Opinion
F085240
12-07-2023
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CARLOS RUBEN ARREDONDO, Defendant and Appellant.
Kathy Moreno, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez and Amanda D. Cary, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County No. SC063493A. Charles R. Brehmer, Judge.
Kathy Moreno, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez and Amanda D. Cary, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
THE COURT [*]
INTRODUCTION
In 1997, a jury convicted appellant Carlos Ruben Arredondo of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1). The jury found true that appellant used a deadly or dangerous weapon, a knife, during the commission of the crime (§ 12022, subd. (b)), and this murder occurred during a burglary or its attempt (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). Appellant was also convicted of three other felonies: (1) first degree burglary (§ 460, subd. (a); count 3); (2) unlawfully taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 4); and (3) arson to a structure (§ 451, subd. (c); count 5).
All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
In 1998, appellant was sentenced to prison for life without the possibility of parole for the murder, plus one year for the use of a deadly weapon.
In March 2022, appellant filed a petition for resentencing in the trial court, claiming he could no longer be convicted of murder based on subsequent changes in the law. The trial court denied the petition.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred. We reject appellant's arguments and affirm.
BACKGROUND
The current record is sparse regarding the facts underlying appellant's crimes, which were committed in 1995. The criminal complaint in this matter was filed against appellant in 1995. It alleged that he committed special circumstance murder when he killed the victim during a burglary. The complaint alleged that appellant had premeditated this murder, and he had used a knife.
In 2022, the trial court appointed counsel to represent appellant after he filed his petition for resentencing. A briefing schedule was set. The prosecutor filed a written opposition to the petition.
Citing to the reporter's transcript, the prosecutor's written opposition set forth the following facts for the court. The prosecutor asserted that appellant had been the actual killer who had stabbed the victim to death. The victim had received 11 stab wounds. Days after being stabbed to death, her body was discovered when her bedroom was set on fire and emergency personnel responded. The victim's body was found badly burned. An accelerant had been used to start this fire.
According to the prosecutor's written opposition, appellant had admitted to law enforcement prior to trial that he had strangled the victim and he had struck her face when she had threatened to call the police on him. Appellant had signed a written statement indicating he had stabbed the victim. He admitted returning to the victim's house and starting the fire.
In reaching our holding that the trial court did not err, we do not rely on these hearsay assertions.
In November 2022, the trial court met with the parties regarding appellant's petition to be resentenced. Appellant appeared via a streaming video service. The court ruled that appellant was ineligible for resentencing, and it denied the petition. The defense did not offer any argument or other support to demonstrate why the petition should be granted.
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court did not Err in Denying the Petition for Resentencing.
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.). This amended both the felony-murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708 (Strong).) Senate Bill No. 1437 also added section 1170.95, now renumbered as section 1172.6. This created a procedural mechanism for those convicted under the former law to seek retroactive relief under the law as amended. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); Strong, at p. 708; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).)
In general, the following three conditions are required for a person to seek resentencing under section 1172.6:
(1) A complaint, information or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of murder liability that is now invalid (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1));
(2) Following a trial or the acceptance of a plea offer in lieu of a trial, the petitioner was convicted of manslaughter, murder, or attempted murder (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(2)); and
(3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder "because of changes" brought by Senate Bill No. 1437 (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3)).
An offender seeking resentencing must file a petition in the sentencing court and serve it on statutorily enumerated persons. Among other requirements, the petition must include a declaration from the petitioner that he is eligible for relief based on the three conditions summarized above. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A)-(C).)
Once a petition meets the initial filing requirements, a briefing schedule is set. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) After the parties have had an opportunity to submit briefs, the trial court must hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing for relief, the court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. The prosecution then bears the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is guilty of murder (or its attempt) under the law as amended by Senate Bill No. 1437. (Ibid.; see also People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 869.)
