Opinion
E066079
02-10-2017
In re A.S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. A.S., Defendant and Appellant.
Jeanine G. Strong, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Joy Utomi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. RIJ1500052) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Walter H. Kubelun, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Reversed and remanded with directions. Jeanine G. Strong, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Joy Utomi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In January 2015, a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 was filed against defendant and appellant A.S. (minor), alleging he committed misdemeanor possession of marijuana on school grounds while school was in session (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357, subd. (e)). Minor was subsequently placed on informal probation pursuant to section 654.2. In August 2015, the juvenile court dismissed the petition without prejudice after it concluded minor successfully completed his informal supervision program.
All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
In May 2016, minor filed a request to seal his records under section 786. The People opposed the request only as to sealing minor's school records because the People believed a school is not considered an " 'agency' " within the meaning of section 786. The trial court partially granted the request, denying the request to seal minor's school records. The trial court agreed with the People's position and found a school is not a governmental agency within the meaning of section 786.
Minor now appeals, arguing the juvenile court erred in denying his request to seal the school records related to his juvenile court proceedings. The Attorney General concedes the juvenile court erred. We agree with the parties, and reverse and remand the matter to the juvenile court to allow the court to exercise its discretionary authority.
I
The details of minor's criminal conduct are not relevant to the limited issue raised in this appeal, and we will not recount them here. Instead, we will recount only those facts and procedural background that are pertinent to the issue we must resolve in this appeal.
DISCUSSION
Minor contends the juvenile court erred in summarily denying his request to seal his school records relating to the dismissed petition under section 786. He therefore requests the order be reversed and the case remanded with directions to the lower court to exercise its discretion under section 786 and order the school records sealed. The Attorney General correctly concedes the juvenile court erred in denying minor's request because it incorrectly found section 786 did not apply to school records, but requests the matter be remanded for the juvenile court to exercise its discretion in the first instance as to whether to order the school records sealed.
Section 786, subdivision (a), provides in pertinent part that if a minor successfully completes informal probation, the juvenile court "shall order the petition dismissed. The court shall order sealed all records pertaining to that dismissed petition in the custody of the juvenile court, and in the custody of law enforcement agencies, the probation department, or the Department of Justice. . . ." (Italics added.)
"A court shall not seal a record or dismiss a petition pursuant to this section if the petition was sustained based on the commission of an offense listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707 that was committed when the individual was 14 years of age or older . . . ." (§ 786, subd. (d); italics added.) Minor's offense is not one listed in section 707, subdivision (b). --------
"The court shall send a copy of the order to each agency and official named in the order, direct the agency or official to seal its records, and specify a date by which the sealed records shall be destroyed. Each agency and official named in the order shall seal the records in its custody as directed by the order, shall advise the court of its compliance, and, after advising the court, shall seal the copy of the court's order that was received." (§ 786, subd. (a)(1)-(3).)
The statute further provides that the sealing of records held by an entity is not limited to the court or law enforcement public agencies. Section 786, subdivision (e)(2), provides: "An individual who has a record that is eligible to be sealed under this section may ask the court to order the sealing of a record pertaining to the case that is in the custody of a public agency other than a law enforcement agency, the probation department, or the Department of Justice, and the court may grant the request and order that the public agency record be sealed if the court determines that sealing the additional record will promote the successful reentry and rehabilitation of the individual." (Italics added.)
Effective January 1, 2016, subdivision (e)(1) of section 786 provides: "The court may, in making its order to seal the record and dismiss the instant petition pursuant to this section, include an order to seal a record relating to, or to dismiss, any prior petition or petitions that have been filed or sustained against the individual and that appear to the satisfaction of the court to meet the sealing and dismissal criteria otherwise described in this section." (Stats. 2015, ch. 368, § 1.)
Interpretation of section 786 presents a question of law subject to independent review on appeal. (See In re Clarissa H. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 120, 125.) " ' "As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task is to determine the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose." ' " (People v. Moreno (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 934, 939; People v. Cole (2006) 38 Cal.4th 964, 974.) "We examine the statutory language, and give it a plain and commonsense meaning. . . . If the statutory language is unambiguous, then the plain meaning controls." (People v. Moreno, supra, at p. 939; see People v. Cole, supra, at p. 975.) In other words, if there is "no ambiguity or uncertainty in the language, the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said," and it is not necessary to "resort to legislative history to determine the statute's true meaning." (People v. Cochran (2002) 28 Cal.4th 396, 400-401; accord, People v. Toney (2004) 32 Cal.4th 228, 232.)
