Opinion
E067947
07-12-2018
In re A.S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. A.S., Defendant and Appellant.
Laurel M. Nelson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, and Stacy Tyler, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. RIJ1501249) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Walter H. Kubelun, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed and remanded with directions. Laurel M. Nelson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, and Stacy Tyler, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
In November 2015, a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 was filed against defendant and appellant A.S. (minor), alleging she committed misdemeanor battery on school grounds (Pen. Code, § 243.2, subd. (a)(1)). Minor was subsequently placed on informal probation pursuant to section 654.2. In May 2016, the juvenile court dismissed the petition without prejudice after it concluded minor successfully completed her informal supervision program. The court also ordered all records pertaining to the petition in the custody of the juvenile court, law enforcement agencies, the probation department, and the Department of Justice sealed pursuant to section 786, subdivision (a). The court denied minor's request to seal her school records as to the petition.
All future references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
Minor subsequently appealed, arguing the juvenile court erred in denying her request to seal the school records related to her juvenile court proceedings. In an unpublished opinion in case No. E066080 (In re A.S. (Dec. 14, 2016, E066080) [nonpub. opn.]), this court agreed with minor that the juvenile court erred in finding section 786 did not apply to school records, and remanded the matter to allow the juvenile court to exercise its discretionary authority under section 786, former subdivision (e)(2), now subdivision (f)(2).
Upon remand, the juvenile court acknowledged that it had discretion to seal school records, but would not rule on the merits of minor's request until minor presented her school records for the court to review. Minor subsequently appealed. On appeal, minor contends the juvenile court erred in refusing to seal her school records related to the battery incident, and requests this court to direct the juvenile court to issue the requested order. We conclude the court acted within its discretion in requiring minor to submit her school records for review before determining whether sealing minor's school records would promote the successful reentry and rehabilitation of minor. However, because the record reveals the juvenile court did not rule on minor's motion to seal her records, we believe a remand is necessary for minor to produce her school records, and for the juvenile court to then accordingly exercise its discretion as to whether sealing minor's school records will promote the successful reentry and rehabilitation of minor. (§ 786, subd. (f)(2).)
II
The details of minor's criminal conduct are not relevant to the limited issue raised in this appeal, and we will not recount them here. Instead, we will recount only those facts and procedural background that are pertinent to the issue we must resolve in this appeal.
DISCUSSION
On remand, defense counsel requested minor's school records involving the April 10, 2015 battery incident in the custody of Valley View High School be sealed because it would benefit minor and her rehabilitative goals and needs. Counsel argued that minor only had this one incident "ever in her school career"; that minor was scheduled to graduate in June 2017 from high school; and that she was already enrolled at Moreno Valley Community College. Counsel further noted that minor had plans "to move forward and go forward with her college career" and that she did not want this incident "to affect her ability to apply for other colleges or graduate schools . . . ."
The prosecutor opposed the request, believing it was not in minor's best interest to seal her school records. Specifically, the prosecutor argued: "our office has objected to this from the beginning through the appellate level, so we're continuing to object to that based on the fact that the school needs to have notice, and all parties in the school should know about the substance of the matter for the minor's benefit to help prevent placing the minor in the same situation or other situations with that individual or other individuals of that character, so to speak, to understand and know that this minor here in Court is capable of such an action, and that; therefore, they should take those extra measures to prevent that from happening in the future. If that were to happen in the future, it would derail; furthermore, there could be other criminal actions. So . . . it is in the best interest of the minor that the school is aware of the substance of it and also of the capabilities of minor, and they can better plan for her educational future in that instance."
The juvenile court determined that the court "does have discretion to seal the school records," but that the court was "hesitant in making blanket orders or orders that are insufficient to potentially seal the records, which would benefit the minor in her successful reentry and rehabilitation." The court, therefore, "consider[ed] sealing" minor's school records, but "not with blind or overbroad or under broad orders." The court explained that it was "fearful that if it makes an order that is too narrow, that the proper records that should be sealed, if the Court were to view them, would not get sealed by the school district. [¶] Conversely, if it's overbroad, it reaches some of the concerns that the People have expressed in that it may endanger other students. It may deprive the school district of important information in the rehabilitation of the minor." The court concluded: "Therefore, the Court would consider sealing the school records should they be presented to the Court. It's the Court's understanding that the minor has the ability [to] obtain her school records. If they are presented to the Court, I will review those records for potential sealing. That will be in the best interest of the minor."
