Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. RIF140202. Jean P. Leonard, Judge.
Phillip I. Bronson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, and Pamela Ratner Sobeck and Jeffrey J. Koch, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
King, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant was charged and convicted of petty theft (stealing gasoline), possessing burglary tools, and falsely identifying himself to a police officer. He admitted six Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of eight years in state prison.
On appeal, he contends the court erred in denying his Penal Code section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence. We disagree, and affirm the convictions.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The present prosecution flows from an incident in the early morning hours of November 12, 2007. While on duty, Riverside City Police Officer Cedric Disla received a dispatch that an individual was siphoning gas from a vehicle. Officer Disla was told that a red pickup truck was believed to be involved. As Officer Disla pulled his patrol car up to the rear of the business where he had been told the illegal conduct was occurring, he observed a red pickup truck with a male, later identified as defendant, standing next to the driver’s side door. Upon seeing the officer, defendant ran and hid behind a dumpster. After being ordered out from behind the dumpster, defendant was handcuffed and placed in the rear seat of the patrol car. In the bed of the pickup truck were various gas cans and hoses. Defendant smelled of gasoline. After defendant gave an incorrect name to the officer, the interior portion of the truck’s cab was searched, yielding a black Adidas box containing stolen items, as well as bolt cutters.
It is the search of the cab of the pickup truck with which defendant takes issue. Specifically, he argues that the search cannot be upheld as (1) a search incident to arrest, or (2) an inventory search as part of the impounding of the vehicle.
On March 7, 2008, a hearing was held on defendant’s Penal Code section 1538.5 motion. The People called one witness, Officer Disla, who testified as follows: On November 12, 2007, at approximately 1:30 a.m., he received a dispatch to 1110 Palmyrita. He was told there was an individual siphoning gas from a vehicle and that a red pickup truck was involved. The address is a business address. He drove to the rear of the business from the south side of the parking lot. As he was driving up, he observed a red pickup truck parked by a driveway of a business; the driver’s door was open, with a man standing by it. When the person saw Officer Disla, the person immediately hid behind a dumpster and some bushes. After calling the person out, Officer Disla took him into custody. The person had a strong odor of gasoline emanating from his body and person. The person was lethargic, like he was under the influence of some kind of narcotic substance. Within Officer Disla’s plain view, in the back of the pickup truck, were a couple of five-gallon jugs of gasoline. There were also hoses and several miscellaneous items. He handcuffed defendant right after he ordered defendant to come out from behind the dumpster. After defendant was handcuffed, the officer sat him in the back of the patrol car.
The person initially gave Officer Disla the name Michael James Brown and a date of birth. The officer ran the name through dispatch and could not make a match. At this point, and prior to searching the cab of the truck, he decided to arrest defendant for siphoning gasand Mirandized him. Defendant then admitted siphoning gas out of cars at that location. Disla also decided he was going to impound the truck. He further testified that impounding a vehicle is what “usually happens. We arrest the subject, the vehicle gets impounded.”
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
Prior to Officer Disla searching the truck, defendant did not admit his true identity. The officer’s intent in searching the truck was to find some identification. He was trying to identify the suspect. While searching the cab of the truck he found a paper with defendant’s name on it. He also located a black Adidas box and bolt cutters. The box and the bolt cutters were found right behind the passenger seat.
Officer Disla further testified that he does not believe defendant told him he was the driver of the red pickup truck. While he believes keys were recovered, he does not remember whether they were found on defendant.
In denying the motion to suppress and upholding the seizure of the black Adidas box and bolt cutters, the court indicated there was probable cause to arrest defendant for siphoning gas and that the search of the interior of the cab was appropriate in that “the officer has legal authority to conduct an inventory search of the vehicle prior to it being impounded and stored.” We agree with the trial court.
III. DISCUSSION
As previously indicated, defendant was convicted of petty theft (stealing gasoline), possessing burglary tools (the bolt cutters), and falsely identifying himself to a police officer. The jury, however, was unable to reach a verdict on count 1 (receiving stolen property). The property subject to this charge was the contents of the black Adidas box. At sentencing and pursuant to the People’s motion, this count was dismissed.