We agree with the parties that by its express language, the statute allows judicial discretion as to whether records held by a public agency and related to a dismissed petition should be sealed. We also agree with the parties by the statute's plain language, a public school is a "public agency" within the meaning of section 786, subdivision (e)(2). (See Gov. Code, § 53050 ["The term 'public agency,' as used in this article, means a district, public authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision or public corporation in the state, but does not include the state or a county, city and county, or city."]; Hovd v. Hayward Unified Sch. Dist. (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 470, 472 [vocational skills center was not "public agency" within meaning of Government Code section 53051 requiring public agencies to file certain information with Secretary of State and county clerk, since it was a subdivision of a district].)
Indeed, Government Code section 54999.1, subdivision (e), defines " '[p]ublic agency' " as "the United States or any of its agencies, the state or any of its agencies, the California State University, the Regents of the University of California, a county, a county office of education, a city, a school district, community college district, or any other district, a public authority, or any other political subdivision or public corporation of this state." (See Gov. Code, § 5956.3 [defining " 'governmental agency' " as "a city, county, city and county, including a chartered city or county, school district, community college district, public district, county board of education, joint powers authority, transportation commission or authority, or any other public or municipal corporation"].)
Furthermore, our Supreme Court has recognized that "[t]he public schools of this state are a matter of statewide rather than local or municipal concern; their establishment, regulation and operation are covered by the Constitution and the state Legislature is given comprehensive powers in relation thereto." (Hall v. City of Taft (1956) 47 Cal.2d 177, 179.) Citing a number of cases dating back to 1922, the court in Hall expressly held that "[s]chool districts are agencies of the state for the local operation of the state school system." (Id. at p. 181.)
Based on the plain language of section 786 and the above statutory and case law, a public school is a public agency within the meaning of section 786. Therefore, the juvenile court was required to exercise its discretion under section 786 to determine whether sealing minor's school records would promote his rehabilitation, and a failure to do so was an abuse of discretion. (Sanford v. Rasnick (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1133 [the failure to exercise discretion is an abuse of discretion]; People v. Orabuena (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 84, 99-100 [same].)
In the present matter, the juvenile court did not exercise its discretion under section 786, subdivision (e)(2), because it incorrectly believed a school was not a public agency within the meaning of section 786. (See Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 393 ["[A] reasoned decision based on the reasonable view of the scope of discretion is still an abuse of judicial discretion when it starts from a mistaken premise . . ."].) " 'Failure to exercise a discretion conferred and compelled by law constitutes a denial of a fair hearing and a deprivation of fundamental procedural rights, and thus requires reversal. [Citations.]' " (Fletcher v. Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 386, 392, quoting People v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298, 306.) If the record shows that a trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion, then we must remand for an informed exercise of the power. (People v. Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 944; People v. Benevides (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 728, 735 [when a trial court's failure to exercise its discretion is based on a mistaken belief regarding its authority to do so, the appropriate relief on appeal is to remand so that the trial court may exercise its discretion], disapproved of on another ground in People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374.)
Although minor recognizes that the juvenile court's authority under section 786 is discretionary, he nonetheless argues that on remand we should order the juvenile court to seal his school records because it would be in the best interest of his rehabilitation and the legislative purpose of the statute. However, where a lower court's ruling rests on erroneous legal grounds, "the prudent course is to remand the matter[.]" (In re Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 145, 167.) "[A]ppellate courts do not have the power to substitute their discretion for that of the trial court or to direct the trial court to exercise its discretion to dismiss [or seal records]." (People v. Benevides, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 735.) Divesting the juvenile court of its discretionary power under section 786 by ordering it to seal the records is improper because " '[w]e cannot foreclose the possibility that further information was available, but not presented, at the time the [juvenile] court ruled upon the motion.' " (In re Charlisse C., supra, at p. 167, quoting People v. Calderon (1994) 9 Cal.4th 69, 81.)
Based on the foregoing, we will remand the matter to allow the juvenile court to exercise its discretion and make a factual determination in the first instance regarding whether sealing minor's school records relating to his juvenile court proceedings will promote minor's reentry and rehabilitation.
II
DISPOSITION
The order denying minor's request to seal his school records relating to his juvenile court proceedings is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
P. J. We concur: HOLLENHORST
J. McKINSTER
J.