Opinion
4-21-0508
04-27-2023
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THOMAS J. ATCHISON, Defendant-Appellant.
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of De Witt County No. 20CF66 Honorable Karle E. Koritz, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE LANNERD delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Harris and Steigmann concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
LANNERD JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court granted the Office of the State Appellate Defender's motion to withdraw as counsel and affirmed the trial court's judgment.
¶ 2 In March 2021, defendant, Thomas Atchison, was convicted of aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer (aggravated fleeing) (625 ILCS 5/11-204.1(a)(1) (West 2020)) and speeding more than 35 miles per hour over the speed limit (speeding) (625 ILCS 5/11-601.5(b) (West 2020)). The trial court sentenced defendant to 4 years' imprisonment on the aggravated fleeing conviction, to run concurrently with a sentence of 364 days in jail on the speeding conviction. Defendant timely appealed and the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) was appointed to represent him. Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), OSAD moves to withdraw its representation of defendant, contending "any request for review in this case would be without merit." We agree and grant OSAD's motion to withdraw and affirm the court's judgment.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 Defendant was arrested and charged in De Witt County with unlawful possession of a converted vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2020)); aggravated fleeing (625 ILCS 5/11-204.1(a)(1) (West 2020)); speeding (625 ILCS 5/11-601.5(b) (West 2020)); and driving while license revoked (625 ILCS 5/6-303(a) (West 2020)). Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of aggravated fleeing and speeding but acquitted of unlawful possession of a converted vehicle and driving while license revoked. As defendant was acquitted on those two charges, we include only those facts necessary to address the issues raised in OSAD's brief.
¶ 5 A. Pretrial
¶ 6 In October 2020, defendant informed the trial court he intended to waive his right to a jury trial. Before accepting his waiver, the court confirmed with defendant that he had sufficient time to discuss this decision with his attorney. Subsequently, the court described a jury trial and the probable permanence of any jury waiver. It also informed defendant that after waiving his right to a jury trial, he would still be entitled to a bench trial before a judge. Defendant acknowledged his understanding of the court's explanations and stated, "I just feel *** that a jury plays off of emotion. *** I feel I would have a better chance with a bench trial." Defendant denied any force, threat, or promise was made to convince him to waive his right to a jury trial and signed a written jury waiver. The court found defendant's waiver was "expressly and understandingly made."
¶ 7 Defendant's attorney, Jennifer Patton, requested a sanity evaluation in December 2020. When requesting the evaluation, Patton stated her request was unrelated to defendant's current fitness to stand trial and solely to determine whether to present the affirmative defense of insanity at defendant's bench trial. The trial court granted her request and appointed Dr. Lawrence Jeckel to evaluate defendant. Dr. Jeckel evaluated defendant in late December, but Patton did not receive his report until February 2021. Based on the report, Patton informed the court she would not be pursuing the affirmative defense of insanity.
¶ 8 In early January 2021, defendant filed a lengthy pro se document in which he recounted "conversations he had with Jesus and [how] he and Jesus wrote a book defining what justice is and what it means." (This document was filed in De Witt County case No. 20-CF-89 and is not included in the record on appeal.) Based on this filing, Timothy Holl, defendant's attorney in case No. 20-CF-89, requested a fitness evaluation and opined defendant did not "actually understand[ ] the nature of the proceedings" and could not assist him in preparing for trial. However, Holl acknowledged defendant knew he was charged with crimes, had a right to a trial, and understood plea negotiations. Patton and the State joined in Holl's request for a fitness evaluation. However, defendant objected and adamantly stated he was "very fit to stand trial." Defendant asserted that he has represented himself in "family law cases" and knows "how to stand trial." Before ruling on Holl's request, the trial court inquired whether Dr. Jeckel's report included any opinion about defendant's current fitness to stand trial. Patton informed the court that the report discussed defendant's "preoccupation with Satan and his spirituality" but considered this to be "overvalued beliefs" rather than delusions. Further, the report "[did] not really say whether [this preoccupation] has affected his ability to *** assist in his defense." Dr. Jeckel's report was not provided to the court or admitted into the record.