Defense counsel responded that section 786 and case law did not require minor or defense counsel to present minor's school records before the court determines whether a minor's school records should be sealed and that the court could make a "specific enough order to the school district to order them to seal, very specifically, the records that pertain to this one incident date and this one incident report number . . . ." Defense counsel also noted a number of practical concerns with the court's order, including the time and cost involved in obtaining all of minor's school records, and pointed out that the court "has to rely on the good faith efforts" of the different agencies in following the court's specific order to seal minor's records related to the specific incident.
The juvenile court reiterated that it was not foreclosing minor from having her school records sealed, but that it wanted minor to produce her school records for the court's review before it determines whether sealing the school records would be in minor's best interest. The court explained, "If I were to seal school records, I want to make abundantly sure that all the records are sealed. That the minor is fully protected from 786, and I'm not willing to put my faith in several or, ultimately, different clerks or school districts which have missed things in the past, whereas, I think you are."
Relying on statutory interpretation of the relevant statutes, minor argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying minor's request to seal her school records until those records were provided by minor for the court's review. Minor also asserts that the juvenile court's order violated the rules of statutory construction prohibiting the altering of statutes by adding provisions to conform to an assumed intent not appearing in the statute's language.
A. Legal Standard
" 'The interpretation of a statute is a question of law we review independently.' [Citation.] To ascertain legislative intent, we first examine the words of the statute and, if the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, its plain meaning governs. [Citation.] A court may not interpret a statute to reflect an intention that does not appear from its plain language." (Adoption of A.B. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 912, 919; see People v. Cole (2006) 38 Cal.4th 964, 974-975; People v. Moreno (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 934, 939.)
" '[O]ur primary task is to determine the lawmakers' intent. [Citation.] . . . To determine intent, " 'The court turns first to the words themselves for the answer.' " [Citations.] "If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature (in the case of a statute). . . ." ' [Citation.] 'We give the language of the statute its "usual, ordinary import and accord significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose. A construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided. The words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose . . . . Both the legislative history of the statute and the wider historical circumstances of its enactment may be considered in ascertaining the legislative intent." ' [Citations.] In addition, ' "[w]e must harmonize 'the various parts of a statutory enactment . . . by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole' [Citations.] We must also avoid a construction that would produce absurd consequences, which we presume the Legislature did not intend." ' [Citation.]" (In re A.V. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 697, 704-705 (A.V.), quoting In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 406; see People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266, 1276-1277.)
We apply the abuse of discretion standard to the issue of whether the juvenile court erred in denying a minor's request pursuant to subdivision (f)(2) of section 786. (In re J.W. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 663, 668 [appellate court reviews trial court's denial of a petition under section 781 to seal juvenile records for abuse of discretion]; V.C. v. Superior Court (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1455, 1469 [appellate court reviews trial court's decision to grant or deny a section 782 motion to dismiss a juvenile petition under the abuse of discretion standard], disapproved on another point in In re Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 414-415.) "[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it." (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.) "Generally, the moving party bears the burden to put the supporting evidence before the court." (People v. Ochoa (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 15, 29, fn. 3; see In re J.P. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 108, 127 [petitioner must make a prima facie showing to trigger right to a hearing pursuant to § 388].)
B. Statutory Background of Section 786
Section 786 provides that if a ward of the juvenile court "satisfactorily completes" formal or informal probation, "the court shall order the petition dismissed" and "shall order sealed all records pertaining to the dismissed petition in the custody of the juvenile court, and in the custody of law enforcement agencies, the probation department, or the Department of Justice." (§ 786, subd. (a); see In re G.F. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1, 5.) Satisfactory completion of probation "shall be deemed to have occurred if the person has no new findings of wardship or conviction for a felony offense or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude during the period of . . . probation and if he or she has not failed to substantially comply with the reasonable orders of supervision or probation that are within his or her capacity to perform." (§ 786, subd. (c)(1).)
We note effective January 1, 2017, the Legislature amended section 786, subdivision (a) to state "a person" instead of "a minor." (Stats. 2016, ch. 858, § 1; see In re G.F., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 5, fn. 3.)
Section 786, subdivision (f)(1), states: "The court may, in making its order to seal the record and dismiss the instant petition pursuant to this section, include an order to seal a record relating to, or to dismiss, any prior petition or petitions that have been filed or sustained against the individual and that appear to the satisfaction of the court to meet the sealing and dismissal criteria otherwise described in this section." (Italics added.)
Section 786, subdivision (f)(2), provides: "An individual who has a record that is eligible to be sealed under this section may ask the court to order the sealing of a record pertaining to the case that is in the custody of a public agency other than a law enforcement agency, the probation department, or the Department of Justice, and the court may grant the request and order that the public agency record be sealed if the court determines that sealing the additional record will promote the successful reentry and rehabilitation of the individual." (Italics added.)