Our high court holds that, when a petitioner files a facially sufficient petition, the trial court must appoint counsel to represent the petitioner. The trial court may consider the record of conviction to determine whether the petitioner makes a prima facie showing only after the appointment of counsel and the opportunity for briefing has occurred. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957.) At the prima facie hearing, the court must take the petitioner's factual allegations as true. However, if the record contains facts refuting the allegations made in the petition, the court may deny the petition without issuing an order to show cause. (Id. at p. 971.) A petition may be denied when the record of conviction conclusively establishes-with no factfinding, weighing of evidence, or credibility determinations-that the defendant was the actual killer. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971; People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843; People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14-15.) Even if convicted under the felony-murder rule, the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing if he was the actual killer. (§§ 188, subd. (a), 189, subd. (e)(1), 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).)
People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th 830 was abrogated in part on another ground in Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2, which amended section 1172.6, subdivision (g), to expressly allow defendants whose convictions are not final to seek relief under Senate Bill No. 1437 on direct appeal.
In the present matter, appellant claims the trial court erred in denying his petition for resentencing without issuing an order to show cause and conducting an evidentiary hearing. Appellant argues that the jury never made a specific finding that he was the actual killer. He acknowledges that the jury found true that he personally used a knife. However, he asserts that he may have only used the knife "to threaten the victim when robbing her." He contends this record does not conclusively demonstrate that he acted alone in killing the victim. He asks this court to remand this matter so that an evidentiary hearing may be conducted.
Appellant relies primarily on two opinions: (1) People v. Cooper (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 106 and (2) People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588. He cites these opinions for the proposition that a jury's true finding regarding the personal use of a weapon does not preclude resentencing relief under section 1172.6. These opinions do not assist appellant.
In People v. Cooper, the defendant and another man were charged with murdering a pregnant woman, and the defendant pleaded no contest to one count of second degree murder. (People v. Cooper, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 108.) The primary issue on appeal was whether the defendant had a right to counsel when he filed a petition for resentencing. (Id. at p. 115.) The appellate court held that the trial court had committed prejudicial error when it denied the defendant's petition without first appointing him legal counsel. (Id. at p. 123.) The trial court further erred when it relied on the transcript of the preliminary hearing to deny the petition without first receiving briefing from the parties. (Id. at p. 124.) The appellate court concluded that, given the lack of clarity as to the defendant's role in this killing, the trial court had impermissibly conducted fact finding when it summarily denied the petition. (Ibid.) The error in failing to appoint counsel was prejudicial because it prevented the defendant from developing the record to demonstrate potential entitlement to relief. (Id. at p. 126.)
In People v. Offley, multiple perpetrators were involved in killing the victim, and it was unclear whether the two defendants on appeal had held their own malice. (See People v. Offley, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 598, 600.) For one defendant, it was insufficient that the jury had found true that he had personally discharged a firearm that caused great bodily injury or death. Instead, such a finding did not also establish a malice to kill. (Id. at p. 597.) The appellate court could not rule out the possibility that the jury had relied on the natural and probable consequences doctrine in convicting the first defendant. (Id. at p. 599.) Likewise, the second defendant had a firearm enhancement imposed against him that was based merely on a principal discharging it, which did not show that the second defendant had played a direct role in killing the victim. (Id. at p. 600.)
We reject appellant's arguments and hold that the trial court did not err. The court appointed legal counsel to represent appellant regarding his petition, and the parties were afforded an opportunity to submit briefing before the court ruled. The record of conviction amply established that appellant was ineligible for resentencing. Appellant's jury was neither instructed on principles of aiding and abetting, nor on accomplice liability. The jury was never instructed that appellant could be guilty of murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Instead, the jury was instructed it could find appellant guilty of first degree murder either because appellant premeditated this killing, or because he killed the victim while intending to commit a burglary.
The jury found true that appellant personally used a knife during the commission of first degree murder, and it found true that appellant committed this murder during the commission of a burglary. The jury instructions given in this matter, along with the verdicts and true findings, overwhelmingly demonstrate that the jury did not impute malice to appellant. Instead, he was the direct perpetrator of the crimes which left the victim dead. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the petition for resentencing without conducting an evidentiary hearing. A remand is not appropriate and this claim fails.
DISPOSITION
The trial court's order denying the resentencing petition is affirmed.
[*] Before Levy, Acting P. J., Pena, J. and Snauffer, J.