¶ 9 The trial court indicated, when determining whether a bona fide doubt exists as to a defendant's fitness to stand trial, it must consider the following factors: "Defendant's irrational behavior and demeanor in court or at trial, any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial and representations of Defendant's counsel concerning the competence of his client, though not conclusive." In addition, the court relied upon two cases regarding fitness to stand trial: People v. Wilson, 124 Ill.App.3d 831, 464 N.E.2d 1158 (1984), and People v. Tolefree, 2011 IL App (1st) 100689, 960 N.E.2d 27. The court summarized Wilson when it said," 'evidence of mental disturbances *** do not in themselves raise a bona fide doubt in Defendant's current fitness.'" Wilson, 124 Ill.App.3d at 837. Further, the court, quoting Tolefree, 2011 IL App (1st) 100689, ¶ 55, stated, "A Defendant is unfit if he is unable to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense." (Internal quotation marks omitted.). Then, the court opined, "Even if *** Defendant believes that he has observed Satan walking on the earth, I think a knee jerk reaction is to interpret that as some kind of mental illness or mental disturbance." Additionally, the court stated it had ample opportunities to observe defendant in court proceedings over the past four years and, based on those observations, defendant understood the charges against him and the possible penalties, and he could assist in his own defense. Accordingly, the court held there was nothing to indicate there was a bona fide doubt as to defendant's fitness to stand trial and denied Holl's request.
¶ 10 B. Bench Trial
¶ 11 At defendant's bench trial in March 2021, defendant informed the trial court he would be raising the affirmative defense of compulsion (720 ILCS 5/7-11(a) (West 2020)). The State presented testimony from four witnesses: Sara Zook, Officer James McClure, Sergeant Bryan Morgan, and Officer Chad Hickey.
¶ 12 1. Sara Zook's Testimony
¶ 13 Sara Zook, defendant's ex-wife, picked up defendant from a motel around 10:30 a.m. on August 27, 2020. After picking him up, Zook informed defendant he had a warrant for his arrest. She and defendant then ran some errands before driving to her workplace. Zook went into work and defendant left in Zook's vehicle. Around 4 p.m., Zook walked to the police station and reported her vehicle stolen.
¶ 14 2. Officer James McClure's Testimony
¶ 15 Officer James McClure, of the Clinton Police Department, met with Zook at the police station and created a report about her stolen vehicle. McClure entered the vehicle's information into the Law Enforcement Agencies Data System.
¶ 16 3. Sergeant Bryan Morgan's Testimony
¶ 17 At the beginning of his shift on August 27, 2020, Sergeant Bryan Morgan, of the De Witt County Sheriff's Office, was informed of the make, model, and license plate number for the stolen vehicle. While on patrol, Morgan and Sergeant McClain were stationed in the median of Route 51, and Morgan observed the stolen vehicle pass them. Morgan and McClain immediately pulled onto the highway behind the vehicle and activated their emergency lights and sirens. The sergeants continued their pursuit because the driver failed to slow down or pull over. During the pursuit, Morgan used his same-direction radar to determine the driver's speed. The sergeants' pursuit of the vehicle lasted approximately seven minutes, during which the driver reached speeds of 125 miles per hour in areas where the posted speed limit varied between 45 to 65 miles per hour. During the trial, footage from Morgan's in-car camera depicting the pursuit was admitted as People's exhibit No. 1. The sergeants terminated their pursuit at the Macon County line, where an officer from the Maroa Police Department continued the pursuit. Shortly after Morgan terminated pursuit, he was dispatched to Macon County because the driver was in custody.
¶ 18 When Morgan arrived on the scene, Macon County deputies were escorting the driver out of a bean field. Morgan immediately identified the driver as defendant, who told Morgan he ran because "he's just tired of goin' to jail." Macon County deputies transferred custody of defendant to McClain, and he transported defendant to the De Witt County jail.
¶ 19 Morgan acknowledged he was dispatched to Zook's home twice the week prior to the pursuit. The first call was about an intruder entering the house and the second was Zook requesting defendant's removal from her home. Morgan denied breaking into the home, as defendant alleged, and asserted he was "let into the residence." He also denied threatening defendant and contended defendant never indicated to him, during any of their encounters, that defendant was fearful of him or felt threatened by him. Morgan acknowledged that defendant told him that Zook was threatening defendant and "trying to hire somebody to harm him."
