Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court No. 06HF0820 of Orange County, William Lee Evans, Judge. Affirmed.
Lauren E. Eskenazi, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey J. Koch and Scott Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MOORE, J.
OPINION
Defendant appeals his conviction for petty theft with a prior related to the theft of two boxes of blank checks from a home owner’s patio. Defendant’s sole contention is that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for petty theft as an aider and abettor. We disagree and affirm.
I
FACTS
As of January 2006, defendant and his girlfriend, Gretchen Strickland, had been dating for approximately six months. They earned money by canvassing Orange County neighborhoods for work painting house numbers on street curbs.
Corona del Mar resident Kris Carnahan had reordered checks from her bank on January 16. At the time, her mailbox was attached to the garage, and not inside her gated front courtyard, which was usually locked. Carnahan never received the checks.
In late January or early February, Carnahan’s bank informed her that her account was overdrawn, and she made a police report. Subsequent investigation revealed that two of the missing checks had been cashed. One check was made out to defendant for $325 and personally cashed by him. The second check was for $780 and was deposited, minus a cash withdrawal, to an account in defendant’s name. Although both checks were barely legible, they were endorsed by defendant, with his driver’s license number used for identification. Bank security camera photographs and defendant’s signature on an earlier signature card at the same bank led to his arrest.
Defendant acknowledged and waived his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, and was interviewed by Newport Beach Police Department Detective William Depweg. During the interview, defendant stated that he and Strickland were canvassing in Carnahan’s neighborhood, attempting to obtain curb-painting work. He was unemployed, living out of a car, and had fallen on “hard times.” Defendant said the boxes of checks were on Carnahan’s patio. Strickland took them, and the two then left the area. He said that he did not take the checks. He admitted cashing and depositing the stolen checks, and after he could no longer cash them, he threw them away. He further admitted knowing the checks were stolen.
Defendant was charged with five counts: petty theft with a prior theft (Pen. Code, §§ 666, 484, subd. (a), 488) (count one); second degree commercial burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (b)) (counts two and four); forgery of a check (§ 470, subd. (d)) (counts three and five). Defendant was also charged with one prior prison term enhancement pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b). At the trial’s conclusion, the jury convicted defendant of all five counts. Defendant was sentenced to a total of two years in state prison and now appeals.
Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.
The separate burglary and forgery counts reflect the passing of each check at a different bank branch on a different occasion.
Defendant’s sentence reflects the middle term of two years on each count. Counts one and four were run concurrent to count two, and counts three and five were stayed pursuant to section 654. The court found the prior conviction true but exercised its discretion to strike the one-year sentence enhancement.
II
DISCUSSION
Defendant’s only claim on appeal is that the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty on count one, petty theft with a prior. The standard of review is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, a rational fact finder could have concluded defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 269.) “Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’ [Citations.]” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) Evidence is substantial when it is of ponderable legal significance, reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value. (People v. Ramsey (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 671, 682.) Further, we do not reassess the credibility of witnesses, and we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence which support the jury’s verdict. (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.) The same standard applies when the conviction rests primarily on circumstantial evidence. (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1124.)
A defendant who aids and abets a crime is equally liable as a principal offender. “[A] person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or she, acting with (1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator; and (2) the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, (3) by act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime.” (People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 561.)
Obviously, the case against defendant on count one was highly circumstantial. We do not, however, as defendant would encourage, dissect isolated bits of the evidence which alone would be insufficient to support the verdict. We examine the evidence as a whole, in light of all the facts and their context. (See People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.)
We have here a defendant who had fallen on hard times and was living out of a car. He and his girlfriend were canvassing Carnahan’s neighborhood, looking for work. They saw the boxes of checks on the patio, took them, and left the area. Subsequently defendant cashed or deposited two of the checks. A jury could reasonably infer that this was a crime of opportunity in which both Strickland and defendant actively participated, regardless of whether defendant physically stole the checks himself. Both he and Strickland were present, and defendant took advantage of the fruits of the theft thereafter by using the stolen checks to obtain cash.
Defendant’s arguments about the lack of direct evidence are simply irrelevant. The jury was entitled to draw logical inferences from the evidence presented. A logical inference, based on the facts taken in context, is that defendant had the requisite criminal intent to aid or encourage Strickland to commit theft. His contradictory statements to the police are also unavailing — the jury was free to find that his statements lacked credibility.
“‘If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment. [Citation.]’” (People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 514.) Taken as a whole, we find the jury’s inferences were reasonable and the evidence was therefore sufficient to support defendant’s conviction on count one.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: O’LEARY, ACTING P. J., IKOLA, J.