Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 08F6452
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.
Defendant Curtis Atkinson entered a plea of no contest to insurance fraud. His ensuing appeal is subject to the principles of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110. Pursuant to the latter, we provide the following summary of the offense and the proceedings in the trial court.
According to the probation report’s summary of the factual basis for the plea, defendant injured his wrist in 2005 and claimed that he was unable to work because he could not lift anything heavier than his shoe or the side of his pants. As a result, he received workers’ compensation benefits. In 2007, the insurance company determined that he was operating a thrift store with his mother, and surveillance footage showed that he was able to use his hand for lifting and pushing. In all, the insurance company had paid $25,300 (rounded) to defendant in fraudulent benefits.
A complaint charged defendant with attempted perjury and insurance fraud. He initially denied the charges and waived a preliminary hearing. After consultation with his attorney, he agreed to a negotiated disposition in which the prosecution would dismiss the charge of perjury and an unrelated misdemeanor in another case in exchange for defendant’s plea of no contest to insurance fraud, with a maximum sentence of 180 days. The court determined that defendant understood the rights he was waiving in the written plea form he had executed (which included his right to have the same judge sentence him) and was entering his plea voluntarily, and that he was aware of the possibility of a restitution order (even though the latter was not essential to the validity of the plea (People v. Campbell (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 825, 830)). The parties stipulated that a factual basis for the plea was contained in a Department of Insurance report. The court then accepted the plea.
The probation report recommended suspension of imposition of the middle term of three years, 120 days in jail (with a credit for defendant’s one day of actual custody), restitution in the amount that the insurance company had initially reported ($25,300), and various fines and fees (breaking down the amounts and statutory bases for each). It also recommended a booking fee (not to be included with the other conditions of probation).
At the hearing, the prosecutor sought $39,300 (rounded) in restitution, based on updated information from the insurance company. The court stated that it would tentatively accept that figure, subject to a subsequent restitution hearing. It then entered an order granting probation, which reflected the terms of the recommended disposition (also noting the value of $120 that the trial court had set at the hearing for the services rendered to defendant from the public defender).
A representative of the insurance company testified at the restitution hearing. The witness attested to costs of $1,825 for adjustors, an unspecified amount (at $60 per hour) for special investigators, costs of $7,950 (rounded) for “medical pay” (which “break out” of other claim expenses in an unclear way), and interest loss during the period to which defendant admitted that his fraud occurred ($3,200). The trial court found these amounts were very conservative estimates of the insurer’s additional costs beyond the total of the benefits that defendant received fraudulently, and it thus reaffirmed the increased amount of restitution in its order.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal “based on the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea.” He did not seek a certificate of probable cause.
We appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel filed an opening brief setting forth the facts of the case, and asks us to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.) Counsel advised defendant of the right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing the opening brief. More than 30 days have elapsed, and we have not received any communication from defendant. Having undertaken an examination of the entire record, we do not find any arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to the defendant.
Disposition
The order granting probation is affirmed.
We concur: SIMS, Acting P. J., HULL, J.