¶ 20 4. Officer Chad Hickey's Testimony
¶ 21 Officer Chad Hickey, of the Maroa Police Department, received a dispatch call on August 27, 2020, about a stolen vehicle proceeding south on Route 51 toward the Macon County line. Hickey positioned himself on the highway near the county line and observed the vehicle being pursued by De Witt County squad cars. After the De Witt County squad cars terminated pursuit at the county line, Hickey began pursuing the vehicle. When the vehicle ultimately stopped, the driver immediately exited the vehicle and fled into a nearby bean field. Macon County deputies apprehended the driver, escorted him out of the field, and transferred custody of him to De Witt County deputies.
¶ 22 When the State rested its case-in-chief, defendant moved for a directed verdict. The trial court denied defendant's motion. Defendant then testified on his own behalf.
¶ 23 5. Defendant's Testimony
¶ 24 On August 27, 2020, defendant was asleep at a motel when Zook started "bang[ing]" on his door and woke him up. She told defendant there was a warrant for his arrest and he should "come home and hide out." Defendant agreed and went to Zook's home, but once there, she told him she needed to return to work. He was concerned Zook was trying to "set [him] up or call the police on [him]." Because of these concerns, defendant accompanied Zook to her workplace, dropped her off, and took her vehicle.
¶ 25 Later that day, defendant was driving Zook's vehicle and saw two De Witt County squad cars in the median of Route 51. Defendant identified one of the vehicles as Sergeant Morgan's squad car. Once defendant passed the squad cars, they "very aggressively began pursu[ing him]." Defendant did not pull over or stop because he was afraid of Morgan. He alleged that Morgan broke into Zook's house a week earlier and tried to kill him. Based on this incident, along with statements from his ex-wife that she hired someone to kill him, defendant believed Morgan would kill him if he did not flee. Defendant drove to Macon County because he thought if he was arrested there, he would not go to the De Witt County jail. He admitted he continued to flee from police in Macon County but insisted he was frightened because he did not know whether Morgan was still after him.
¶ 26 6. Trial Court's Ruling
¶ 27 After defendant's testimony, the defense rested, and the parties presented closing arguments. The trial court, after considering the testimony, exhibits, and arguments of counsel, found defendant guilty of aggravated fleeing and speeding. It found that the evidence showed defendant operated a motor vehicle on Route 51, where the speed limit was 65 miles per hour, at a rate of 125 miles per hour, and this was sufficient to convict defendant of speeding. The court also found that both Morgan and McClain gave defendant a visual and audible signal to stop, defendant willfully "sped off in an effort to evade or elude [them]," and defendant fled at speed of more than 35 miles per hour over the speed limit. The court determined defendant had not proven his affirmative defense and stated, "The evidence for, or in support of, the compulsion defense is right at zero, or less than zero." In discussing defendant's testimony regarding his alleged fear of Morgan, the court indicated it did not find his testimony credible. It pointed out that defendant continued to flee from the officers in Macon County after Morgan terminated his pursuit, defendant never told the Maroa officers he was afraid of Morgan, and Morgan testified that defendant never indicated he felt threatened by Morgan. Consequently, the court found the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated fleeing.
¶ 28 C. Posttrial
¶ 29 On April 6, 2021, defendant filed a pro se motion for a new trial, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant requested to proceed pro se on April 27. Immediately before defendant waived his right to counsel in this case, he also waived his right to counsel in other, unrelated criminal cases. During that discussion, the trial court reviewed the Ward admonitions with defendant (see People v. Ward, 208 Ill.App.3d 1073, 1081-82, 567 N.E.2d 642, 647-48 (1991)). After the court accepted defendant's waiver in those cases, it then began a new colloquy with defendant in this case. The court admonished defendant as to the nature of the offenses and the possible sentencing ranges. It also noted defendant had already been convicted of both offenses. Defendant affirmatively stated he understood the nature of the charges and possible penalties. Then, the court advised defendant he had an absolute right to an attorney and a right to have an attorney appointed for him if he could not afford one. Then, "out of an abundance of caution," the court reread the Ward admonitions to defendant. Throughout the hearing, defendant persisted in his desire to represent himself and acknowledged his understanding of all his rights. The court found defendant's waiver of counsel was "knowingly and intelligently made."
