The defendants' remaining contentions are not properly before the Court at this time ( see, CPL 470.15; People v. Armstrong, 237 A.D.2d 452). Joy, J. P., Krausman, Florio and McGinity, JJ., concur.

The sentences imposed on the remaining counts were not excessive (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80). The defendant's remaining contentions, including those raised in his supplemental pro se brief, are either not properly before this Court on appeal (see, People v. Bachert, 69 N.Y.2d 593; People v. Armstrong, 237 A.D.2d 452; People v. Grossfeld, 216 A.D.2d 319), or are without merit. O'Brien, J.P., Copertino, Thompson and Krausman, JJ., concur.

To the extent the defense seeks to expand the record through an evidentiary hearing to explore the trial strategy of defense counsel regarding the fingerprint expert, that is properly done, if at all, in a CPL 440.10 proceeding, should the defense be so advised to pursue it. CPL 330.30 (1), by its terms, limits judicial inquiry to matters of record. See, People v. Wolf, 98 NY2d 105, 119 (2002); 98 NY2d 105, 119 (2002); People v. Jackson, 19 AD3d 614 [2nd Dept 2005]; People v. Wells, 265 AD2d 588 [ 2nd Dept. 1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 886 (2000); People v. Armstrong, 237 AD2d 452 [2nd Dept 1997]; People v. Nieves, 144 AD2d 588, [2nd Dept 1988], lv denied 73 NY2d 924 (1989); compare People v. Satterfield, 66 NY2d 796 (1985). In my view, neither the ineffective assistance claim presently made nor any asserted errors in the prosecutor's summation undermine the Court's confidence in the jury's verdict nor would these claims require an appellate court to reverse or modify this judgment as a matter of law.

Defendant's present motion must be premised on a ground that appears in the record and that, if raised on appeal, would require reversal as a matter of law (CPL 330.30). Insofar as he seeks recall of the guilty verdict on the ground that a statutorily specified consequence of an as-yet-to-be-imposed sentence is, for him, too harsh, his application is procedurally defective ( see People v. Morgan, 271 AD2d 248 [1st Dept 2000]; People v. Armstrong, 237 AD2d 452 [2d Dept 1997]; People v. Grossfeld, 216 AD2d 319 [2d Dept 1995]; and see People v. Williams, 305 AD2d 804 [3d Dept 2003]). Turning to the legal issues he raises, whether the proof establishes that this defendant was actually "aware" that the incident caused personal injury, i.e., injury to a person as opposed to an animal or to property, is not dispositive ( cf. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 600, [2]; § 601; and see People v. Smith, 288 AD2d 629 [3d Dept 2001]).

Defendant's present motion must be premised on a ground that appears in the record and that, if raised on appeal, would require reversal as a matter of law (CPL 330.30). Insofar as he seeks recall of the guilty verdict on the ground that a statutorily specified consequence of an as-yet-to-be-imposed sentence is, for him, too harsh, his application is procedurally defective ( see People v. Morgan, 271 AD2d 248 [1st Dept 2000]; People v. Armstrong, 237 AD2d 452 [2d Dept 1997]; People v. Grossfeld, 216 AD2d 319 [2d Dept 1995]; and see People v. Williams, 305 AD2d 804 [3d Dept 2003]). Turning to the legal issues he raises, whether the proof establishes that this defendant was actually "aware" that the incident caused personal injury, i.e., injury to a person as opposed to an animal or to property, is not dispositive ( cf. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 600, [2]; § 601; and see People v. Smith, 288 AD2d 629 [3d Dept 2001]).