Opinion
H045246
07-10-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LORENZO ARTEAGA, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. 17CR02629)
Defendant Lorenzo Arteaga appeals from an order finding that he was not competent to stand trial and authorizing the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication. (Pen. Code, § 1370, subd. (a)(2).) He contends: (1) the trial court erred in committing him for a maximum term of four years and six months; and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the authorization of involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication. We modify the order to specify that the maximum term of commitment is three years. As modified, the order is affirmed.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless stated otherwise.
I. Statement of the Case
On May 3, 2017, defendant was charged by felony complaint with leaving the scene of an accident causing serious bodily injury or death (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a) - count 1) and driving with a suspended license based upon a prior driving under the influence conviction (Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd. (a) - count 2). As to count 1, the complaint alleged that defendant had suffered 11 prior convictions for lewd or lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14, which are strikes under section 667, subdivisions (b)-(i).
The following day, defendant waived his right to counsel under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806. He subsequently filed a demurrer to the complaint, which was denied.
On July 10, 2017, defendant filed a motion to recuse the trial court (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 170.1, 170.6). He asserted that the trial court, the district attorney, a deputy district attorney, county counsel, and a private investigator were part of a conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights. Four days later, the trial court stayed determination of the recusal motion, declared a doubt as to defendant's competency, suspended proceedings under section 1368, and appointed Dr. Thomas Reidy to evaluate defendant. The trial court also ordered the South Bay Conditional Release Program to evaluate defendant and recommend whether he should be required to undergo outpatient treatment or commitment to a mental health facility.
On July 31, 2017, Dr. Reidy's evaluation was filed. Dr. Reidy concluded that defendant was not competent to stand trial.
About a week later, the trial court appointed counsel for defendant. At trial counsel's request, the trial court appointed Dr. Gregory Katz to evaluate defendant.
On September 7, 2017, the trial court ordered Drs. Reidy and Katz to reevaluate defendant based on trial counsel's statement that defendant was now willing to speak with them.
A week later, the Harper Medial Group, which was the representative of the South Bay Conditional Release Program, filed an assessment in which it was recommended that defendant be committed to the Department of State Hospitals for placement in a trial competency program.
Dr. Reidy completed a second evaluation in which he concluded defendant was not competent for trial purposes and lacked the capacity to make decisions regarding the need for psychiatric medication.
The preliminary hearing was held on October 2, 2017. Defendant was removed from the courtroom due to his disruption of the proceedings. Following the hearing, the trial court held defendant to answer on the charges
Three weeks later, the trial court found defendant incompetent to stand trial and ordered him transferred to a state hospital until his competency was restored. The trial court ordered that the commitment would not exceed four years and six months. The trial court also authorized the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication.
II. Statement of Facts
The statement of facts is based on the preliminary hearing transcript.
On May 1, 2017, Officer Jeffery Auldridge was dispatched to the scene of a traffic collision involving a vehicle and a pedestrian. The victim subsequently died. Robert Alvarez, a witness, did not see the accident, but heard a "thump." As Alvarez approached the victim, he saw the driver, who was later identified as defendant, climb out of the window of his vehicle, walk back towards the victim, and stand by her. Alvarez also heard defendant say, "what the fuck . . . ." When Alvarez heard sirens, defendant climbed back into his car and left.
As Officer Dustin Ross was driving to the scene, he saw defendant's vehicle and performed a traffic stop. After defendant crawled out of the driver's side window, the officer detained him. Defendant seemed frantic and was speaking in a rapid manner. He told the officer that he had called 911 and later said that he was going to get a battery.
A tape of defendant's 911 call was entered into evidence. Defendant's license was suspended when the accident occurred.
III. Discussion
A. Maximum Term
Defendant contends, and the Attorney General concedes, that the trial court erred when it committed him to a state hospital for a maximum term of four years and six months.
Section 1370, subdivision (c)(1) provides in relevant part: "At the end of three years from the date of commitment or a period of commitment equal to the maximum term of imprisonment provided by law for the most serious offense charged in the information . . . , whichever is shorter, . . . a defendant who has not recovered mental competence shall be returned to the committing court." Here, since the maximum term on the charged offense was four years and six months, the applicable maximum term was three years. Thus, the order setting the maximum term for the restoration of competency must be modified to three years.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant next contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's order authorizing the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication.