¶ 30 The trial court heard evidence and arguments on defendant's pro se motion for a new trial on May 12, 2021. Defendant alleged Patton provided ineffective assistance of counsel because she failed to (1) obtain certain videos and 911 calls for him and share discovery with him before trial, (2) file a motion to quash arrest based on his arrest warrant not being issued by a "neutral or detached judge," and (3) file a motion to quash arrest because defendant was "illegally" transported to the De Witt County jail after being arrested in Macon County.
¶ 31 Patton testified that she did not request the 911 calls or body camera footage from the incident at Zook's house a week prior to the pursuit because she did not think they had any evidentiary value. She explained that, for the affirmative defense of compulsion, defendant needed to show an objective sense of danger, rather than a subjective belief. She opined that the 911 calls and body camera footage would only demonstrate defendant's subjective belief Morgan was a threat to him. Patton acknowledged defendant requested she file two motions to quash his arrest. However, she declined to file them because she believed they were frivolous, and she has an ethical obligation which prohibits her from filing frivolous motions. She denied any failure to show defendant his discovery and stated, while she never made a trip to the jail to show defendant his discovery, she allowed him to review all the police reports "in the back" after one of their court appearances. The only additional discovery material was the dashcam and body camera footage from the pursuit, which defendant saw at his preliminary hearing. According to Patton, there was not "anything more to show [defendant]," and "[h]e knew the facts of his case very well prior to *** trial."
¶ 32 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion. It found no merit in defendant's contention Patton should have filed motions to quash his arrest because his arrest was not improper. There was probable cause established in De Witt County for the offense of aggravated fleeing, and it did not matter if that arrest was effectuated in Macon County. The court then evaluated Patton's performance under the two-part test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and held defendant failed to prove either prong. It stated, even if Patton had presented "the evidence [defendant] identified that [he] believed should have been presented at trial but wasn't, that would not establish the defense of compulsion whatsoever by even the slimmest burden of proof." Therefore, the court contended, even if it assumed, for argument's sake, that defendant proved Patton's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, her failure did not prejudice defendant.
¶ 33 After denying defendant's motion, the trial court proceeded immediately to sentencing. Two Maroa police officers testified that during the pursuit, defendant drove through several stop signs at an excessive speed, causing many cars to apply their brakes suddenly to avoid a collision. In his argument, defendant discussed his struggle with substance abuse and requested drug court so he could get help with his addiction. He then offered a statement in allocution, in which he apologized for his actions and acknowledged he "put a lot of people in danger." In sentencing defendant, the court noted it had reviewed and considered the statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation, the sworn testimony, and the arguments of the parties. The court stated it was "hard-pressed" to identify any applicable factors in mitigation. Defendant had multiple arrests over the past five years, his children were no longer in his custody, and he clearly understood that his conduct would cause or threaten serious physical harm. The court then outlined multiple applicable factors in aggravation, including defendant's lengthy criminal history, which included four prior prison sentences; the dangerousness of the current offenses and the risk to public safety; and that defendant was on bond for another offense when these offenses occurred. The court sentenced defendant to 4 years' imprisonment on the aggravated fleeing conviction, to run concurrently with a sentence of 364 days in jail on the speeding conviction.
¶ 34 Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal, and this court appointed OSAD to represent him. OSAD filed a motion to withdraw its representation of defendant and supported its motion with a memorandum of law providing a statement of facts, a list of potential issues, and arguments why those issues lack arguable merit. OSAD provided proof of service of its motion and memorandum on defendant and this court granted defendant the opportunity to file a response. Defendant failed to respond.
¶ 35 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 36 OSAD moves to withdraw, asserting defendant's potential claims lack arguable merit. Counsel considered defendant's claims of whether (1) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) the trial court abused its discretion in not ordering a fitness evaluation for defendant, (3) defendant properly waived his right to a jury trial, (4) the court erred when it determined defendant could represent himself, (5) the court erred when it denied defendant's pro se motion for a new trial, and (6) defendant's sentence constituted an abuse of discretion. After examining the record, the motion to withdraw, and the memorandum of law, we agree that defendant's potential claims lack arguable merit.