The black Adidas box was apparently taken from a vehicle parked a short distance away within the locked and fenced premises of SoCal Pump & Well. The chain securing the gate to the premises had been cut. The vehicle was unlocked and the windows were down. Inside the box were miscellaneous documents belonging to Lewis Cummins. Defendant told Officer Disla that his friend, Gary, had taken the shoe box and brought it back to defendant while defendant was “dumpster diving.”
Because defendant was not convicted of receiving stolen property (the contents of the black Adidas box), we address the seizure of the box only to the extent that it may have led to a jury determination that the bolt cutters were burglary tools. Otherwise, we limit our discussion of the search of the interior of defendant’s truck to the seizure of the bolt cutters.
A. Penal Code Section 1538.5 Motion
“‘An appellate court’s review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is governed by well-settled principles. [Citations.] [¶] In ruling on such a motion, the trial court (1) finds the historical facts, (2) selects the applicable rule of law, and (3) applies the latter to the former to determine whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated. [Citations.] “The [trial] court’s resolution of each of these inquiries is, of course, subject to appellate review.” [Citations.] [¶] The court’s resolution of the first inquiry, which involves questions of fact, is reviewed under the deferential substantial-evidence standard. [Citations.] Its decision on the second, which is a pure question of law, is scrutinized under the standard of independent review. [Citations.] Finally, its ruling on the third, which is a mixed fact-law question that is however predominantly one of law,... is also subject to independent review.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 182.) “‘“‘A proceeding under [Penal Code] section 1538.5 to suppress evidence is one in which a full hearing is held on the issues before the superior court sitting as a finder of fact.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.] (Italics added.) In such a proceeding the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences, is vested in the trial court. On appeal all presumptions favor the exercise of that power, and the trial court’s findings on such matters, whether express or implied, must be upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence.... [I]t becomes the ultimate responsibility of the appellate court to measure the facts, as found by the trier, against the constitutional standard of reasonableness.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Green (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 367, 372 (Green).) With these standards, we review the trial court’s ruling.
B. An Inventory Search of the Interior of the Pickup Truck Was Proper, Given the Imminent Towing and Impounding of the Vehicle
“The policies behind the warrant requirement are not implicated in an inventory search, [citation] nor is the related concept of probable cause[.]” (Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367, 371.) The impoundment of a vehicle and subsequent inventory search are part of the caretaking procedures of the police. (Id. at p. 372.) “[P]olice have a legitimate interest in taking an inventory of the contents of a vehicle,... before towing it. This inventory serves ‘to protect an owner’s property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police from danger.’ [Citation.]... ‘[I]nventory searches are now a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.’ [Citation.]... [P]olice must ‘follow[] standardized procedures.’ [Citations.] ‘[R]easonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 126.)
For an inventory search to be lawful, it must be performed pursuant to “standardized criteria or established routine.” (Florida v. Wells (1990) 495 U.S. 1, 4.) There need not be a showing of a written policy relative to the procedures of impoundment and inventory. (People v. Steeley (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 887, 891-892) [following a department routine is sufficient]; U.S. v. Duguay (7th Cir. 1996) 93 F.3d 346, 352.) While our record contains no evidence of a written policy, it is clear that Officer Disla performed an inventory search pursuant to department routine.
Vehicle Code section 22651, subdivision (h)(1), provides that a vehicle may be removed “[w]hen an officer arrests a person driving or in control of a vehicle for an alleged offense and the officer is, by this code or other law, required or permitted to take, and does take, the person into custody.” Here, defendant had been arrested for siphoning gasoline. Prior to the officer searching the cab of the pickup truck, defendant was in police custody, handcuffed, and seated in the back of the patrol vehicle. The officer testified that impounding a vehicle is what usually happens in this situation; after the subject is arrested, “the vehicle gets impounded.” Green is instructive. In that case, “[the officer] clearly stated on cross-examination that, ‘It was an inventory search since we were impounding his vehicle.’ The substance of this statement is clear. [The officer] considered the inventory search to be a natural consequence following the decision to impound defendant’s automobile. Although she did not use the magic words ‘standard procedure,’ her matter-of-fact response indicates that an inventory search following impound of the vehicle is standard department procedure.” (Green, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at pp. 374-375.) As in Green, Officer Disla indicated that the impounding of the vehicle and subsequent inventory search were pursuant to state law and established department routine.
