defendant under step three to show that the reasons put forth by the prosecutor should be rejected as pretextual (see, People v. Payne, supra, at 181; People v. Richie, 217 A.D.2d 84, 87). The defendant failed to sustain this burden and therefore, the trial court properly denied his Batson motion.
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.
SANTUCCI, J.P., ALTMAN, FLORIO and GOLDSTEIN, JJ., concur.