¶ 37 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 38 Initially, OSAD asserts no meritorious argument exists that the State failed to prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 39 When a challenge is raised regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the question before this court is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, "any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the crime." People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48, 1 N.E.3d 888. In a criminal case, the State must prove a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to each element of an offense. People v. Murray, 2019 IL 123289 ¶ 28, 155 N.E.3d 412. This standard applies regardless of whether the defendant elects to receive a bench trial rather than a jury trial. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48. This court will not reverse a criminal conviction for insufficient evidence "unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it justifies a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt." People v. Sauls, 2022 IL 127732, ¶ 52.
¶ 40 The offense of aggravated fleeing requires the State prove a defendant "fle[d] or attempt[ed] to elude a peace officer, after being given a visual or audible signal [to stop] *** and such flight or attempt to elude: (1) is at a rate of speed at least 21 miles per hour over the legal speed limit." 625 ILCS 5/11-204.1(a)(1) (West 2020). Pursuant to section 11-204, the signal "may be by hand, voice, siren, red or blue light." 625 ILCS 5/11-204(a) (West 2020). To prove the offense of speeding, the State must demonstrate that a defendant drove a vehicle "upon any highway [in Illinois] at a speed that is 35 miles per hour or more in excess of the applicable maximum speed limit." 625 ILCS 5/11-601.5(b) (West 2020).
¶ 41 At defendant's bench trial, Sergeant Morgan testified a vehicle passed him while he was positioned in the median of Route 51. When Morgan began pursuing that vehicle, it did not slow down or pull over, even though Morgan activated his emergency lights and siren. During the pursuit, the driver reached speeds of 125 miles per hour in areas where the posted speed limit varied between 45 and 65 miles per hour. Footage from Morgan's in-car camera confirms Morgan's account of the pursuit. It depicts a marked squad car pursuing a vehicle on a highway; the squad car's flashing lights are visible and sirens can be heard.
¶ 42 Defendant raised the affirmative defense of compulsion. Defendant acknowledged he was the driver of the vehicle pursued by Morgan, but he asserted he was compelled to flee because he feared Morgan would harm him. Pursuant to the compulsion statute:
"A person is not guilty of an offense *** by reason of conduct that he or she performs under the compulsion of threat or menace of the imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm, if he or she reasonably believes death or great bodily harm will be inflicted upon him or her, or upon his or her spouse or child, if he or she does not perform that conduct." 720 ILCS 5/7-11(a) (West 2020).
The only evidence defendant presented to support his argument was his own testimony that he was afraid Morgan would kill him if he pulled over. Defendant alleged that approximately one week prior to the pursuit, Morgan broke into the house where defendant resided. Based on this encounter, along with statements from defendant's ex-wife that she hired someone to kill him, defendant believed Morgan would kill him if he did not flee. Morgan denied defendant's assertions that he broke into the home and affirmatively stated he has never threatened to harm defendant.
¶ 43 The trial court found defendant's affirmative defense was not credible and not supported by the evidence. It detailed defendant's testimony regarding his alleged fear of Morgan and explained why it did not find the testimony credible. "In a bench trial it is for the trial judge to determine the credibility of witnesses ***. [Citations.] On review the trial court's judgment will not be set aside unless the proof is so unsatisfactory, improbable or implausible as to justify a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt." People v. Slim, 127 Ill.2d 302, 307, 537 N.E.2d 317, 319 (1989). We find nothing in the record suggesting the court's credibility determination should be set aside. Consequently, we agree with OSAD that no meritorious argument can be made that the State failed to prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 44 B. Fitness Evaluation
¶ 45 According to OSAD, there is also no merit in the contention that the trial court abused its discretion in not ordering a fitness evaluation for defendant.