As we previously held, a public school is a "public agency" within the meaning of section 786, subdivision (f)(2). (See Gov. Code, § 53050 ["The term 'public agency,' as used in this article, means a district, public authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision or public corporation in the state, but does not include the state or a county, city and county, or city."]; Hovd v. Hayward Unified Sch. Dist. (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 470, 472 [vocational skills center was not "public agency" within meaning of Government Code section 53051 requiring public agencies to file certain information with Secretary of State and county clerk, since it was a subdivision of a district].)
"Under 'well-settled principle[s] of statutory construction,' we 'ordinarily' construe the word 'may' as permissive and the word 'shall' as mandatory, 'particularly' when a single statute uses both terms. [Citation.] In other words, '[w]hen the Legislature has, as here, used both "shall" and "may" in close proximity in a particular context, we may fairly infer the Legislature intended mandatory and discretionary meanings, respectively.' [Citation.]" (Tarrant Bell Property, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 538, 542.)
C. Analysis
Examining the exact same issue as in the present case, this court in In re M.L. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 120 (M.L.) recently held that the juvenile court acted within its discretion in requiring the minor to provide his school records for review by the court before ordering his school records sealed. (Id. at pp. 122-124.) We explained: "First, education records, including student disciplinary records, are already protected from disclosure under state and federal laws. (Rim of the World Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1396-1399; 20 U.S.C § 1232g.) Thus, it is unclear why a court-ordered sealing of those records would be necessary. [¶] Second, the only proffered reason respecting how sealing of Minor's school records would 'promote the successful reentry and rehabilitation of' Minor was that Minor would be applying to colleges soon. However, Minor did not carry his burden of showing that colleges would require the entirety of Minor's school records, i.e., that colleges would require any records which would contain any reference to the allegation in the petition. Moreover, as the People and the court below have suggested, it could be beneficial for a school to continue to have access to information regarding the incident both for the purposes of helping to rehabilitate and educate Minor and to protect other students." (M.L., at p. 124.)
We also rejected the minor's claim that requiring him to provide the records to the court for review prior to any sealing order would be impractical. (M.L., supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 124.) We noted that the minor "had more ready access to those documents than did the court," and that the minor "bore the burden of producing evidence to support his request." (Ibid.) We rationalized: "Without access to the records Minor was requesting be sealed, or at least without some more specific description of those records, the court could not truly exercise its discretion in ordering the records sealed. Likewise, as also suggested by the court below, ordering Minor's school records sealed without any specific description of which documents were being sealed posed the danger that the sealing order would be interpreted overly broad to include records to which school personnel might need access and which had nothing to do with the incident." (Ibid.) We concluded that the juvenile court acted within its discretion in denying the minor's request without prejudice to the minor renewing the request later with evidence to support it. (Ibid.)
We adhere to our conclusion in M.L. As such, we find that the juvenile court acted within its discretion in requiring minor to submit her school records for review before determining whether sealing minor's school records would promote the successful reentry and rehabilitation of minor. However, because the record reveals the juvenile court neither granted nor denied minor's request to seal her school records, we believe a remand is necessary to allow minor to produce her school records, if she chooses to do so, and for the juvenile court to accordingly exercise its discretionary authority. (See Pen. Code, § 1260 [appellate courts "may . . . remand the cause to the trial court for such further proceedings as may be just under the circumstances"].)
Because minor was not 18 at the time of the hearing in this case on March 17, 2017, we will not address minor's arguments relating to section 781. Minor urges this court to "harmonize" section 786 with section 781. She also asserts that since she has now attained the age of 18, having turned 18 in April 2017, an order to seal her school records is specifically mandated under section 781.
Subdivision (a)(1)(A) of section 781 provides in relevant part that a person who has been the subject of a section 602 petition may, at any time after he or she has reached the age of 18, petition the juvenile court for sealing of the records related to the case. The court "shall order" (italics added) that the records be sealed "[i]f, after hearing, the court finds that since the termination of jurisdiction . . . [the petitioner] has not been convicted of a felony or of any misdemeanor involving moral turpitude and that rehabilitation has been attained to the satisfaction of the court." (§ 781, subd. (a)(1)(A).)
At the time of the March 17, 2017 hearing in this case, by its plain terms, section 781 did not apply to minor and had no applicability. The plain meaning of section 786 controlled at the time of the March 17, 2017 hearing. Further, because the language of section 786 is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to "harmonize" its terms with those of section 781. Minor, however, is not without remedy. Minor may petition the juvenile court to seal her juvenile records in the custody of the juvenile court or "other agencies, entities, and officials." (§ 781, subd. (a)(1)(A).)
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed, and the matter is remanded with directions, in accordance with this opinion.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
P. J. We concur: MILLER
J. SLOUGH
J.