1. Background
When Dr. Reidy attempted to interview defendant in July 2017, defendant became agitated, refused to speak to him, made "loud unintelligible comments about 'criminal court of appeal' . . . ." Defendant also claimed that he "had just talked to two real doctors." Dr. Reidy noted that the jail mental health staff described defendant on May 3, 2017, as "delusional based on comments about having chips put in his teeth in 1960 and was being experimented upon." Defendant told them that he had been at Atascadero State Hospital for eight years, though records indicated that he had spent approximately two years at the hospital. Defendant also "made other tangential and loosely organized comments about confidential legal work and the Constitution" and was described as "odd" and "not a good historian." Jail mental health staff again contacted defendant on May 14, 2017. At that time, defendant displayed paranoid behavior, exhibited tangential speech and delusional thinking, and refused medication and treatment efforts by jail staff. Defendant believed that the trial court, the district attorney, and an investigator were conspiring against him and read his materials. The prosecutor informed Dr. Reidy that defendant displayed "disorganized, bizarre, and paranoid behavior during court proceedings."
Based on his exchange with defendant, the jail mental health records, and information provided by the prosecutor, Dr. Reidy diagnosed defendant with psychosis not otherwise specified and concluded that he was not competent for trial purposes. Dr. Reidy also concluded that defendant would "require psychiatric medications to restore competency. So far he has refused medication. If he does not comply, I would not consider him to have the capacity to make decisions regarding the need for psychiatric medication due to impaired mental status. The potential benefits of medication . . . outweigh any potential side effects."
In August 2017, Dr. Katz conducted his evaluation of defendant. When defendant refused to leave his jail cell for his interview with Dr. Katz, Dr. Katz interviewed him in his cell. Defendant was "marginally groomed . . . , disheveled, lying in bed with no shirt or shorts, covered with a blanket." He was "pressured in speech, rambling, tangential, difficult to interrupt. He refused to speak with [Dr. Katz], repeatedly stating he had filed a 'habeas corpus', and rambled about the Court of Appeals." Dr. Katz's repeated attempts to discuss the court proceedings or to gain his cooperation were not successful.
Dr. Katz also summarized the comments of the jail mental health staff, which were included in Dr. Reidy's evaluation. Dr. Katz further noted that defendant denied the need for mental health treatment and was not willing to take psychotropic medication. Dr. Katz opined that defendant was not competent to stand trial. Dr. Katz also stated: "The defendant exhibits poor insight, grossly impaired reality testing and judgment. Therefore he would be unable to rationally weigh the risks and benefits and make well-reasoned decisions related to the administration of antipsychotic medications. Psychotropic medication is likely to restore the defendant to mental competence, and would be the only reasonable alternative effective treatment for his current mental state. Alternative treatments alone are unlikely to have any significant impact on his mental competence. Of course, there are likely side effects from the administration of antipsychotic medications, but there are no reasonable alternative interventions which would positively impact his mental competence."
In mid-September 2017, the Harper Medical Group filed an evaluation of defendant's mental health and the appropriate treatment option. The evaluation summarized the reports by Drs. Reidy and Katz and concluded that defendant was not an appropriate candidate for outpatient treatment. This conclusion was based on the "predominance of a serious mental disorder" when the alleged offense was committed and his current serious psychiatric disorder. The evaluation further noted that defendant did not accept his illness and need for treatment, had a history of substance abuse, and his sex offense convictions were "significant risk factors for future dangerousness and noncompliance with an outpatient competency program." The evaluators recommended that defendant be committed to the Department of State Hospitals.
After defense counsel informed the trial court that defendant was now willing to speak with Drs. Katz and Reidy, the trial court ordered another evaluation by these experts. Dr. Reidy conducted an evaluation. Defendant carried a large box of records to the interview. However, when he saw Dr. Reidy, he stated, "I don't want to see no fucking doctor." Dr. Reidy summarized information from his prior report. He also noted defendant continued to refuse medication and wanted no contact with mental health services. Dr. Reidy again found defendant incompetent to stand trial. Dr. Reidy also opined that defendant did not have "the capacity to make decisions regarding the need for psychiatric medication due to impaired mental status. The potential benefits of medication, including restoration to competency, outweigh any potential side effects."
The record does not include a second evaluation by Dr. Katz. --------
About a month later, the hearing was held on defendant's competency and the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication. During this hearing, the trial court repeatedly admonished defendant to remain quiet. The parties submitted the matter on the reports of Drs. Reidy and Katz. Defense counsel argued that defendant had previously been medicated "with no effect" and thus the medication order was not necessary. After defendant continued to interrupt the proceedings, the trial court ordered that he be removed. The trial court stated: "In any event, the doctors have recommended that he take medication. He's not, at this point, competent to make decisions regarding medication. His condition requires him to improve. And if he doesn't take medication, it's likely it would be detrimental to his mental health . . . ." The trial court also concurred with the prosecutor's statement that "the observations that we've all made when he's in court, I think all support the Court's ultimate ruling that he's incompetent." The prosecutor also submitted the issue of medication on the recommendation of the Harper Medical Group. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ordered the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication.