¶ 46 In Illinois, a defendant is not fit to stand trial if, "because of his mental or physical condition, he is unable to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense." 725 ILCS 5/104-10 (West 2020). Fitness to stand trial involves "a defendant's ability to function at trial, not his sanity or competence in other contexts. [Citation.] Thus, a defendant may be fit for trial but otherwise mentally unsound." People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451, ¶ 29, 34 N.E.3d 560. Section 104-11(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 allows the trial court "in its discretion" to order a fitness examination to aid in its determination of whether a bona fide doubt exists. 725 ILCS 5/104-11(b) (West 2020). The Illinois Supreme Court has held that "an assertion by counsel that a defendant is unfit does not, of itself, raise a bona fide doubt of competency." People v. Eddmonds, 143 Ill.2d 501, 519, 578 N.E.2d 952, 960 (1991). It is the ultimate decision of the trial court whether a bona fide doubt exists, and that decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Weeks, 393 Ill.App.3d 1004, 1009, 914 N.E.2d 1175, 1180 (2009).
¶ 47 The trial court, in denying the request for a fitness evaluation, recounted the factors it must consider in determining whether a bona fide doubt exists. In addition, the court discussed two cases regarding fitness to stand trial: Wilson and Tolefree. Finally, the court noted it had ample opportunities to observe defendant in court proceedings over the past four years, and based on those observations, defendant fully understood the current charges and possible penalties, and he could assist in his own defense. The court determined, after considering the factors regarding fitness to stand trial, Patton's proffer, Holl's request, defendant's filing, and its observations of defendant, a bona fide doubt about defendant's fitness to stand trial did not exist. We find nothing in the record to suggest the court's decision was an abuse of discretion; therefore, we agree with OSAD no meritorious argument can be made that the court abused its discretion in denying the request for a fitness evaluation.
¶ 48 C. Waiver of Jury Trial
¶ 49 OSAD next considered whether there was any meritorious argument that defendant unknowingly or involuntarily waived his right to a jury trial.
¶ 50 For a jury waiver to be valid, the defendant must make the waiver knowingly and voluntarily. People v. Bannister, 232 Ill.2d 52, 65, 902 N.E.2d 571, 581 (2008). The trial court does not need to provide a defendant with any "specific admonition or advice" for the waiver to be made knowing and voluntarily. Bannister, 232 Ill.2d at 66. However, it is crucial defendant understand, when he waives his right to a jury trial, that" 'the facts of the case will be determined by a judge and not a jury.'" People v. May, 2021 IL App (4th) 190893, ¶ 46, 194 N.E.3d 1027 (quoting Bannister, 232 Ill.2d at 69). The facts and circumstances of each case will determine the validity of the jury waiver. Bannister, 232 Ill.2d at 66.
¶ 51 Here, defendant waived his right to a jury trial in open court. The trial court provided defendant a thorough explanation of a jury trial and a bench trial and the probable permanence of any jury waiver. Defendant indicated his understanding of all the court's explanations and never asked any questions of the court. While being admonished by the court, defendant stated, "I just feel *** that a jury plays off of emotion. *** I feel I would have a better chance with a bench trial." Defendant denied any force, threat, or promise was made to convince him to waive his right to a jury trial, and he signed a written jury waiver. Defendant clearly understood the difference between a jury trial and a bench trial and made a calculated decision to waive his right to a jury trial.
¶ 52 Based upon all the facts and circumstances, we agree with OSAD that the record shows defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial.
¶ 53 D. Waiver of Counsel
¶ 54 Similarly, OSAD next asserts that the record shows defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.
¶ 55 In Illinois, a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel only occurs when the trial court substantially complies with Rule 401(a), which requires the trial court to inform a defendant of and determine he understands: "(1) the nature of the charge; (2) the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law ***; and (3) that he has a right to counsel and, if he is indigent, to have counsel appointed for him by the court." Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984); see also People v. Campbell, 224 Ill.2d 80, 84, 862 N.E.2d 933, 936 (2006). In Ward, 208 Ill.App.3d at 1081-82, this court encouraged a trial court to also warn a defendant of 10 additional concerns not mentioned in Rule 401(a) before accepting a waiver of counsel.
