red in a foreign jurisdiction and the underlying offense has all of the essential elements of a violent felony if it had occurred in New York. It is well settled that foreign convictions have the "same force and effect in New York that [they] would have where entered" when assessing whether a defendant is subject to multiple offender status (People v Kuey, 83 NY2d 278, 284 [1994]). In New York, a prior adjudication as a youthful offender โ whether it occurred in New York or another jurisdiction โ cannot serve as the basis for multiple offender sentencing provided the foreign youthful offender adjudication is similar to and consistent with New York's youthful offender treatment (see People v Carpenteur, 21 NY2d 571 [1968]; cf Kuey, 83 NY2d 278). New York courts, however, have declined to retroactively assign youthful offender status to underlying convictions of foreign jurisdictions even though, had the crimes been committed in New York, such consideration could have been granted (see People v Arroyo, 179 AD2d 393, 394 [1st Dept 1992]; People v Coolbaugh, 259 AD2d 781, 782 [3d Dept 1999]). In People v Treadwell, the Appellate Division accurately observed, "mere speculation that defendant might have been accorded youthful offender treatment had the offense been committed in New York, where such treatment was not and could not have been accorded by the jurisdiction in which the crime was actually committed, cannot preclude the use of such a conviction as a predicate felony" (80 AD2d 697, 698 [3d Dept 1981]).
In New York, a prior adjudication as a youthful offenderโwhether it occurred in New York or another jurisdictionโcannot serve as the basis for multiple offender sentencing provided the foreign youthful offender adjudication is similar to and consistent with New York's youthful offender treatment ( see People v. Carpenteur, 21 N.Y.2d 571, 289 N.Y.S.2d 615, 236 N.E.2d 850 [1968];cf. Kuey, 83 N.Y.2d 278, 609 N.Y.S.2d 568, 631 N.E.2d 574). New York courts, however, have declined to retroactively assign youthful offender status to underlying convictions of foreign jurisdictions even though, had the crimes been committed in New York, such consideration could have been granted ( see People v. Arroyo, 179 A.D.2d 393, 394, 577 N.Y.S.2d 843 [1st Dept.1992]; People v. Coolbaugh, 259 A.D.2d 781, 782, 687 N.Y.S.2d 737 [3d Dept.1999] ). In People v. Treadwell, the Appellate Division accurately observed, โmere speculation that defendant might have been accorded youthful offender treatment had the offense been committed in New York, where such treatment was not and could not have been accorded by the jurisdiction in which the crime was actually committed, cannot preclude the use of such a conviction as a predicate felonyโ (80 A.D.2d 697, 698, 436 N.Y.S.2d 457 [3d Dept.1981] ).
"[I]t is well settled that '[w]here youthful offender treatment is not accorded in a foreign jurisdiction, the fact that the defendant would have been eligible for youthful offender treatment had the offense been committed in New York does not preclude the use of such conviction in New York as a predicate felony for enhanced sentencing'" ( People v Coolbaugh, 259 AD2d 781, 782, quoting People v Arroyo, 179 AD2d 393, 394, lv denied 79 NY2d 997; see People v Treadwell, 80 AD2d 697, 698).
Notwithstanding the failure to preserve this issue for our review ( see, CPL 470.05), were we to review the merits thereof, we would conclude that the crimes are similarly defined. Concerning defendant's final contention, we note that it is well settled that "[w]here youthful offender treatment is not accorded in a foreign jurisdiction, the fact that the defendant would have been eligible for youthful offender treatment had the offense been committed in New York does not preclude the use of such conviction in New York as a predicate felony for enhanced sentencing" ( People v. Arroyo, 179 A.D.2d 393, 394, lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 997; see, People v. Hamilton, 104 A.D.2d 1048). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment in its entirety.
The court properly resentenced the defendant as a second felony offender, since youthful offender status in Florida deals with the conditions of the sentence to be imposed and does not vitiate the underlying conviction for a felony (see, Fla Stat Annot, tit 47, ยง 958.04; People v Kuey, 186 A.D.2d 684; People v Arroyo, 179 A.D.2d 393; People v Elliott, 99 Misc.2d 794). In addition, the defendant's age at the time of the Florida offense would have rendered him ineligible for youthful offender status under the laws of this State (see, CPL 720.
To the extent that prior decisions of this Court hold to the contrary (see, e.g., People v Sykes, 150 A.D.2d 627), they are hereby overruled. We have examined the defendant's remaining arguments, including those raised in his supplemental pro se brief, and find them to be without merit (People v Hunt, 162 A.D.2d 782, 783, affd 78 N.Y.2d 932; People v Arroyo, 179 A.D.2d 393; People v Elliott, 99 Misc.2d 794). Mangano, P.J., Thompson, Rosenblatt and Copertino, JJ., concur.