Opinion
06-07-2017
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Nadege AUGUSTE, appellant.
Mark Diamond, New York, NY, for appellant. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York, NY (Nikki Kowalski and Hannah Stith Long of counsel), for respondent.
Mark Diamond, New York, NY, for appellant.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York, NY (Nikki Kowalski and Hannah Stith Long of counsel), for respondent.
JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, J.P., SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, HECTOR D. LaSALLE, and VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Goldberg, J.), rendered November 17, 2014, convicting her of scheme to defraud in the first degree and grand larceny in the third degree (eight counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the prosecution established by a preponderance of the evidence that venue was proper in Kings County (see CPL 20.40[1] ; People v. Greenberg, 89 N.Y.2d 553, 555–556, 656 N.Y.S.2d 192, 678 N.E.2d 878 ; People v. Ribowsky, 77 N.Y.2d 284, 291–292, 567 N.Y.S.2d 392, 568 N.E.2d 1197 ).
The defendant's contention that the evidence supporting her convictions was legally insufficient is partially unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2] ; People v. Hawkins, 11 N.Y.3d 484, 492, 872 N.Y.S.2d 395, 900 N.E.2d 946 ). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5] ; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe their demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053 ; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Upon reviewing the record, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 ).
The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court improperly discharged a sworn juror and replaced her with an alternate is also without merit. The court conducted a reasonably thorough inquiry into the juror's unavailability and providently exercised its discretion in replacing the juror after determining that the juror would not appear within the two-hour period set forth in CPL 270.35(2) (see People v. Jeanty, 94 N.Y.2d 507, 706 N.Y.S.2d 683, 727 N.E.2d 1237 ). The defendant's claim regarding the constitutionality of the discharge of the juror is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v. Angelo, 88 N.Y.2d 217, 222, 644 N.Y.S.2d 460, 666 N.E.2d 1333 ; People v. Ballard, 51 A.D.3d 1034, 1035–1036, 858 N.Y.S.2d 769 ) and, in any event, without merit (see People v. Jeanty, 94 N.Y.2d at 517, 706 N.Y.S.2d 683, 727 N.E.2d 1237 ; People v. Ballard, 51 A.D.3d at 1036, 858 N.Y.S.2d 769 ).
Contrary to the defendant's contentions, the Supreme Court properly denied, without a hearing, that branch of her motion which was to set aside the verdict pursuant to CPL 330.30(2), based upon alleged juror misconduct (see CPL 330.40[2][e] ; People v. Gerrara, 88 A.D.3d 811, 813–814, 930 N.Y.S.2d 646 ; People v. Bab Lin You, 264 A.D.2d 780, 780, 694 N.Y.S.2d 760 ; People v. Cervantes, 242 A.D.2d 730, 731, 662 N.Y.S.2d 802 ).