2. Analysis
An appellate court reviews the trial court's order authorizing the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication for substantial evidence. (People v. Lameed (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 381, 397.) Under this standard, an appellate court reviews "the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value . . . ." (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.)
A trial court has three distinct avenues for authorizing the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(2)(B)(i).) The issue in the present case is whether there was sufficient evidence to meet the requirements of subsection (I) of section 1370, subdivision (a)(2)(B)(i): (1) "[t]he defendant lacks capacity to make decisions regarding antipsychotic medication," (2) "the defendant's mental disorder requires medical treatment with antipsychotic medication," and (3) "if the defendant's mental disorder is not treated with antipsychotic medication, it is probable that serious harm to the physical or mental health of the patient will result." (§ 1370, subd. (a)(2)(B)(i)(I).)
Defendant argues that there was no evidence that he lacked the capacity to make decisions about medication. He argues that "[t]he experts did not have any specific information about his ability to understand and weigh the benefits of the medication because they had no discussions with [him] on the subject." Thus, he reasons that their "conclusions on this point were nothing more than the equivalent of an assumption that if someone is mentally ill and does not want to take medication, they must lack the capacity to make decisions regarding that medication." He also points out that there was no evidence that he had a significant psychotic break or that his mental illness was connected to his offense.
Defendant has overlooked the evidence supporting the trial court's order. Defendant was diagnosed with psychosis not otherwise specified. He made unintelligible comments, exhibited delusional thinking, and displayed paranoid behavior. His insight was poor and he showed "grossly impaired reality testing and judgment." He also did "not accept his mental illness and need for treatment." Defendant argues that this evidence related to restoring his mental competence, which was irrelevant to a determination of whether he had the capacity to make medical decisions. There is no merit to this argument. The experts were relying on defendant's statements and behavior in determining not only his mental competency but also his ability to make a rational decision about treatment with antipsychotic medication.
As to the second requirement, there was substantial evidence that defendant's mental disorder required treatment with antipsychotic medication. Defendant was diagnosed as psychotic. His medical records and behavior in jail and in the courtroom supported this diagnosis. Dr. Reidy concluded that "[t]he potential benefits of medication, including restoration to competency, outweigh any potential side effects." According to Dr. Katz, antipsychotic medication was "the only reasonable alternative effective treatment for [defendant's] current mental state." Thus, the evidence provided by these experts established that medication was necessary to restore defendant's mental health.
Defendant argues that the evidence only established that treatment with antipsychotic medications was necessary to restore him to competency, not that his mental illness required such treatment. However, implicit in the experts' opinions that medication would restore defendant's competence was that defendant's mental illness required treatment to mitigate his symptoms.
Defendant also argues that though "there is evidence that he is mentally ill, . . . there is no medical evidence that he is suffering significant problems as a result of that mental illness." The record does not support this argument. As previously stated, some of defendant's comments were unintelligible, his thinking was delusional, and his insight was poor. He also displayed paranoid behavior. Moreover, defendant was unable to control his symptoms either in jail or in the courtroom. This evidence established that he was suffering significant problems due to his mental illness.
As to the third requirement under section 1370, subdivision (a)(2)(B)(i)(I), defendant contends that there was no evidence that he would suffer serious harm without the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication.
As required by the statute, "[p]robability of serious harm to the physical or mental health of the defendant requires evidence that the defendant is presently suffering adverse effects to his or her physical or mental health, or the defendant has previously suffered these effects as a result of a mental disorder and his or her condition is substantially deteriorating. The fact that a defendant has a diagnosis of a mental disorder does not alone establish probability of serious harm to the physical or mental health of the defendant." (§ 1370, subd. (a)(2)(B)(i)(I).) Here, the trial court's finding was not based solely on defendant's diagnosis. There was substantial evidence that defendant was presently suffering adverse effects, such as delusions, paranoia, pressured speech, and an inability to control his behavior, as a result of his mental disorder. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support the finding that defendant would suffer serious harm without the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication.
In sum, there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's order.
IV. Disposition
The order is modified to specify that defendant's maximum term of commitment for restoration of competency is three years. As modified, the order is affirmed.
/s/_________
Mihara, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
Greenwood, P. J. /s/_________
Elia, J.