While the trial court did not specifically find that Officer Disla’s impoundment and search was done pursuant to established department routine, substantial evidence supports this implied finding. Additionally, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s implied finding that the officer’s opening of the Adidas box was part and parcel of the department’s standard routine. (See People v. Needham (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 260, 266.) Thus to the extent that subsequent statements of defendant led to the officer’s observation of the cut gate chain and the vehicle from which the Adidas box was taken, thus allowing for the characterization of the bolt cutters as burglary tools, the doctrine of “fruit of the poisonous tree” is not implicated.
“Whether ‘impoundment is warranted under [the] community caretaking doctrine depends on the location of the vehicle and the police officers’ duty to prevent it from creating a hazard to other drivers or being a target for vandalism or theft.’ [Citation.] If officers are warranted in impounding a vehicle, a warrantless inventory search of the vehicle pursuant to a standardized procedure is constitutionally reasonable. [Citation.] When an inventory search is conducted based on a decision to impound a vehicle, we ‘focus on the purpose of the impound rather than the purpose of the inventory,’ since an inventory search conducted pursuant to an unreasonable impound is itself unreasonable. [Citation.] Although a police officer is not required to adopt the least intrusive course of action in deciding whether to impound and search a car [citation], the action taken must nonetheless be reasonable in light of the justification for the impound and inventory exception to the search warrant requirement. Reasonableness is ‘[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Williams (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 756, 761-762.) Here, defendant had given the officer a false name, it was 1:30 a.m., and the pickup truck was located in a business driveway near a dumpster and bushes. From the record, it appears that the general vicinity was relatively deserted during the night hours. At the time of the encounter, defendant was unaccompanied by any individual to whom the pickup truck could be entrusted. And, in that defendant had been arrested, the vehicle would be unattended throughout the remainder of the night. Given these circumstances, the community caretaking function was furthered by not leaving defendant’s vehicle unattended and subject to vandalism or theft. The officer’s decision to impound the vehicle was clearly reasonable.
The present case is not substantially unlike In re Arturo D. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 60, 76 and 77, wherein the court cited Green, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th 367, with approval. In Arturo D., the officer found contraband underneath the car’s seat while looking for identification of the defendant.
Inapposite are People v. Williams, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th 756 and U.S. v. Caseres (9th Cir. 2008) 533 F.3d 1064, wherein the respective courts found that the impounding of the vehicles was not within the community caretaking doctrine in that at the time of the defendants’ arrests, the vehicles were legally parked in front of, or two doors down from, their respective residences and there was no reason to believe the vehicles were at risk of vandalism or theft.
As in Green, “‘[i]nventory searches of the type involved in this case have repeatedly been found to be reasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘And if during the course of the inventory contraband or other evidence of crime is observed, it may be seized for legally permitted confiscation, or for use as evidence in a later criminal prosecution.’ [Citation.]” (Green, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 374.)
We therefore agree with the trial court; the officer had the legal authority to impound the pickup truck and conduct an inventory search. The bolt cutters were properly admitted into evidence and the conviction stands. Additionally, there can be no argument as to the seizure of the containers of gasoline. They were clearly within the plain view of the officer.
A substantial portion of defendant’s opening brief and all of his reply brief, is spent discussing the lawfulness of the search as incident to an arrest. (See New York v. Belton (1981) 453 U.S. 454.) We do not address this argument because we agree with the trial court that the evidence was lawfully seized as a result of the impoundment and inventory search of defendant’s pickup truck.
IV. DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment of conviction.
We concur: Hollenhorst, Acting P.J., Miller, J.