¶ 56 Here, when defendant waived his right to counsel, the trial court admonished him of the nature of the charges, the possible penalties, and his absolute right to counsel. The court also went over the Ward admonitions with defendant twice during the court appearance. Defendant affirmatively stated he understood all his rights and that no threats or promises were made to get him to waive his right to counsel. After all the court's admonitions, defendant persisted in his desire to represent himself. The record is devoid of any evidence suggesting defendant unknowingly or unintentionally waived his right to counsel. Thus, we agree with OSAD that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.
¶ 57 E. Motion for a New Trial
¶ 58 OSAD next contends it can raise no reasonable argument that the trial court erred in denying defendant's posttrial motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶ 59 A defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is analyzed under the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland. People v. Veach, 2017 IL 120649, ¶ 29, 89 N.E.3d 366. To prevail on a claim, "a defendant must show both that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant." People v. Petrenko, 237 Ill.2d 490, 496, 931 N.E.2d 1198, 1203 (2010). To establish deficient performance, the defendant must show "counsel's performance 'fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.'" People v. Valdez, 2016 IL 119860, ¶ 14, 67 N.E.3d 233 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). Prejudice is established when a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. People v. Evans, 209 Ill.2d 194, 219-20, 808 N.E.2d 939, 953 (2004). A defendant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland standard, and the failure to satisfy either prong precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Clendenin, 238 Ill.2d 302, 317-18, 939 N.E.2d 310, 319 (2010).
¶ 60 At the hearing on defendant's pro se motion for a new trial, Patton refuted defendant's assertions that she never showed him the discovery. She testified that she allowed defendant to review all his discovery and that "[h]e knew the facts of his case very well prior to *** trial." Patton also explained that she did not request the additional evidence defendant wanted because it did not have any evidentiary value. While Patton admitted defendant requested she file two motions to quash his arrest, she declined to file them because she believed they were frivolous. After hearing the testimony and arguments, the trial court found defendant failed to prove either prong of the Strickland test. We find nothing in the record to indicate the court erred in its analysis and denial of defendant's pro se motion for a new trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶ 61 F. Sentencing
¶ 62 Finally, OSAD addresses whether the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced defendant.
¶ 63 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967) "grants a reviewing court the power to reduce a sentence. [Citation.] That power, however, should be exercised cautiously and sparingly." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Alexander, 239 Ill.2d 205, 212, 940 N.E.2d 1062, 1065 (2010) (quoting People v. Jones, 168 Ill.2d 367, 378, 659 N.E.2d 1306, 1311 (1995), quoting People v. O'Neal, 125 Ill.2d 291, 300, 531 N.E.2d 366, 370 (1988)). Based on this rationale, Illinois courts have determined "[a] reviewing court may not alter a defendant's sentence absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court." People v. Lawson, 2018 IL App (4th) 170105, ¶ 26, 102 N.E.3d 761. "A trial court's sentence is an abuse of discretion if it is greatly at odds with the spirit and purpose of the law or is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense." People v. Musgrave, 2019 IL App (4th) 170106, ¶ 56, 141 N.E.3d 320.
¶ 64 A defendant convicted of aggravated fleeing is subject to the penalties of a Class 4 felony, which is a term of one to three years' imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-45(a) (West 2020). However, defendant in this case was extended-term eligible, which modified the sentencing range from one to three years to one to six years. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-45(a) (West 2020). Speeding more than 35 miles per hour over the limit is a Class A misdemeanor, and the maximum possible sentence is 364 days in jail. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-55(a) (West 2020).
¶ 65 In this case, defendant was sentenced to 4 years' imprisonment on the aggravated fleeing conviction, to run concurrently with a sentence of 364 days in jail on the speeding conviction. Defendant's sentences are well within the applicable statutory ranges of one to six years for extended-term sentencing on the felony conviction and up to 364 days for the misdemeanor conviction. When sentencing defendant, the trial court noted it was "hard-pressed" to identify any applicable factors in mitigation and detailed multiple applicable factors in aggravation. Further, defendant acknowledged the seriousness of the offense and that he "put a lot of people in danger." Thus, we conclude defendant's sentences are not manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offenses or greatly at variance with the law's spirit and purpose.
¶ 66 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 67 For the reasons stated, we grant OSAD's motion to withdraw as appellate counsel and affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 68 Affirmed.